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Resumen
Desde la antigu¨edad hasta hoy, el campo de la lo´gica ha ido ganando fuerza y
actualmente contribuye activamente en muchas a´reas distintas, como filosof´ıa,
matema´tica, lingu¨´ıstica, ciencias de la computacio´n, inteligencia artificial, fab-
ricacio´n de hardware, etc. Cada uno de estos escenarios tiene necesidades es-
pec´ıficas, que van desde requerimientos muy concretos, como un me´todo de in-
ferencia eficiente, hasta propiedades teo´ricas ma´s abstractas, como un sistema
axioma´tico elegante. Durante muchos an˜os, los lenguajes cla´sicos (principalmente
la lo´gica de primer orden) eran la alternativa a utilizar, pero esta gran variedad
de aplicaciones hizo que otro tipo de lo´gicas empezaran a resultar atractivas en
muchas situaciones.
Supongamos que llega el momento de elegir una lo´gica para una tarea en
particular. ¿Co´mo podemos decidir cua´l es la ma´s adecuada? ¿Que´ propiedades
deber´ıamos buscar? ¿Co´mo podemos “medir” una lo´gica con respecto a otras?
E´stas no son preguntas sencillas, y no hay una receta general que uno pueda
seguir. En esta tesis vamos a restringir estas cuestiones a una familia de lo´gicas
en particular, y en ese contexto vamos a investigar algunos aspectos teo´ricos que
nos van a ayudar a responder parte de estas inquietudes. Podemos aprender
mucho estudiando casos particularmente interesantes, y nuestra contribucio´n se
va a desarrollar teniendo esa filosof´ıa en mente.
Las lo´gicas modales proposicionales ofrecen una alternativa a los lenguajes
tradicionales. Pueden ser pensadas como un conjunto de herramientas que per-
miten disen˜ar lo´gicas espec´ıficamente construidas para una tarea en particular,
posibilitando tener un control fino en su expresividad. Ma´s au´n, las lo´gicas
modales resultaron tener un buen comportamiento computacional que probo´ ser
bastante robusto frente a extensiones. Estas caracter´ısticas, entre otras, ubicaron
a las lo´gicas modales como una alternativa atractiva con respecto a los lenguajes
cla´sicos.
En este trabajo vamos a presentar una nueva familia de lo´gicas modales lla-
mada memory logics. Las lo´gicas modales tradicionales posibilitan describir es-
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tructuras relacionales desde una perspectiva local, ¿pero cua´l sera´ el resultado
si permitimos que una fo´rmula cambie la estructura en la que esta´ siendo evalu-
ada? Queremos explorar el efecto de agregar a las lo´gicas modales cla´sicas una
estructura de almacenamiento expl´ıcita, una memoria, que permita modelar com-
portamiento dina´mico a trave´s de operadores que permitan almacenar y recuperar
informacio´n de la memoria. Naturalmente, dependiendo del tipo de estructura
de almacenamiento que utilicemos, y de que´ operadores tengamos disponibles, la
lo´gica resultante va a tener distintas propiedades que valen la pena investigar.
Esta tesis esta´ organizada de la siguiente manera. En el Cap´ıtulo 1 empezamos
dando un breve resumen de co´mo nacieron las lo´gicas modales, mostrando las
diferentes perspectivas con las que histo´ricamente se miro´ a la lo´gica modal.
Luego presentamos formalmente a la lo´gica modal ba´sica, y a un conjunto exten-
dido de operadores que permiten apreciar el “estilo” modal de algunos lenguajes
ma´s ricos. Este cap´ıtulo finaliza con un primer bosquejo de las memory logics,
mostrando co´mo pueden ayudar a modelar la nocio´n de estado cuando fijamos a
un conjunto como estructura de almacenamiento. El cap´ıtulo 2 esta´ dedicado a
presentar a las memory logics con detalle. En dicho cap´ıtulo mostramos algunos
ejemplos que pueden ser descriptos agregando un conjunto a las estructuras rela-
cionales esta´ndar, junto con los operadores usuales sobre conjuntos que permiten
agregar elementos y verificar pertenencia. A continuacio´n mostramos otros oper-
adores sobre conjuntos que pueden ser considerados, y discutimos la posibilidad
de agregar restricciones a la interaccio´n entre los operadores que trabajan sobre
la memoria y los operadores modales. Estas restricciones pueden ser pensadas
como una manera de lograr un control ma´s fino en la expresividad. Dado que re-
alizamos cambios en las lo´gicas modales cla´sicas, estamos interesados en analizar
el impacto que esos cambios causaron en las lo´gicas resultantes. Por lo tanto,
el resto del cap´ıtulo presenta un conjunto de herramientas a trave´s de las cuales
analizamos esta nueva familia de lo´gicas. Este conjunto de herramientas puede
verse como un esquema que organiza el resto de la tesis, y que permite analizar
a las memory logics en te´rminos de expresividad, complejidad, interpolacio´n y
teor´ıa de prueba.
El resto de los cap´ıtulos investigan cada uno de estos aspectos en detalle. En
los Cap´ıtulos 3 y 4 exploramos el poder expresivo de varias memory logics y estu-
diamos para cada fragmento la decidibilidad del problema de determinar la satis-
factibilidad de una fo´rmula. En los casos decidibles, determinamos la complejidad
computacional de cada uno. Analizamos el impacto de los diferentes operadores,
su interaccio´n, y tambie´n estudiamos otras estructuras de almacenamiento, como
la pila. Luego, en el Cap´ıtulo 5, analizamos las propiedades de interpolacio´n de
Craig y definibilidad de Beth para algunas memory logics. Tambie´n nos interesa
estudiar a las memory logics desde la perspectiva de la teor´ıa de prueba. En
los Cap´ıtulos 6 y 7 nos volcamos al estudio de axiomatizaciones a` la Hilbert y
sistemas de tableau, y caracterizamos varios fragmentos usando principalmente
te´cnicas utilizadas en lo´gicas h´ıbridas. En el Cap´ıtulo 8 presentamos nuestras
viii
conclusiones, mencionamos algunos problemas abiertos y futuras direcciones de
investigacio´n.
Palabras clave: lo´gica, modal, memoria, expresividad, decidibilidad, axiom-
atizacio´n, interpolacio´n, tableau.
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Abstract
From ancient times to the present day, the field of logic has gained significant
strength and now it actively contributes to many different areas, such as philos-
ophy, mathematics, linguistic, computer science, artificial intelligence, hardware
manufacture, etc. Each of these scenarios has specific needs, that range from
very concrete requirements, like an efficient inference method, to more abstract
theoretical properties, like a neat axiomatic system. Given this wide diversity
of uses, a motley collection of formal languages has been developed. For many
years, classical languages (mainly classical first order logic) were the alternative,
but this assortment of applications made other types of logics also attractive in
many situations.
Imagine that the time for choosing a logic for some specific task arrives. How
can we decide which is the one that fits best? Which properties should we look
for? How can we “measure” a logic with respect to others? These are not easy
questions, and there is not a general recipe one can follow. In this thesis we are
just going to restrict these questions to a particular family of logics, and in that
context we will investigate theoretical aspects that help to answer some of these
concerns. Much can be discovered by carefully analyzing appealing cases, and
our contribution will be developed having that philosophy in mind.
Propositional modal logics offer an alternative to traditional languages. They
can be regarded as a set of tools that allow to design logics specially tailored for
specific tasks, having a fine-grained control on their expressivity. Additionally,
modal logics turned out to have a good computational behavior, which proved
to be quite robust under extensions. These characteristics, among others, placed
modal logics as an attractive alternative to classical languages.
In this dissertation we are going to present a new family of modal logics called
memory logics. Traditional modal logics enable us to describe relational struc-
tures from a local perspective. But what about changing the structure? We want
to explore the addition of an explicit storage structure to modal logics, a mem-
ory, that allows to model dynamic behavior through explicit memory operators.
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These operators store or retrieve information to and from the memory. Natu-
rally, depending on which type of storage structure we want, and which memory
operators are available, the resulting logic will enjoy different properties that are
worth investigating.
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 1 we start by giving a brief recap
of how modal logic was born, showing the different historical perspectives used to
look at modal logic. Then we formally present the basic modal logic and a set of
extended operators that helps grasp the modal “flavor” of some richer languages.
We finish this chapter by giving a first glance of memory logics, and showing how
they can help to model state when we choose to use a set as storage structure.
Chapter 2 is devoted to present memory logics in detail. We show some examples
that can be described by adding a set to standard relational structures, and the
usual set operators to add elements and test membership. We then show some
other memory operators that can be considered, and we discuss the possibility
of adding constraints to the interplay between memory and modal operators.
These constraints can be regarded as a way to have a finer-grained control on
the logic expressivity. Since we have made changes to classical modal logics, we
are interested in analyzing the impact those changes cause in the resulting logics.
Therefore, the rest of this chapter presents a basic logic toolkit through which
we can analyze this new family of logics. This toolkit can be seen as an outline
that organizes the rest of the thesis and that allows to analyze memory logics in
terms of expressivity, complexity, interpolation and proof theory.
The rest of the chapters investigate each of these aspects in detail. In Chap-
ters 3 and 4 we explore the expressive power of several memory logics and we
study the decidability of their satisfiability problem. In the decidable cases, we
determine their computational complexity. We analyze the impact of the differ-
ent memory operators we consider, and how they interact. We also study other
memory containers, such as a stack. Then, in Chapter 5, we analyze Craig inter-
polation and Beth definability for some memory logic fragments. We also study
memory logics from a proof-theoretic perspective. In Chapter 6 and 7 we turn
to Hilbert-style axiomatizations and tableau systems, and we characterize several
fragments of the memory logic family mostly using techniques borrowed from hy-
brid logics. We close in Chapter 8 with some concluding remarks, open problems
and directions for further research.
Keywords: logic, modal, memory, expressivity, decidability, axiomatization,
interpolation, tableau.
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Re´sume´
Depuis l’antiquite´ jusqu’a` aujourd’hui, le domaine de la logique a gagne´ une im-
portance remarquable et contribue de´sormais a` de nombreuses autres branches,
telles que la philosophie, les mathe´matiques, la fabrication de mate´riel infor-
matique, la linguistique, l’informatique, l’intelligence artificielle, etc. A` chacun
de ces sce´narios correspondent des besoins spe´cifiques, qui vont d’exigences tre`s
concre`tes, telles qu’une me´thode d’infe´rence efficace, a` des proprie´te´s the´oriques
plus abstraites, telles qu’un syste`me d’axiomes e´le´gant. E´tant donne´e cette
grande diversite´ d’utilisations, une palette he´te´roclite de langages formels a e´te´
de´veloppe´e. Pendant de nombreuses anne´es, les langages classiques (notamment
la logique du premier ordre) e´taient la seule alternative concevable, mais cet as-
sortiment d’applications a rendu d’autres types de logiques e´galement de´sirables
dans de nombreuses situations.
Imaginez que l’heure de choisir une logique pour une taˆche spe´cifique arrive.
Comment choisir la plus approprie´e? Quelles proprie´te´s devrions-nous rechercher?
Comment “mesurer” une logique par rapport aux autres? Ce sont des questions
difficiles, et il n’existe pas de recette ge´ne´rale a` suivre. Dans cette the`se, nous al-
lons simplement restreindre ces questions a` une famille particulie`re de logiques, et
dans ce contexte, nous explorerons les aspects the´oriques qui aideront a` re´pondre
a` ces pre´occupations. Beaucoup peut eˆtre de´couvert par une analyse attentive
des cas les plus inte´ressants, et notre contribution sera de´veloppe´e selon cette
philosophie.
Les logiques modales propositionnelles offrent une alternative aux langages
traditionnels. Elles peuvent eˆtre conside´re´es comme un ensemble d’outils per-
mettant de concevoir des logiques adapte´es a` des taˆches pre´cises, posse´dant un
controˆle fin sur leur expressivite´. De plus, il s’est ave´re´ que les logiques modales
posse`dent un bon comportement computationnel, qui se trouve eˆtre robuste y
compris malgre´ l’ajout d’extensions. Ces caracte´ristiques, parmi d’autres, ont
e´leve´ les logiques modales au rang d’alternatives de´sirables aux langages clas-
siques.
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Dans ce the`se, nous allons pre´senter une nouvelle famille de logiques modales
appele´e logiques me´morielles. Les logiques modales traditionnelles permettent
de de´crire les structures relationnelles d’un point de vue local. Mais pourquoi
ne pas changer cette structure? Nous voulons e´tudier l’ajout d’une structure de
stockage explicite aux logiques modales, une me´moire, qui permet de mode´liser
un comportement dynamique a` travers des ope´rateurs me´moriels explicites. Ces
ope´rateurs sauvent ou restaurent de l’information vers et a` partir de la me´moire.
Naturellement, selon le type de structure de sauvegarde de´sire´ et les ope´rateurs
me´moriels disponibles, la logique re´sultante posse`dera diffe´rentes proprie´te´s qui
valent la peine d’eˆtre e´tudie´es.
Cette the`se est organise´e de la fac¸on suivante. Dans le Chapitre 1, nous com-
menc¸ons par rappeler brie`vement comment la logique modale est ne´e, en mon-
trant les diffe´rents points de vue historiques la concernant. Puis, nous pre´sentons
formellement la logique modale de base et un ensemble d’ope´rateurs e´tendus qui
aident a` capturer le “gouˆt” modal de langages plus riches. Nous finissons ce
chapitre en donnant un premier aperc¸u des logiques me´morielles, et montrons
comment elles peuvent aider a` mode´liser l’e´tat quand nous choisissons d’utiliser
un ensemble comme une structure de sauvegarde. Le Chapitre 2 est de´die´ a` la
pre´sentation de´taille´e des logiques me´morielles. Nous montrons quelques exemples
qui peuvent eˆtre de´crits en ajoutant un ensemble a` des structures relationnelles
usuelles, ainsi que les ope´rateurs ensemblistes usuels permettant l’ajout d’e´le´ment
et le test d’appartenance. Puis, nous montrons que d’autres ope´rateurs me´moriels
peuvent eˆtre envisage´s, et nous discutons de la possibilite´ d’ajouter des contraintes
a` l’interaction entre la me´moire et les ope´rateurs modaux. Ces contraintes peu-
vent eˆtre vues comme une manie`re d’avoir un controˆle fin sur l’expressivite´ de la
logique. Comme nous avons fait des changements aux logiques modales classiques,
nous nous inte´ressons a` l’analyse de l’impact de ces changements sur les logiques
re´sultantes. Ainsi, le reste de ce chapitre pre´sente une boite a` outils logique
basique avec laquelle nous pouvons analyser cette nouvelle famille de logiques.
Cette boite a` outils peut eˆtre vue comme un plan qui organise le reste de cette
the`se et qui permet d’analyser les logiques me´morielles en termes d’expressivite´,
de complexite´, d’interpolation et de the´orie de la preuve.
Le reste des chapitres consiste a` e´tudier en de´tail chacun de ces aspects.
Dans les Chapitres 3 et 4, nous explorons l’expressivite´ de plusieurs logiques
me´morielles et nous e´tudions la de´cidabilite´ de leur proble`me de satisfiabilite´.
Dans les cas de´cidables, nous de´terminons leur complexite´. Nous analysons
l’impact des diffe´rents ope´rateurs me´moriels conside´re´s, et leur interaction. Nous
e´tudions e´galement d’autres conteneurs me´moriels, tels que la pile. Puis, dans le
Chapitre 5, nous analysons l’interpolation de Craig et la de´finabilite´ de Beth pour
certains fragments des logiques me´morielles. Nous e´tudions e´galement les logiques
me´morielles du point de vue de la the´orie de la preuve. Dans les Chapitres 6 et 7,
nous passons aux axiomatisations a` la Hilbert et aux syste`mes de tableaux, et
nous caracte´risons plusieurs fragments de la famille des logiques me´morielles, en
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utilisant principalement des techniques emprunte´es aux logiques hybrides. Nous
concluons dans le Chapitre 8 avec quelques remarques, des proble`mes ouverts et
des directions pour de futures recherches.
Mots-cle´s: logique, modale, me´moire, expressivite´, de´cidabilite´, axiomatisa-
tion, interpolation, tableau.
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1.1. The place of Modal Logics 3
is currently true, but we can also try to think if there is a situation in which this
claim is not true. This, a priori, seems difficult to imagine, since the sentence
is formulating a mathematical principle. For example, the claim “there are nine
planets in the solar system” is currently true, but clearly it is not true in every
possible world, since we could had a solar system with more planets in some
alternative world. On the other hand, the sentence “π is an irrational number”,
is necessarily true, since there is not a possible world in which is false. Other
reasonable analysis is to think what happens with this claim in terms of the
flow of time. The sentence “it is going to rain tomorrow” will be true at some
point in the future, but definitively it is not true at every point. In contrast, “π
is an irrational number” will always be true, since the truth of a mathematical
principle does not seem to be affected by the flow of time. We could also be
interested on whether the fact that π is an irrational number is known or not by
somebody. Observe that this sentence is not known by everybody, since it implies
some affinity with mathematical concepts. We can also think in terms of belief,
and conclude that “π is an irrational number” is not universally believed, since
there are people who do not trust in mathematicians.
That is, we can distinguish between various modes of truth, such as possibly
true, believed to be true, known to be true, true at some point in time, etc. The
first formal studies on modalities go back to the beginning of the XX century,
with the work of C. I. Lewis [Lew18], who tried to solve the paradoxes of material
implication using necessity and possibility. In fact there were other people before
Lewis who built logic systems for this purpose, but Lewis seems to be the strongest
link with contemporary modal logic. The problem that Lewis was trying to solve
is that the natural language construction “if condition then consequence” implies
some reasonable connection between the condition and the consequence. So,
although the classical logic implication says that from a contradictory antecedent
we always end up with a true claim, a phrase like “if the Earth has four moons,
then the cube of 3 is 27” may be interpreted as false by most speakers, since
the number of moons and the result of a mathematical operation are considered
unrelated. Translated to a modern notation, Lewis idea was to take some assertion
ϕ, and prefix it with a ✷ or a ✸ symbol, so ✷ϕ says that the proposition ϕ is
necessary and ✸ϕ that the proposition ϕ is possible. Using modalities, Lewis
sought to tighten up the connection between antecedent and consequent, and he
introduces the strict implication, that can be defined as ✷(p → q). So p strictly
implies q when the classical conditional necessarily holds in all possible worlds.
With this brief introduction we made, it is quite clear that modal logics ac-
tively contribute to keep the zoo of logics quite full. Modalities show to be a
source of many different kinds of logics, and they expand the logics menu with
new perspectives to consider.
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1.1.1 A little of modal history
The work of Lewis gave rise to what some people call the ‘syntatic era’ of modal
logics (starting in 1918), in which most of the work was essentially syntactic.
Lewis and his contemporaries tried to determine rules of reasoning for the different
ways of interpreting modalities, basically working with axiomatic systems a` la
Hilbert for propositional and first order logic enriched with some new modality.
For example, if we want the intended interpretation of ✷ϕ to be ‘there is a proof
for ϕ’, then we would probably want to have ✷ϕ → ϕ (if there is a proof for
ϕ, then ϕ must be true) as a theorem in our system. At that point there was
no model theory for modal logics, and this entailed many technical difficulties.
How can we be sure that two different axiomatizations model the same concept?
Or how do we know that we have considered all the relevant axioms and rules
given the intended interpretation of the modalities? Some examples of this kind
of work can be found in [vW51, McK45, MT48] and for a detailed discussion of
this period see the historical section of [BS84].
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, mainly pushed by the influence of Prior
in temporal logic (or as he called it, tense logic) [Pri57] and Jo´nsson and Tarski
with their work in the theory of boolean algebras with operators [JT51, JT52],
semantics landed in the area of modal logics. In particular, Kripke’s ideas on
relational semantics turned up in this period. The actual authorship of relational
semantics is in discussion (Hintikka, Kanger and Kripke are the best candidates),
but relational semantics is often called Kripke semantics and definitively Kripke’s
work [Kri63a, Kri63b] was crucial in establishing the relational approach. Roughly
speaking, Kripke’s proposal was that a suitable model to evaluate a modal formula
is just a set of possible worlds, with relations among them. The surprising thing
when Kripke came with these ideas is that the different intended interpretations
(like necessity, belief, knowledge, etc.), who seemed quite unrelated in terms of
axiomatic systems, can be all characterized imposing structural properties in the
relation among the worlds.
We already saw that necessity can be seen as “true at all possible worlds”.
Looking from the perspective of Kripke semantics, the current world is just some
distinguished point w in a graph, and the outgoing edges of w represent all the
“possible worlds” that are considered from the current world. The claim that
says “it is necessary the case that π is an irrational number” can be translated to
the formula ✷pi-irrational-number , where pi-irrational-number is a propositional
symbol representing the fact that π is irrational. If we want to know whether this
formula is true in the current world, we just have to check if at all the accessible
successors of w the proposition pi-irrational-number holds.
Providing modal logics with a model theory was a revolutionary achievement.
Many problems that had been thought of as difficult turned out to be quite
straightforward using semantic arguments. Naturally, modal research at this
point shifted to semantically driven results, where the concept of completeness
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was the leading figure: finally modal logicians could be sure that an axiomatic
system has all the relevant axioms and rules needed to characterize the intended
interpretation of a modality. The concept of canonical models emerged, a useful
tool to prove completeness results, and they were applied to many problems that
the syntactic era had left open. The work of Makinson [Mak66], Cresswell [Cre67]
and Lemmon and Scott [LS77] are good representatives of this line of research.
At the beginning of 1970 several changes impacted the conception of what
modal languages actually are. On one hand, in those years modal languages
began to be adopted by theoretical computer science. For example, in [Pnu77]
Pnueli suggested using temporal modal logic to reason about execution traces
of programs, and the first computational complexity analysis (for example, Lad-
ner [Lad77], Pratt [Pra79]) were brought to modal logics. On the other hand,
the discovery of frame incompleteness results showed that there are classes of
models for which there is no possible axiomatization (Thomason [Tho72, Tho74]
and Fine [Fin74]). This shows that modal logics cannot be analyzed from a pure
syntactic perspective. Also, solid links were established between modal logics and
other classical logical systems (like first and second order logic, universal algebra
and classical model theory, see [Sah73, Fin75, vB85, vB84]). These results helped
to shift the view of modal logics as ‘intensional’ formalisms that were only able
to talk about ‘modes of truth’ to a much broader panorama, which constitutes
the current way of looking at modal logics.
1.1.2 A contemporary perspective
Nowadays modal logics can be thought of as a family of languages for talking
about structures or models. What kind of structures? There is not a single kind,
and although relational semantics is one of the most developed, there are many
active lines of research in alternative semantics for modal logic (like algebraic
or topological semantics, see [MT44, Esa74, She83, Tar38]). Relational seman-
tics are a deeply explored style of modal semantics, and it has been used as a
tool to talk about belief, computational processes, time, provability, possibility,
etc [BdRV01, BWvB06]. All these very different areas have in common that the
fundamental concepts they need to model can be expressed in terms of graphs-like
structures. As one can notice, this definition is very inclusive, and a broad set
of entities can be thought of as relational structures: labeled transition systems,
knowledge representation ontologies, tree structures used in linguistics, many fa-
miliar mathematical structures, etc. Furthermore, from a syntactic perspective,
propositional modal languages, that is, the result of taking the well-known propo-
sitional logic as the underlying language and augment it with modal operators,
are the simplest languages to deal with relational structures. This explains why
there are so many potential (and concrete!) applications in which modal logics
can be used to describe, reason about, verify and constrain the concepts involved
in each specific scenario.
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Modal logics have also proved to be a family of logics that is not isolated
from the rest of the logical world. The semantics of modal logics can be thought
of as a close relative of the semantics of classical first order logic, but in which
explicit quantification is restricted. The way to achieve this is by replacing classic
quantification (∀ and ∃) by a priori less expressive modal operators that do not
make use of explicit variables and bindings.
Let us try to clarify this. Recall the example where✷ϕ represented ‘necessarily
ϕ’ and ✸ϕ ‘possibly ϕ’. As we saw before, one way of interpreting ‘necessarily
ϕ’ is to think that this claim holds when ϕ is true in all possible worlds. In
the same way, ‘possibly ϕ’ is true when ϕ holds in some possible world. This
interpretation suggests a strong link between the ✷ operator and the ∀ quantifier,
and equivalently, between ✸ and ∃. The key difference lies in the fact that modal
languages perform quantification in some kind of guarded way, in which the range
of quantification is bounded to points that are considered significant from the
point of view of the current ‘situation’. In this sense, when modal languages
are evaluated in a relational model they provide an internal perspective of its
structure, from a particular point. As Blackburn, et al. say in [BdRV01],
“a modal formula [can be seen as] a little automaton standing at
some state in a relational structure, and only permitted to explore
the structure by making journeys to neighboring states”
So modal languages inherit their semantics from the standard semantics of
classical predicate logic, but with a ‘tamed’ way of doing quantification. On
one hand, these similarities make modal logics have many properties in common
with their classical counterparts. On the other hand, as modal operators usually
have less expressive power than classical quantifiers, this results in many new
properties, rather different from those of standard logic. Decidability is a clear
example, since modal logics have helped discover many new decidable fragments of
classical systems (even beyond first order logic!) whose computational complexity
is often relatively low [Var97] (for example, the satisfiability problem for the basic
modal logic is PSPACE-complete, see the complexity section in [BdRV01]). In
this way, understanding modal logics as a fragment of first order, or even higher-
order predicate logic does not bear any adverse connotation. This perspective
shows modal logics as a set of fine-grained tools for exploring the inner structure
of classical systems.
1.2 A formal introduction
It is now time to formally meet the modal logics we are going to work with and
its relational semantics. We start by defining the basic modal language ML.
Because we are interested in working with many modalities at the same time, the
diamond (✸) and box (✷) operators are going to turn into the operators 〈r〉 and
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[r], where r indicates the modality we are working with. When we are in a case
where there is a single modality, we are going to use ✸ and ✷ again.
Although we introduce modal logic from scratch, we assume that the reader
has at least a basic understanding of classical first order logic.
1.2.1. Definition. [Syntax] Suppose we have a set of propositional symbols
prop = {p1, p2, . . . } and a set of modality symbols rel = {r1, r2, . . . }. We
assume that both sets are pairwise disjoint and countable infinite. A specific
choice of prop and rel is called the signature of the language. We define the set
of formulas of the basic modal language over the signature 〈prop,rel〉 as:
ϕ ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ ψ | ϕ↔ ψ | 〈r〉ϕ | [r]ϕ
where p ∈ prop, r ∈ rel and ϕ, ψ are formulas. We call props(ϕ) the set of
propositional symbols occurring in ϕ.
Of course this is not a minimal definition. One can fix an adequate set of
primitive boolean connectors (like ¬ and ∧) and define all the other boolean con-
nectors in terms of that primitive set. Also, as it will follow from the satisfaction
definition we are going to present below, diamond and box are dual operators,
and therefore for all r ∈ rel, 〈r〉ϕ can be defined as ¬[r]¬ϕ, and conversely, [r]ϕ
is equivalent to ¬〈r〉¬ϕ. We are not going to bother yet to pick a set of primitives
operators, since it is not really important at this point. When we do that, we will
only have to worry about choosing a convenient set that allows us to generate the
whole language.
Now we formally define the models for the basic modal language. As we
mention before, Kripke semantics define models as graphs, and in fact, as directed
graphs with decorations.
1.2.2. Definition. [Kripke models] Let S = 〈prop,rel〉 be a signature. A
Kripke model M for S is a tuple 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉 satisfying the following con-
ditions: (i) W , the domain, is a nonempty set whose elements are called points,
but also, depending on the context, states, worlds, times, etc.; (ii) each Rr, an
accessibility relation, is a binary relation on W and (iii) V : prop → 2W , the val-
uation, is a labeling function that assigns to each propositional symbol p ∈ prop
a subset of W . We can think of V (p) as the set of points in M where p holds.
Given a modelM and w in the domain ofM, we call 〈M, w〉 a pointed model.
Before moving on, let us see an example of a Kripke model, in order to clarify
the concept. Consider the following model M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉:
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b
w1
w2
w3
w4
p
p, q
q
a
a
b
b
a
This model has a domain of four points, W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}. The signature
in which it is based on is 〈prop = {p, q},rel = {a, b}〉, that is, it has two binary
relations, a and b, and two propositional symbols, p and q. We explicitly indicate
in the picture the places where the propositional symbols hold. Translated to the
valuation function V , that means that V (p) = {w1, w3} and V (q) = {w2, w3}.
Observe that at w4 no propositional symbol holds.
If we look at the definition of Kripke models again, we can see that the directed
graph itself is defined by the domain and the accessibility relations, whether the
valuation function plays the role of decorating the graph with propositional sym-
bols. Given a modelM, we call the frame underlyingM its first two components,
that is, 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel〉. When dealing with models with only one accessibility re-
lation, we often omit the set (Rr)r∈rel and we write directly 〈W,R, V 〉 for the
model and 〈W,R〉 for the frame.
Sometimes we are going to be interested in restricting ourselves to a portion
of a given model. Let us define here the notion of submodel.
1.2.3. Definition. Let M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉 and M
′ = 〈W ′, (R′r)r∈rel, V
′〉
be two models. We say that M′ is a submodel of M if W ′ ⊆ W , each R′r is the
restriction of Rr to W
′ (that is, R′r = Rr ∩ (W
′ ×W ′)) and V ′ is the restriction
of V to M′ (that is, for each p ∈ prop, V ′(p) = V (p) ∩W ′).
Now we are ready to define the semantics for the basic modal language, since
we already have both the syntax and the structures the language is going to talk
about. Recall that modal logics describe Kripke structures from an internal per-
spective. This means that, in contrast with first order logic in which formulas see
models from some kind of omniscient lookout point, modal formulas are evaluated
at some particular point of the model.
1.2.4. Definition. Given the model M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉 and w ∈ W , we
inductively define the notion of a formula ϕ being satisfied (or true) inM at the
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point w as follows:
M, w |= ⊤ always
M, w |= ⊥ never
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p) p ∈ prop
M, w |= ¬ϕ iff M, w 6|= ϕ
M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ
M, w |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ or M, w |= ψ
M, w |= ϕ→ ψ iff M, w 6|= ϕ or M, w |= ψ
M, w |= ϕ↔ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ if and only if M, w |= ψ
M, w |= 〈r〉ϕ iff there is a w′ such that wRrw
′ and M, w′ |= ϕ
M, w |= [r]ϕ iff for all w′ such that wRrw
′,M, w′ |= ϕ
Given a model M, we say that ϕ is globally satisfied (or globally true) on
M, and write M |= ϕ, if for all points w in the domain of M we have that
M, w |= ϕ. A formula ϕ is valid if it is globally satisfied in all models, and
in that case we write |= ϕ. A formula ϕ is satisfied in a model M when there
is a point in M where ϕ is true, and ϕ is satisfiable if there is some point in
some model at which it is satisfied. When working with sets of formulas, these
definitions are lifted in the expected way. Given a class of models C, we will
note T (C) the set of all valid formulas in C. Given a model M and a point w
in M, we denote T (M, w) = {ϕ | M, w |= ϕ}. A formula ϕ is a local semantic
consequence of a set of formulas Σ if for all models M and all points w ∈ M,
if M, w |= Σ, then M, w |= ϕ. When that is the case we write Σ |= ϕ. We
define the set of consequences of a set of formulas as cons(Σ) = {ψ | Σ |= ψ}.
Sometimes we will use this definition applied to a single formula instead of a set,
with the usual interpretation. In Chapter 2 we are going to define the notion of
global semantic consequence, but for now let us stay with the local version of the
definition. When we say just “semantic consequence” we always refer to local
semantic consequence.
One final remark about the basic modal logic. In the same way we define a
language that supports multiple modalities, there is no reason to restrict ourselves
to unary modalities. An extended version of the basic modal language can be
given, in which modalities are n-ary, and each one is interpreted by an n+ 1-ary
relation on the domain. We choose to define it in a more restricted manner in
order to keep the notation compact, and also because we are not really going to
exploit that specific feature of modal languages.
1.2.1 Some modal examples
We have already defined a number of concepts that allow us to start digging in
the modal logic universe. Let us consider now some examples in order to grasp a
general flavor of how modal languages work.
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1.2.5. Example. Consider the following model:
t1 t2 t3 t4
p, q p q
This model represents four different instants in time, and the accessibility
relation is the “earlier than” relationship, that orders the flow of time (and con-
sequently, it is a transitive relation). If we want to evaluate a formula in this
model we first have to decide in which instant of time we want to evaluate it, and
at each point the result of the evaluation may vary. For example, the formula
✸p ∧✸q is satisfied at t1 and t2, because both points are before t3 and t4, where
p and q hold respectively. But ✸p ∧ ✸q does not hold at t3, and neither at t4.
On the other hand, consider the formula ✸(p ∧ q). In contrast with the previous
formula, note that this one only holds at t1, since it is requiring the existence of a
future point in time where p and q hold simultaneously. One particular situation
is the case of t4. In this point, the formula ✷p is true. Why? Because if we check
the satisfaction definition for the ✷ operator, we can see that ✷ϕ holds at a point
w iff ϕ holds at all the successors of w. Since t4 has no successors, this condition
is trivially true. In fact, this means that ✷ϕ will be true at t4 no matter which ϕ
we choose (and even when ϕ is ⊥).
The idea of using modal logics to model events in time is due to Prior (see
[Pri67, Pri77]), and he mainly analyzed the use of tenses relative to the point
of speech. Nowadays, the study of temporal logics is very well developed [All05,
Eme90, Bla90, vB91, HR06], and briefly speaking, modal temporal languages are
usually interpreted on models that have a “time-like” structure. This can be a
linear structure (like the toy example we have just presented), or some kind of
transitive tree, representing branching time.
The next example shows that modal logics are not only a way to model “in-
tended meanings”, but also that they can be used as a tool to represent knowledge
and to describe extensional information.
1.2.6. Example. Let us analyze this group of people and their relations:
respects
buddha
jehovakrishna
mahoma
johnrespects
admires
respects
respects admires respects
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Note that in this model we have two different modalities: admires, and re-
spects. There are many things we can say here with modal formulas. For example,
the formula
[RESPECTS]⊥ ∧ 〈ADMIRES〉〈RESPECT〉⊤
is only true when evaluated at Jehova: he does not respect anyone, but he admires
John, who respects Buddha.
Nowadays modal logic is widely used to describe extensional situations. In
fact, there is a “flavor” of modal logics, called description logics (DLs) that are
specially designed to represent concepts, individual elements and their relations.
Description logics were born in the computer science community, in contrast
with classical modal logics, who came from the philosophy/mathematical area.
Furthermore, there are available many inference tools for DLs that make them
very useful tools in practical applications. More references about description
logics can be found in [BCPS07].
Proposition dynamic logic is a very nice example to present at this point. On
one hand, it involves reasoning about execution traces of programs, and allows to
explicitly model its inductive structure. On the other hand, it is an example of a
modal language that is not a strict fragment of first order logic, and nevertheless,
it is still decidable!
1.2.7. Example. The language of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) has an
infinite collection of modalities. Each modality 〈π〉 represents a non-deterministic
program, and the intended interpretation of 〈π〉ϕ is ‘some terminating execution
of the program π from the current state leads to a state carrying the information
ϕ’.
What is interesting about PDL is that the structure of programs is made
explicit in the syntax. When writing a formula, complex programs can be built
using primitive ones with the help of a set of program constructors. Let us suppose
fixed a set of basic programs πa, πb, πc, and so on (that is, we have the modalities
〈πa〉, 〈πb〉, 〈πc〉, . . . as part of the language). With these basic programs we can
construct new programs in the following way:
• (composition) If π1 and π2 are programs, then π1; π2 is also a program.
The program π1; π2 first executes π1 and then π2.
• (union) If π1 and π2 are programs, then π1 ∪ π2 is also a program. The
program π1 ∪ π2 executes non-deterministically π1 or π2.
• (iteration) If π is a program, then π⋆ is also a program. The program π⋆
executes π a finite (zero or more) number of times.
Given the connection we have between programs and modalities, this means
that if 〈π1〉 and 〈π2〉 are modalities, then 〈π1; π2〉, 〈π1 ∪ π2〉 and 〈π
⋆
1〉 are also
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modalities. Observe that in PDL there are two layers of syntax, one inner layer
for modalities, that allows us to describe the structure of programs, and an ex-
ternal layer that uses those modalities to characterize the behavior of program
executions. For example, the formula p → 〈(π1 ∪ π2)
⋆〉q says that if we are in a
state where p holds, then a state where q holds can be reached executing π1 or
π2 a finite number of times.
The three ways of constructing new programs (composition, union and itera-
tion) constitute what it is called regular PDL. However, there are other construc-
tors that can be added, for example:
• (test) If ϕ is a formula, then ϕ? is a program. The program ϕ? tests
whether ϕ holds, and if so, continues. If ϕ does not hold, it fails.
Observe that the test operator allows us to turn a formula into a modality.
This constructor, combined with other programs, can produce very interesting
examples. For example the formula
〈(ϕ?; a)⋆; (¬ϕ)?〉ψ
represents that the program “while ϕ do a” ends in a state satisfying ψ.
The idea to extend modal logics with modalities representing programs is
due to Pratt [Pra76], and PDL itself was first investigated by Fischer and Lad-
ner [FL77, FL79]. The capability to perform finite iterations, through the con-
struction π⋆, provides PDL with a way to express the transitive closure operator.
This means that PDL has some kind of second-order expressivity, beyond first
order, since first order logic cannot define the transitive closure. Surprisingly,
PDL is decidable, and its satisfiability problem is EXPTIME-complete [FL77,
FL79, Pra79].
The last example we are going to discuss shows how modal logics can be
applied to model knowledge and belief, that is, we want to show that modal
logics can also be used in the field of epistemic logics.
1.2.8. Example. Epistemic logics deal with agents and what agents consider
possible given their current information. Suppose we have three card players:
John (j), Peter (p) and Carol (c), and each player holds one of the cards with
colors green (g), blue (b) and red (r). In the game they are playing, each of the
three have looked at his own card, but have kept it hidden from the others. This
situation can be modeled as follows: the proposition pc represents a situation
where the player p holds the card c. For example, Johnblue (abbreviated jb)
indicates that John holds the blue card. The inability of a player p to distinguish
two different situations of the game, given his current knowledge, is represented
with a modality 〈p〉. That is, if the player p cannot distinguish between the point
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jb, pg , cr
jg , pb, cr jg , pr, cb
jb, pr, cg
jr, pg , cb jr, pb, cg
c
p
b
j
p
c
j
p
c
Figure 1.1: The model M, representing possible deals
w and w′, then w is connected with w′ through the relation p. If we represent
every possible deal in the game, the result is the model shown in Figure 1.1.
For example, imagine that the current deal is: John holds the green card,
Peter the blue card and Carol the red card. Looking at the model, we are in the
point jg, pb, cr. Let us analyze what John can say in this situation. He knows he
holds the green card, but he doesn’t know which cards the other players have.
One possibility would be the real one (in which Peter has the blue card and Carol
has the red card), but the other possibility for John is that Peter has the red card
and Carol the blue card. He cannot distinguish between these two situations, and
we can express it with the formula jg ∧ pb ∧ cr → 〈j〉(jg ∧ pr ∧ cb). Observe that
this formula is globally satisfied in our model.
Epistemic logics can also be dynamic, in order to reflect the changes in the
information the agents have. Public announcements is a way of communication
between agents, where an agent makes some information public, so everybody
knows it. So, if an agent announces ϕ, all the points where ¬ϕ holds should be
erased from the model, since they are no longer compatible with the information
that all the agents have. Let us suppose that John decides to show his card to
the other two players. After that action, everybody knows that John holds the
green card, and therefore all the points in the model where John holds a card
different than green are no longer possible. That action transforms the previous
model into this one:
jg , pb, cr jg , pr, cb
j
Figure 1.2: The modified model M′, after John shows the green card
That is, in the resulting model M′, Peter and Carol know all the cards and
therefore they can distinguish between the two situations left. Therefore, there
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are neither p-relations nor c-relations inM′. On the other hand, John only knows
that he has the green card, so he still cannot say which are the cards of the other
players. That is why there is a j-relation connecting the two situations (in both
directions).
Epistemic logics were first defined by Hintikka [Hin62], but there is also more
recent work available, such as [FHMV03] by Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi.
There is also much work in dynamic epistemic logics, and the notion of model
update, see [BB99, Ger99, vBL07, vB06, vBvEK06, Pla07].
1.3 A wide menu to choose from
So far we have been dealing mostly with the basic modal language, and we showed
some examples that illustrated a general horizon of possible uses. At this point we
might be tempted to ask: is it possible to enrich modal logics to obtain stronger
languages keeping at least some of its attractive properties? Since we were talking
about the basic modal language, we can suspect that the answer to this question
is positive. Modal logicians have been investigating richer languages for many
years, so here we are going to show some of their work.
The process of enriching the basic modal language can take many directions.
Sometimes it consists of insisting that a modality should be interpreted by some
specific relation (the universal modality is a good example, as we will see). Oc-
casionally the enrichment is designed to support new semantics capabilities, as
we are going to show with hybrid logics or propositional dynamic logic. In other
cases, it takes the form of more complex satisfaction definitions, like temporal
logics and Since and Until operators. There are also many other ways in which
the modal languages can be extended. The existence of this motley extensions
naturally rises the question: what do all these richer languages have in com-
mon? What are the properties that make them ‘modal’? This is not an easy
question, but there are some recurrent notions in all these languages: restricted
quantification, characterizations of fragments of first and second order logic, and
decidability in most of the cases.
1.3.1 The universal modality
We have emphasized the locality of modal logics, but sometimes there are situ-
ations that demand a global perspective. For example, suppose we are working
with a modal language for talking about the weather, and in this language ϕ
means “we are in summer”, and ψ means “the temperature is beyond 25 de-
grees”. With the basic modal language there is no clear way to express that
whenever we are in summer, the temperature is beyond 25 degrees. If we check
for the satisfiability of ϕ→ ψ and we get a positive answer, this only means that
there is a model and a point where ϕ is false or ψ is true. But we want to force
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every point in the model to satisfy ϕ → ψ. This is a case where the universal
modality is useful.
Let us suppose that we are working with only one modality, just for the sake
of simplicity. We can add to this language a second modality called E whose
interpretation is fixed: in every model 〈W,R, V 〉 the interpretation of E must be
the universal relation W ×W . The formal semantic definition is the following:
M, w |= Eϕ iff there is a u ∈ W such that M, u |= ϕ.
So this new modality scans the whole model looking for a point that satisfies
ϕ. Its dual Aϕ ≡ ¬E¬ϕ has the following interpretation:
M, w |= Aϕ iff for all u ∈ W we have that M, u |= ϕ.
That is, Aϕ checks if ϕ holds at all points in the model. Observe that in this
way we have internalized the notion of global truth into the modal language: for
any model M and any formula ϕ, we have that M |= ϕ iff Aϕ is satisfiable in
M.
So now we can formulate our question about the weather using the modal
language extended with the universal modality. To test whether whenever we are
in summer, the temperature is beyond 25 degrees, we can check the satisfiability
of the formula A(ϕ→ ψ).
Universal modality seems to be a nice operator to have, but what happened
with what we said about modal languages providing an “internal perspective” of
the structure of models? Have we broken this principle including the universal
modality? The first impression could point in that direction, but in fact the
extended language still takes an internal perspective. The universal modality
places modal formulas in every possible point in the model, but formulas are still
evaluated at a particular point. For example, this is reflected in the fact that
we still preserves decidability. In [Hem96], Hemaspaandra showed that the basic
modal language enriched with the universal modality is EXPTIME-complete. For
further details about the universal modality see [GP92].
1.3.2 Since and Until operators
Recall Example 1.2.5, in which we mention temporal logic, and the work of Prior
with tense logic. In the late 1960s the operators U (Until) and S (Since) were
added by Hans Kamp [Kam68] to Prior’s logic. Later, around 1980, Gabbay,
Pnueli, Shelah and Stavi [GPSS80] realized that these operators were extremely
useful to reason about program executions, since they allow to describe the con-
ditions that an execution must satisfy all along its life-cycle.
Even though these operators are mostly used in temporal logic, we define them
here in their most general form:
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M, w |= U(ϕ, ψ) iff there is a v such that wRv and M, v |= ϕ, and
for all u such that wRu and uRv,M, u |= ψ.
M, w |= S(ϕ, ψ) iff there is a v such that vRw and M, v |= ϕ, and
for all u such that vRu and uRw,M, u |= ψ.
Intuitively, if we think about the meaning of these operators in the context of
temporal logics, Until checks if there is some point v in the future where ϕ holds,
and that at all points between the point of evaluation and v, ψ holds. Since works
similarly but looking towards the past.
The first thing to ask is what can we say with these operators. To start with,
in the context of temporal logic where the accessibility relation is transitive and
reflexive, we should notice that they can say at least the same things as regular
diamonds. Why? Observe that U(ϕ,⊤) is semantically equivalent to ✸ϕ. But
with S and U we can say more. In the analysis of program executions, it is often
needed to express properties like “something good is going to happen, and until
that time nothing bad will happen”. Such properties are often called guarantee
properties in the computer science community. Since and Until seem perfectly
tailored to express these kind of things. Let us take a temporal linear model, with
the usual relation “earlier than”, that orders the flow of time. If ϕ represents a
good event, and ψ the guarantee that nothing bad is happening, then U(ϕ, ψ) is
expressing a guarantee property in terms of ϕ and ψ.
U(ϕ,ψ) ϕ
ψ
As we said before, modal logics are robustly decidable, and the extension
with Since and Until is not an exception. The basic modal logic extended with
Since and Until is decidable, and the most general definition falls into what is
called the packed fragment [Mar01], a syntactic restriction of first order logic,
whose satisfiability problem is 2EXPTIME-complete. When the class of models
is restricted to linear orders, then there are better complexity bounds, see [SC85,
Rey03, DR07]
1.3.3 Hybrid Logics
As we said before, one of the cornerstones of modal logics is the internal perspec-
tive they provide to inspect models. The curious thing about this matter is that
even though points in a model play a fundamental part in modal logics seman-
tics, the basic modal languages cannot directly name them. The feeling is that,
when evaluating a formula in a model, the points are hidden from the syntax.
We cannot say that some particular individual has some property, or that two
different processes lead us to the same state. Of course this is not the case for first
1.3. A wide menu to choose from 17
order logic, where we can use constants to name individuals of interest, and the
equality symbol to check their identity. The basic hybrid language is the result
of addressing this issue. They treat points in the model as first class citizens,
using a special sort of atomic formulas to refer to points. The first steps in this
direction were taken by Prior [Pri67, Pri77] in the 1960s, when he first proposed
to sort propositional symbols and use formulas as terms.
So let us take a modal language with propositional symbols p, q, r, and so on,
and add a second sort of propositional symbols nom, called nominals, typically
written i, j, k, etc. Nominals can be used to construct new formulas in the same
way propositional symbols do, but the key difference is that we are going to add
the constraint that each nominal must be true at exactly one point in any model.
In this way, nominals name points. From the formal point of view, for any model
〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉, the valuation function V is extended to interpret also nominals,
V : prop∪nom → 2W , and we insist that V (i) is a singleton set, for any valuation
V and nominal i. Observe that we are not asking that at every point in the model
a nominal must hold. It is perfectly right if we have points without name.
This change already increases the expressive power. For example, the formula
✸(i ∧ p) ∧✸(i ∧ q)→ ✸(p ∧ q)
is valid: if the antecedent is satisfied, that means that at the (unique) point
where i holds, the propositions p and q also hold. This is clearly not the case if
we replace i by some arbitrary propositional symbol.
Once we have added names to the language, satisfaction operators turn up
quite naturally: we would like to have a way to evaluate a formula at a specific
named point. Satisfaction operators has the form @iϕ (read ‘at i, ϕ’) where i is
a nominal. The formula @iϕ moves the point of evaluation to the point named
by i, and evaluate ϕ there. More formally, given a modelM = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉,
the semantics is the following:
M, w |= @iϕ iff M, u |= ϕ, where V (i) = {u}.
Satisfaction operators can be thought of as modalities, but observe that they
are self-dual: @iϕ iff ¬@i¬ϕ. That is, we can think of satisfaction operators as
either diamonds or boxes.
There is an issue that can be confusing the first time one starts using these
operators. Which is the difference between the formulas i ∧ ϕ and @iϕ? At first
glance, both seem to say that ϕ holds in the point named by the nominal i.
The key distinction is that @iϕ holds independently of the point in which it is
evaluated, since the satisfaction operator actually moves the point of evaluation
to the point named by i. This is clearly not the case for i ∧ ϕ, that only checks
whether the point of evaluation is the one named by i, and if ϕ holds there.
There is another perspective that justifies the existence of satisfaction opera-
tors. Recall what we said about the use of constants in first order logic to name
18 Chapter 1. A zoo full of logics
individuals, combined with the use of the equality symbol to compare them. In
the same way, satisfaction operators give us a modal equality to compare individ-
uals. Note that formulas like @ij asserts that the point named by i is identical
to the point named by j. In this way, we can establish a modal theory of equal-
ity: for all nominals i, j, the formulas @ii (reflexivity), @ij → @ji (symmetry),
@ij ∧@jk → @ik (transitivity) and @iϕ ∧@ij → @jϕ (congruence) are valid.
The idea of sorting atomic formulas, and to use one sort of atoms to re-
fer to points in the model is quite simple. This simplicity gets reflected in
hybrid logic complexity: we do not have to pay a special price for this addi-
tional machinery, and the satisfiability problem for the basic hybrid logic remains
PSPACE-complete [ABM01]. And even more, in certain aspects hybrid logic
behaves better than its modal counterpart. Completeness is a good example
of this, and nominals can be very helpful in many situations to provide a nice
completeness theory. Nominals can also be combined with other operators. For
example, there are extensions of PDL that have some connections with nominals,
like the pioneering work from the “Bulgarian school” in combinatory dynamic
logic, see [PT85, PT91].
The next natural step is to think of nominals not as names, but as variables
over individual points, and to add quantifiers. It is quite clear that this path gets
us even closer to classical logics, in which quantifiers and variables are explicit
in the syntax. But this is one of the nice features of modal logics: they allow to
increasingly add new features to a logic, but in a fine-grained way, taking care of
what are the aspects that are being incorporated. The classical first order notion
of quantifiers does not reflect the intrinsically local behavior of modal logic. That
is the motivation to introduce ↓, the downarrow binder. This binder allow us to
create a name “on the fly” for the current point of evaluation, and let us refer to
it later in the formula. That is, when evaluating ↓x.ϕ in a point w, the variable
x will act in ϕ as a nominal that names w. For example, in any model M the
formula ↓x.✸x is true precisely at the reflexive points.
Since now we have variables, to formally define the semantics of ↓ we need an
assignment function g to evaluate a formula. This is equivalent to the assignment
function for first order logic. We do not necessarily need a new sort of atomic
symbols to represent variables, we can reuse nominals and think that the binder
‘resets’ a nominal to the current point of evaluation. In this scenario, the valuation
function V does not interpret nominals anymore, since this task is now delegated
to g. So, given a Kripke modelM = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉 and an assignment function
g : nom → W , the semantics conditions for downarrow are defined as follow:
(M, g), w |= i iff g(i) = w
(M, g), w |= ↓i.ϕ iff (M, giw), w |= ϕ where g
i
w is identical to g
except perhaps in that giw(i) = w.
There is a nice interplay between ↓ and @. We can think of ↓ as storing values
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for nominals in the assignment function, while @ retrieves them. Consider the
following formula, which is true in any model at points where the accessibility
relation behaves transitively:
↓i.✷✷↓j.@i✷j.
This formula first names the point of evaluation i, and then names j all the two-
steps successors of i. Then, using @, it jumps back to i to assert that all the
one-step successors of i are also two-step successors.
As we can see, ↓ provides a significant increment of expressivity. This addi-
tional expressive power comes with a price: we have crossed the border of decid-
ability. Already the satisfiability problem for the hybrid language with nominals
and ↓ (that is, even without @) is undecidable [BS95] (and originally in unpub-
lished work by V. Goranko). But this logic is not as expressive as first order logic.
For further details about the characterization of this fragment see [ABM01].
1.4 Modifying models: memory and state
In this section we will start heading to the main subject of this thesis. We are
going to present a new family of modal logics which we call memory logics. Let us
recall the analogy of thinking about a modal formula as an automaton standing
at some point, and only permitted to locally explore the structure of the model.
But what about “changing” the model? Suppose we want to grant our little
automaton the additional power to modify the structure during its exploratory
trips. This question is not new, and it has resulted in different proposals of what
are called dynamic logics.
Consider, for example, the task of assigning semantics to a programming lan-
guage. Clearly, the different instructions of the language change the computa-
tional state. It is then natural to specify their semantics by defining exactly
which changes each atomic operation of the language introduces. This idea is at
the core of logics like Hoare-Floyd logics [Hoa69, Flo67] which include, for exam-
ple, special operators to indicate the state of variables before and after a given
instruction.
As a second example, consider the area of linguistics called dynamic semantics.
One of its fundamental claims is that the standard truth-conditional view of
sentence meaning – which is the result of using classical logic as representation
languages – does not do sufficient justice to the fact that uttering a sentence
changes the context it was uttered in. Deriving inspiration, in part, from work
on the semantics of programming languages, dynamic semantic theories have
developed several variations on the idea that the meaning of a sentence is to be
equated with the changes it makes to a context. Different dynamic logics like the
ones introduced in, e.g., [GS91a, GS91b] try to capture these ideas.
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As yet a third example with an ample literature we could cite different dy-
namic epistemic logics [vDvdHK07, vBvEK06, vB01, Pla07, Ger99, vB05]. As we
saw in the Example 1.2.8, these are languages used to model the evolution of the
knowledge of epistemic agents via updates to the model representing their epis-
temic state. The action of a public announcements we saw there can be carried
out by an operator that updates the model, eliminating all alternative epistemic
states that are incompatible with the new provided information.
Our last family of examples come from the area of temporal logics for ver-
ification. In this area, it is many times necessary to model time-critical sys-
tems that depend on quantitative rather than qualitative properties. Many
temporal logics introduced for this task use explicit global clocks which are ac-
cessed and controlled through logical operators. Examples of such logics are
XCTL [HLP90], half-order logics [AH89a, Hen90], and timed and metric tempo-
ral logics [ACD93, AFH96, Koy90, OW05]. Other interesting example of adding
some sort of memory in the context of temporal logic is presented in [KV06].
On the other hand, other dynamic logics are not dynamic in the sense men-
tioned above. In PDL, for example, formulas are evaluated in a model but they
cannot modify it. Nevertheless, there are work in using PDL to represent model
updates, see [Dem05, PW04, vdM96].
Memory logics can be seen as an attempt to investigate some of the common
characteristics of all these logics, in the simplest possible set up. Going back
to our little automaton, suppose we extend our definition of a model to a 4-uple
M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉, where S is an arbitrary subset ofW . We can think of S
as a memory where the automaton can store a point that it considers particularly
interesting. Defining the semantics of this operation is straightforward. Suppose
that we use ©r (‘remember’) to represent the memorize operator, then we could
define
〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉, w |=©rϕ iff 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S ∪ {w}〉, w |= ϕ.
Notice that ©r modifies the model, and that ϕ is evaluated in the modified
model. The operation ©r by itself is totally useless. If we cannot access the
information stored in S, ©rϕ is equivalent to ϕ. Let us add then an operator ©k
(‘known’) that checks whether the current point has been previously memorized:
〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉, w |=©k iff w ∈ S.
Even with this simple addition we have that 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, ∅〉, w |=©r 〈r〉©k
will be true only if w is self reachable via the accessibility relation corresponding to
the modality 〈r〉. This property cannot be expressed in the basic modal language.
In the same spirit of the operators ©r and ©k introduced above, we can natu-
rally define operators that modify any component of a model (adding or deleting
nodes and edges or modifying the labeling function). We can also change the
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storage structure, and instead of sets we can use other containers such as stacks,
lists, etc.
Just to see another example of the possibilities we have, let us suppose that we
redefineM = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉, and set S to be an arbitrary stack of elements
of W . In this case we have to change the memory operators accordingly, and use
for example the usual stack operators push, pop and top. Suppose that S · w is
the stack that results from pushing w in the top of S. Then the semantics could
be
M, w |= (top) iff S = S ′ · [w] for some S ′
M, w |= (pop)ϕ iff 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S
′〉, w |= ϕ
for some S ′, w′ such that S = S ′ · w′
M, w |= (push)ϕ iff 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S · w〉, w |= ϕ.
In Chapter 2 we are going to explore these ideas with detail, and define them
formally.
To sum up, memory logics are a novel family of modal logics that allows
to model dynamic behavior through explicit memory operators that change the
evaluating structure. This proposal introduces a framework for studying the
notion of state in a more general way, without bounding the analysis to any fixed
domain (like knowledge change, time flow, linguistics contexts, etc.). Most of the
work that has been done in this direction implicitly adds some specific native
behavior in the “dynamic component”. We want to study some of the dynamic
capabilities of the above mentioned approaches from a more abstract point of
view, and analyze the different aspects of this family in terms of logic properties.
1.5 Overview of the thesis
In the previous section we gave an informal presentation of the family of memory
logics. In the rest of this thesis we are going to see that the idea of adding an
explicit memory to Kripke models, and operators that are able to query and
modify that memory, extend the modal logic menu with new fragments with very
interesting properties. This is a new family of logics, and therefore there are
several aspects that are worth investigating.
The first thing we want to know about these logics is what can we actually say
with them. Are they really providing additional expressive power, or they are just
a complicated way of writing the same things we already could say with the basic
modal language? Or perhaps it is the other way around, and adding an explicit
memory places these logics beyond the scope of modal or even hybrid logics. To
move one step at a time, in Chapter 2 we are going to formally introduce the
family of memory logics, we will show some examples, and present the different
fragments we are going to work with. Then in Chapter 3 we are going to study
this family in terms of expressive power. In this chapter we want to show which
is the impact of the different memory operators we consider, and how is the
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interaction between them. To be able to do that, we will introduce a key concept
to analyze expressivity: bisimulations.
After studying the expressive power, the next natural step is to look at the
computational complexity. In Chapter 4 we will analyze some fragments of the
memory logic family and we will determine whether its satisfiability problem is
decidable for each case. Have we added enough expressive power to cross the
border of decidability? To check that, we are going to introduce a technique
called tiling, which is very useful to prove undecidability results. Also, we are
going to show that some fragments have the finite model property, which is a key
property to have decidability.
Then, in Chapter 5, we are going to analyze Craig interpolation and Beth
definability for some memory logic fragments. A logic enjoying these properties
can be seen as having “completeness in the theory of definitions”, as opposed to
the theory of deductions. These properties also allow reasoning systems to be set
up in a modular way.
We are also interested in studying memory logics from a proof-theoretic per-
spective. In Chapter 6 we are going to turn to Hilbert-style axiomatic systems,
and we are going to try to characterize several fragments of the memory logic
family mostly using techniques borrowed from hybrid logics. In this chapter we
are going to see that nominals enable us to provide simpler axiomatic systems in
many situations.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we are going to study semantic tableau systems for
memory logics. Taking inspiration from the prefixed tableau calculus developed
for hybrid logics, we are going to present a sound and complete tableaux calculi
that works with a rich memory logic fragment, and some of its sub languages.
We close in Chapter 8 with some concluding remarks, open problems and
further work.
Many of the results presented along this thesis were published in [AFM09,
AFFM08, AFGM09].
Chapter 2
Memory Logics
Sab´ıa las formas de las nubes australes del amanecer del treinta de abril de mil
ochocientos ochenta y dos y pod´ıa compararlas en el recuerdo con las vetas de un libro
en pasta espan˜ola que so´lo hab´ıa mirado una vez y con las l´ıneas de la espuma que un
remo levanto´ en el Rı´o Negro la v´ıspera de la accio´n del Quebracho.
“Funes el memorioso”, Jorge Luis Borges.
In the previous chapter we gave some intuitions about memory logics, and
the idea of explicitly adding state to Kripke models. As we said before, this
idea is not new, but most of the work that has been done in this direction is
for domain-specific reasons. We want to analyze the idea of incorporating the
notion of state from a “pure” perspective, in which we do not add any specific
built-in behavior in the evolution of the model (like clocks, programming language
semantics, epistemic updates, etc. do). As we mention in Section 1.4, we are going
to do this by analyzing which is the outcome of adding a memory to a Kripke
model. Having a memory and specific operators to access and change it, provides
us with a nice framework for studying dynamic logics from this perspective.
2.1 Focusing on sets
What kind of memory do we want to have? Of course this choice will have a major
impact in the type of logic that will come out. Also the type of memory to use
will determine the set of possible operators that will interact with it, in order to
retrieve or write data. We want to start analyzing this concept from their roots,
and to accomplish that we will take the idea we presented in Section 1.4, and
concentrate mostly in a very simple memory structure: a set that stores points
of the model.
Let us see an example of this. Suppose that we have a Kripke model M =
〈W,R, V, S〉 equipped with a memory as in Figure 2.1. Assume that V (p) = ∅ for
all p ∈ prop and that we have a unique relation R, as shown in the picture. The
initial memory of this model in empty (S = ∅), and when a point is added to the
memory we are going to graphically represent that with a solid black point (in
contrast with the outlined white points we have now in the picture).
There are many things we can say here with the modal language extended
with the operators ©r and ©k we presented in Section 1.4. Let us suppose fixed
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w1 w2
w3
w4
Figure 2.1: A model with an initially empty memory
the model in Figure 2.1, and let us see how we can describe it using this language.
For example, how can we say that w1 has a successor different from itself? We
can check whether the formula
©r✸¬©k
is satisfiable in w1. What is this formula doing? First, it uses ©r to remember
the current point of evaluation, adding w1 to the memory. That means that the
previous model turns into M′ = 〈W,R, V, S = {w1}〉:
w1 w2
w3
w4
So now the remaining formula ✸¬©k is evaluated in M′. To be satisfiable, this
formula needs a w1-successor v such that v 6∈ S. But this is the case, since w2
fulfills that requirement. Observe that if we had not memorized w1, then we
would not be sure if the w1-successor is in fact different from w1.
We can also check, for example, whether w2 is involved in a cycle of length
3. And even more, we can check that from the perspective of w1. How can we
do that? In the first place, we want to be sure that we actually move from w1 to
w2, in order to avoid looping in w1. To do that, we can use the same trick that
we used before: we should remember w1 and ask for a non-memorized successor.
Then we should identify the cycle. The way to recognize it involves remembering
also w2, so we know when we are back to the same point. Therefore, to check
this property we can evaluate the formula
©r✸(¬©k ∧©r✸✸✸©k )
at w1. Observe that this formula works well to check the property we wanted in
this particular model, but it is easy to imagine other models that satisfy the same
formula where there is not a cycle of length 3. For example, consider the model
shown in Figure 2.2. Observe that the formula ©r✸(¬©k ∧©r✸✸✸©k ) also holds
when evaluated at w1 in that model. Therefore, this formula is not characterizing
the models with cycles of length 3. In contrast, if we return to the previous
example where we had the property “w1 has a successor different from itself”, the
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w1 w2
w4 w3
Figure 2.2: A model with a cycle of length 4
formula ©r✸¬©k evaluated in a point w1 distinguishes precisely the models that
satisfy that property.
Notice that the fact that the memory was initially empty was crucial to express
the properties we wanted. Intuitively, a non-empty memory adds “noise” when
trying to express a property: every time we check if a point in the model is
memorized, we are not really sure whether it was originally in the memory or it
is the result of a previous application of the remember operator. That is why it is
quite natural to consider starting to evaluate a formula with an empty memory,
and it is over these models that the operators©r and©k have a clearer role. As we
will see in the next chapters, the restriction to this class of models has important
effects on expressivity and decidability. In Section 2.1.3 we are going to define
this class of models formally.
2.1.1 Extended operators
As we saw,©r stores points in the memory, and©k allows to test for membership.
The next step is to start thinking in operators that delete elements from the
memory. The ability to erase points can be useful in many situations, as we will
see. In the previous example, the initial memory of the model was completely
empty, and this was quite convenient for our purposes, but imagine that the initial
model is like in Figure 2.3. That is, all the points in the model are memorized.
w1 w2
w3
w4
Figure 2.3: A model in which all the points are memorized
How do we say now that w1 has a successor different from itself? The formula
©r✸¬©k is no longer satisfiable in (M, w1), since there is not a point where ¬©k
holds. Intuitively, it is quite clear that in this context there is no way of saying
what we want, and in fact in Chapter 3 we are going to prove this formally. The
situation changes if we add operators to delete elements from the memory. Let
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us suppose that we add the operator ©e (for ‘erase’), that completely wipes out
the memory. Formally, its semantics is defined in the following way:
〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉, w |=©eϕ iff 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, ∅〉, w |= ϕ.
Having ©e , it is easy to express that w1 has a successor different from itself,
even when the memory is not initially clean. We just have to prefix the formula
we used in the first example with an ©e . That is, the formula
©e©r✸¬©k
evaluated at w1 expresses what we want: first, it cleans the memory using©e , and
then the remaining formula ©r✸¬©k is evaluated in the model we already saw in
Figure 2.1.
Observe that©r has a local behavior, in the sense that it stores in the memory
the current point of evaluation. In contrast, ©e has a global behavior, since it
erases all the memory completely, independently of the evaluating point. This
asymmetry suggests the idea of thinking in a local version of©e , that deletes only
the current point of evaluation. So let us also add the operator ©f (for ‘forget’):
〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉, w |=©fϕ iff 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S \ {w}〉, w |= ϕ.
Taking again the model shown in Figure 2.3, in which all the points were
memorized, we can use ©f to check, for example, whether w1 is related to itself
with the formula
©f✸¬©k .
This formula, evaluated at w1, first deletes the current point from the memory,
leaving the model like this:
w1 w2
w3
w4
And then the remaining formula ✸¬©k is satisfied using the reflexive edge of w1.
As we can see, even in this simple setup in which we take sets as the storage
structures, there is a menu of different operators to choose. We are going to see
that this menu increases if we add the capability of controlling the interaction
between memory and modal operators.
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2.1.2 Memorizing policies
Until now, memory and modal operators were working ‘in parallel’, in the sense
that the logics we presented allowed to freely explore the model using modalities,
and at the same time, to store or delete points from the memory during this
exploration. As we said in Chapter 1, restricting expressivity can sometimes be
helpful reducing computational cost, and that is why we can try to impose certain
constraints in the interplay between memory and modal operators.
Let us see the following example to clarify these ideas. We mention in Sec-
tion 1.2.1 that modal logics are useful to model knowledge and belief. Consider
the model shown in Figure 2.4. A point in this model represents the epistemic
state of an agent, that is, the agent’s current knowledge. The neighborhood of
a point w represents the possible “one-step” situations, modeling how the world
might be from the perspective of w. This means that, for example, if the agent is
in w1, then w0, w1 and w2 are epistemically acceptable alternatives to the current
situation.
Suppose that we are interested in reasoning about the changes in the epistemic
state of an agent a from a given point w, and we want to identify specifically which
sequences of changes in the agent’s knowledge lead again to w. This sequences
can be thought of as an indicator that the knowledge of an agent is not really
“evolving” when following certain paths. For example an agent may know p, but
also accepts a possible situation where he does not know p anymore. This can
be said with the formula p∧ 〈a〉¬p. He may also re-learn p later, and we can say
this with p∧ 〈a〉(¬p∧ 〈a〉p). If a given model satisfies this formula, it means that
the agent can start knowing p, and re-learn it again after some epistemic evolving
steps. But how can we know if the rest of the agent’s knowledge remains the
same or not after all these changes?
For example, the model shown in Figure 2.4 allows both alternatives. The
agent knows p in w0 and admits an alternative epistemic state w1, where ¬p
holds. From w1, the agent can learn p again returning to w0, the original state,
or he can travel to w2. The epistemic state w2 does not coincide with w0: even
though they agree on p, they differ on q.
p q p, q
w0 w1 w2
Figure 2.4: Epistemic states of an agent
We can use memory operators to distinguish these situations. The formula
p ∧ ©r 〈a〉(¬p ∧ ©r 〈a〉(p ∧ ©k )) is true in models where p can be re-learned by
returning to exactly the same epistemic state where the agent has started.
What is interesting from this example is that if we only care about identifying
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“already visited” epistemic states, then every time we remember a point in the
model is to perform a modal transition. That is, the actions of memorizing a
point and exploring the graph are highly coupled. This suggests the idea that in
this context perhaps we do not need 〈r〉 and ©r as two separated operators, but
just one operator that performs both things at once. So let us introduce the 〈〈r〉〉
operator that does exactly that:
〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉, w |= 〈〈r〉〉ϕ iff ∃w
′ ∈ W,wRrw
′ and
〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S ∪ {w}〉, w
′ |= ϕ.
In terms of expressivity, this operator is a priori weaker than having both ©r
and 〈r〉, since now we cannot make a modal transition without memorizing the
current point of evaluation. In the next chapters we are going to see that this
memorizing policy in fact restricts the expressive power, and allows us to regain
decidability for some fragments.
One can certainly imagine some other memorizing policies. For example, we
can add operators in the line of dynamic epistemic logics: every time we make
a modal transition, all the states that satisfy some semantic condition are added
to the memory. The semantic condition may vary depending on the scenario.
For example, we could define an operator 〈〈r〉〉p like this: given a model M =
〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 and w ∈ W ,
M, w |= 〈〈r〉〉pϕ iff ∃w
′ ∈ W,wRrw
′ and 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S
′〉, w′ |= ϕ
where S ′ = S ∪ {w | M, w |= p}.
In this dissertation we are going to restrict ourselves to 〈〈r〉〉. We want to use
it as a proof of concept to show that the interactions between modal and memory
operators are a factor to consider when looking for the appropriate fragment for
a given application.
2.1.3 Putting it all together
Since we are going to work with many different fragments and notations, let us
sum up what we have talked about until now. We defined several memory oper-
ators, taking sets as the storage structure, so we formally introduced the syntax
and semantics of (almost) all the memory logics that we will investigate. All the
languages we introduced are obtained by extending the syntax and semantics of
the basic modal logic.
2.1.1. Definition. [Syntax] We extend the syntax given in Definition 1.2.1 over
a given signature 〈prop,rel〉 with the following operators:
ϕ ::= · · · | ©k | ©rϕ | ©eϕ | ©fϕ | 〈〈r〉〉ϕ
where ϕ ∈ forms and r ∈ rel. We define the dual of 〈〈r〉〉 in the usual way: for
all r ∈ rel, [[r]]ϕ can be defined as ¬〈〈r〉〉¬ϕ.
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The models for these languages are standard Kripke models (refer to Defini-
tion 1.2.2) with the addition of a set used as a storage structure.
2.1.2. Definition. [Memory Kripke models] Given a signature S = 〈prop,
rel〉, a memory Kripke model M for S is a tuple 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 satisfying
the following conditions: (i)W is a nonempty set; (ii) each Rr is a binary relation
on W ; (iii) V : prop → 2W assigns to each propositional symbol p ∈ prop a
subset of W and (iv) S, the memory of the model, is a set such that S ⊆ W .
In the rest of the thesis the following notation will be useful. Let M =
〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 be a model and w ∈ W , then we define
M[+w] = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S ∪ {w}〉
M[−w] = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S\{w}〉.
For [◦1w1, . . . , ◦nwn] a nonempty ordered list with wi ∈ W and ◦i ∈ {+,−},
let M[◦1w1, . . . , ◦nwn] = (M[◦1w1])[◦2w2, . . . , ◦nwn], where M[ ] = M. We will
usually write [w1, . . . , wn] instead of [+w1, . . . ,+wn]. Additionally, given a set
S ′ ⊆ W we define
M[S ′] = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S ∪ S
′〉
M[−S ′] = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S \ S
′〉.
In the same way as before, for [◦1S1, . . . , ◦nSn] a nonempty ordered list with
Si ⊆ W and ◦i ∈ {+,−}, let M[◦1S1, . . . , ◦nSn] = (M[◦1S1])[◦2S2, . . . , ◦nSn],
where M[ ] =M. We will usually write [S1, . . . , Sn] instead of [+S1, . . . ,+Sn].
When the context is clear enough, we will just say model instead of memory
Kripke model. Let us summarize now the semantics for the operators we have
introduced:
2.1.3. Definition. Given a model M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 and w ∈ W , we
extend the semantics presented in Definition 1.2.4 with the following rules:
M, w |=©k iff w ∈ S
M, w |=©rϕ iff M[w], w |= ϕ
M, w |=©fϕ iff M[−w], w |= ϕ
M, w |=©eϕ iff M[−W ], w |= ϕ
M, w |= 〈〈r〉〉ϕ iff ∃w′ ∈ W,wRrw
′ and M[w], w′ |= ϕ.
As we said before, the class of models where the memory is empty is particu-
larly interesting. We denote this class as C∅ = {M | M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, ∅〉}. It
is worth noting that when we say that we restrict ourselves to this class we mean
that a formula is initially evaluated in a model of C∅, but during its evaluation
the model can change to one with a nonempty memory.
For notational convenience, let us assume fixed from now on the modelsM =
〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉, M1 = 〈W1, (R
1
r)r∈rel, V1, S1〉 and M2 = 〈W2, (R
2
r)r∈rel, V2,
S2〉.
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Memory logics and its notational convention
We will not consider all possible combinations of operators, since it is not our
intention to be completely exhaustive. We are only going to analyze some combi-
nations that we consider interesting, and each time we will point out over which
fragments we are working with. Furthermore, even though we presented the syn-
tax and semantics of the different memory operators extending the basic modal
logic, sometimes we will extend in the same way the basic hybrid language. So, let
us clarify the notation we are going to use in the rest of this dissertation. We call
ML the basic modal logic (defined in Section 1.2) and HL the basic hybrid logic
(that is, the basic modal language augmented with nominals, see Section 1.3.3).
When we add a set as a storage structure and the basic set operators ©r and ©k ,
we indicate this appending m as a superscript to the corresponding logic. Then
we will list the additional operators included in the language. Since the usual
semantics of the diamond operator is going to be slightly modified in some cases,
we will also include the diamond explicitly in this list (and take the box operator
as the usual shorthand). For example, MLm(〈r〉,©e ) is the modal logic with the
classic diamond operator extended with ©r , ©k and ©e , and, to give another ex-
ample, HLm(@, 〈r〉) is the basic hybrid logic with the usual diamond, ©r , ©k and
the @ operator.
In some cases we are going to restrict the class of all models, and work with
C∅, the class of models with an empty memory. To indicate that, we add ∅ as a
subscript. For example, MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) is the basic modal logic with 〈〈r〉〉 instead of
〈r〉, the operators ©r and ©k , and whose models have an initially empty memory.
Observe that in the notational convention we are condensing two different
“dimensions”. On one hand, we are specifying different languages, in the sense
that we are adding or removing operators, and therefore changing the syntax
of our logics. On the other hand, we are distinguishing two different classes of
models: the class of all models, and the class of models with an empty memory.
In this way, we are changing the logic itself, without necessarily modifying the
syntax.
2.2 Getting to know your logic
In the previous sections we introduced changes in classical modal logics, but what
is exactly the impact those changes cause in the resulting logics? The main aim
of this thesis is precisely that: to analyze properties of different memory logics,
in order to get to know these new members of the modal logic family.
As we mentioned in Section 1.5, we want to examine memory logics in terms
of expressivity, complexity, interpolation, and proof theory. To carry out this
task, we need suitable logic tools that allow us to explore these issues. Here we
are going to present a basic toolkit that will help us throughout this work.
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2.2.1 Expressivity
In Chapter 1 we said modal logics are not an isolated logic system. Recall that the
semantics of modal operators can be thought of as performing a guarded quan-
tification over elements of the domain, in contrast with the general quantification
capability of classical first order logic. This makes modal logics a priori less ex-
pressive than their first order relative. We talked about that in an intuitive way,
but how can we prove it formally?
One way to see that a logic is a fragment of another is by using translations,
that is, a systematic way to transform a formula from one logic to the other pre-
serving equivalence. First of all, we have to be sure that the two logics we want to
compare can talk about the same kind of objects, in order to establish a common
ground to make the comparison. Let us take, for example, the basic modal logic
ML and first order logic FOL. As we saw before, the objects thatML describes
are Kripke models. What about FOL? The first impression could be that FOL
describes objects that are completely different from Kripke models. But we are
not forced to talk about Kripke models using exclusively modal languages: Kripke
models have everything needed to interpret classical languages too. To talk about
a Kripke model 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉 using FOL, we can simply make use of a first
order language with a binary relation symbol Qr for every r ∈ rel, and a unary
relation symbol P for every p ∈ prop. So, every time we have a Kripke model,
we can think of it as a first order model: the structure is exactly the same, we
are just using different languages to describe it. The language used in FOL to
interpret modal languages is called the first order correspondence language for the
basic modal language over prop and rel. It is called “correspondence language”
because every basic modal formula in the signature 〈prop,rel〉 corresponds to
a first order formula via the standard translation:
STx(p) = P (x) where p ∈ prop
STx(¬ϕ) = ¬STx(ϕ)
STx(ϕ ∧ ψ) = STx(ϕ) ∧ STx(ψ)
STx(〈r〉ϕ) = ∃y(xQry ∧ STy(ϕ)) where y is new.
Let us analyze this translation. Propositional symbols are mapped to unary
predicates, booleans are treated homomorphically and diamond and boxes are
handled by explicit first order quantification over Qr accessible points. Recall
that we defined the box operator as a shorthand. Applying that definition, the
translation for this case is STx([r]ϕ) = ∀y(xQry → STy(ϕ)). Observe that the
translation is making explicit the guarded quantification of modal logics, con-
trolled by the relation Qr. The variable y used in the translation for diamonds
and boxes is chosen to be one that has not been used so far. Note that the for-
mulas in the image of the translation contains exactly one free variable x. This
variable, now explicit, is encoding the internal perspective of modal logics: as-
signing a value to this variable is equivalent to evaluating a modal formula at
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a particular point in the model. But the key point is that we have defined an
equivalence preserving translation:
2.2.1. Proposition ([BdRV01]). Let ϕ be any modal formula. Then for any
Kripke model M, and any point w ∈ M we have that M, w |= ϕ iff M, gxw |=
STx(ϕ).
Here gxw is an arbitrary assignment function mapping first order variables to
elements of the model domain, with the condition that x is mapped to w. Observe
that the modelM is a Kripke model in the left side of the equivalence, and it is a
first order model in the right side. But as we said before, it is the same structure
in both sides, just described with different languages.
This translation shows us that basic modal logic is indeed a fragment of first
order logic: every time we have a modal formula we can translate it to a first
order formula preserving equivalence. In this sense, basic modal logic is included
in first order logic in terms of expressivity.
This translation acts also as a bridge that allows us to ‘import’ results from
first order logic. For example, the set of validities in the basic modal language
is recursively enumerable. This is easy to see using the standard translation and
the fact that the set of validities for first order formulas is recursively enumerable:
a modal formula ϕ is valid iff STx(ϕ) is valid. Other results can be transfered as
well, such as compactness (if every finite subset of a set of formulas Γ is satisfiable,
then Γ is satisfiable) and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property (if a set of formulas Γ
is satisfiable in an infinite model, then Γ is satisfiable by a model of cardinal k,
for every cardinal number k).
Bisimulations
The standard translation shows us that every modal formula has an equivalent
first order counterpart. But what happens in the other direction? Could it be the
case that every first order formula (in the appropriate signature of course) has
an equivalent modal formula? The intuition says that this is not possible, and
that basic modal logic is a proper fragment of first order logic. How can we prove
that? In other words, how can we be sure that there is no possible translation
from first order logic to the basic modal logic?
The expressive power of a language can be measured in terms of the distinc-
tions the language can draw. In terms of models, the question would be: when
should two models be viewed as modally identical? That is, when do the same
modal formulas hold in both models? Let us formalize first this notion.
2.2.2. Definition. Let L be a language with signature S,M andM′ two mod-
els over S, and w and w′ two points in M and M′ respectively. The L-theory
of w is the set of formulas in L satisfied at w, that is, {ϕ | M, w |= ϕ}. We
say that w and w′ are L equivalent (notation: w !L w
′) if they have the same
L-theories.
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When the context is clear enough, we will drop the subscript and use !
directly.
Consider now the following two models:
w0
w1
v0
Let us consider now the basic modal language. Assuming that V (p) = ∅ in
both models for all p ∈ prop, is there a way to distinguish w0 from v0 in ML?
That is, is there a basic modal formula that is true at w0 and false at v0? This
doesn’t seem to be easy to find. On the other hand, if we can use first order logic
this is quite straightforward: the formula ¬R(x, x) is true if we assign w0 to x,
and false in the case of v0.
The idea of asking when two different structures are identical for a given
language lies within a long established tradition among mathematicians of looking
for the structure preserving morphisms in a given domain. The first formulation of
this notion in the context of modal logic was made by van Benthem [vB84, vB85],
who introduced the concept of bisimulations :
2.2.3. Definition. [Bisimulation] A bisimulation between two models M =
〈W,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 is a non-empty binary relation E ⊆ W ×W ′
between their domains such that whenever wEw′ we have that:
Atomic harmony: w and w′ satisfy the same propositional symbols.
Zig: if wRv, then there exists a point v′ in M′ such that vEv′ and w′R′v′.
Zag: if w′R′v′, then there exists a point v in M such that vEv′ and wRv.
If there is a bisimulation between two modelsM andM′ we say thatM andM′
are bisimilar and we write M↔M′. Moreover, we say that two points w ∈ M
and w′ ∈M′ are bisimilar if they are related by some bisimulation, and we write
M, w ↔M′, w′.
One can give an equivalent notion in terms of morphisms, that relates two
models through a function rather than through a relationship. In the context of
modal logic they are called bounded morphisms.
2.2.4. Definition. [Bounded morphisms] Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈W ′,
R′, V ′〉 be two models. A mapping f : W → W ′ is a bounded morphism if it
satisfies the following conditions:
Atomic harmony: w and f(w) satisfy the same propositional symbols.
Zig: if wRv, then f(w)R′f(v).
Zag: if f(w)R′v′, then there exists a point v in M such that f(v) = v′ and
wRv.
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We gave the definition for the uni-modal case, but this can be easily gener-
alized to the multi-modal case. Observe that the definitions of bisimulation and
bounded morphism are quite similar: a bounded morphism is just a functional
view of a bisimulation.
Returning to the modelsM1 andM2 we have just presented, it is easy to see
that M1, w0 ↔ M2, v0. The bisimulation would be as follows (the dotted line
indicates the pairs in the bisimulation relationship):
w0
w1
v0
The definition of bisimulation we just gave is specifically designed for the basic
modal logic, and thus the expected property is that satisfiability of formulas in
the basic modal logic is invariant under bisimulations:
2.2.5. Theorem. [BdRV01] LetM andM′ be two Kripke models over the same
signature. Then, for every w ∈M and w′ ∈M′, w ↔ w′ implies that w ! w′.
The standard translation told us that the basic modal logic is a fragment
of first order logic, but we have just seen that in fact this fragment is proper.
Why? Let us assume the opposite, and suppose there is an equivalence preserv-
ing translation Tr from first order logic to the basic modal logic. Take the first
order formula ¬R(x, x) (who is in the appropriate signature) and its correspond-
ing modal formula, Tr(¬R(x, x)). Take again the two models M1 and M2 we
presented above. BecauseM1, w0 ↔M2, v0, we know that both points satisfy the
same modal formulas, that isM1, w0 ! M2, v0. In particular, this happens with
the translation of ¬R(x, x): M1, w0 |= Tr(¬R(x, x)) iff M2, v0 |= Tr(¬R(x, x)).
But, as we saw before, M, gxw0 |= ¬R(x, x) but M
′, gxv0 6|= ¬R(x, x), so the trans-
lation does not preserve equivalence. This implies that the translation cannot
exist.
Bisimulations can also tell us that there are certain structural properties that
the basic modal logic cannot discern. Let us see a couple of examples of this. For
example, the basic modal logic cannot distinguish cycles in a model. What does
this mean? Suppose we have these two models:
w0
M1
. . .
v0 v1 v2 v3
M2
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And assume also that propositional symbols do not help us to distinguish them,
that is V (p) = ∅ for all p ∈ prop for M1 and M2. It is easy to see that the
relation (w0, v0), (w0, v1), (w0, v2), . . . is indeed a bisimulation. In fact, M2 is
what is called the unraveling ofM1, that is, the result of a model operation that
unfolds the cycles of a model starting from a given point.
Another example is the generated submodel property. This property reflects
the intrinsically local behavior of the basic modal logic. Intuitively, it says that
the satisfiability of a formula at a point w is not affected by points that are not
reachable from w. Let us try to clarify this. Suppose we have a modelM1 based
on the frame (Z, <), that is, the integers with their usual order. Suppose we
form a submodelM2 by throwing away all the negative numbers, and restricting
the valuation (whatever it was) to the remaining numbers. The two models look
something like this:
. . . . . .
−2 −1 0 1 2
M1
. . .
0 1 2
M2
Suppose a formula ϕ is satisfied at some point n inM1, with n ≥ 0. Is ϕ also
satisfied at the same point in M2? The answer to this question is yes, and it is
quite easy to see that one can establish a bisimulation that links every point n
in M2 with the same point in M1. The important thing here is to observe that
given an evaluating point n ≥ 0, the only points relevant to ϕ’s satisfiability are
the points greater than n, and all those points belong to M2.
This example shows that the basic modal logic cannot discern between sub-
models closed under the accessibility relation of the original model. Such models
are called generated submodels (or generated subframes, if we are dealing with
frames instead of models) and they show another invariance principle for the ba-
sic modal logic. There are also other satisfiability preserving operators, but here
we will not go further in that direction. See [BdRV01] for a formal definition and
details.
Bisimulations as a game
The notion of bisimulation can also be presented using a more dynamic perspec-
tive, closer to a form of process equivalence. The task of determining whether
two models are bisimilar can be recast in the form of an Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´
game [EFT84].
Let 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M2, w2〉 be two pointed models. An Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´
game for the basic modal logic (notation: EF (M1,M2, w1, w2)) is defined as
follows. There are two players called Spoiler and Duplicator. The two play-
ers compare successive pairs, starting from (M1, w1) and (M2, w2). Duplicator
immediately loses if w1 and w2 do not coincide in the propositional symbols.
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Otherwise, the game starts, with the players moving alternatively. Spoiler al-
ways makes the first move in a turn of the game, starting by choosing in which
model he will make a move. In subsequents rounds, Spoiler chooses a point in one
model which is a successor of the current w1 or w2, and Duplicator responds with
a matching successor in the other model. If the chosen points differ in the atomic
propositions, Spoiler wins. If one player cannot move, the other wins. Duplicator
wins on infinite runs of which Spoiler does not win.
Note that with this definition, exactly one of Spoiler or Duplicator wins each
game. A strategy for Duplicator is a function that takes a sequence of valid plays
of odd length and returns a possible next move for Duplicator. A strategy for
Spoiler is defined in the same way, substituting “odd” by “even”. We say that
a player is following a strategy s when all his moves in a game comply with the
answer of s for every stage of the game. A strategy is winning if the player
following it necessarily wins the game, no matter what his opponent plays. Given
two pointed models 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M2, w2〉 we will write 〈M1, w1〉 ≡
EF 〈M2, w2〉
when Duplicator has a winning strategy for EF (M1, M2, w1, w2).
Intuitively, this game captures exactly the zigzag behavior of bisimulations,
and the atomic harmony condition. The two notions are equivalent, but depend-
ing on the context, one can be more natural than the other.
2.2.6. Proposition. [GO05] Given two pointed models 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M2, w2〉
then 〈M1, w1〉 ≡
EF 〈M2, w2〉 if and only if 〈M1, w1〉 ↔ 〈M2, w2〉.
Summing up, bisimulations are a very powerful tool to measure the expres-
sivity of a logic: it provides us with structural conditions on the models that
characterizes the appropriate structure preserving morphisms. Since bisimula-
tions are directly linked to the expressivity of a given logic, there is not a unique
notion of bisimulations. Here we have just presented the bisimulation for the
basic modal logic, but for every logic we need to find a suitable definition of
bisimulation, and this notion is a direct reflex of the logic expressive power. In
this sense, looking for the appropriate bisimulation allows us to learn about the
logic we are working with. In the next chapter we are going to see the associ-
ated bisimulations for some of the fragments of the memory logic family, and we
will use these notions to compare them with other well known modal and hybrid
logics.
2.2.2 Decidability
We are also going to examine the computability of the satisfiability problem for
some members of the memory logic family. The abstract formulation of the ques-
tion would be: given a modal formula ϕ and a class of models C, is it computable
whether ϕ is satisfiable in a model of C?
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There are several techniques to try to determine this matter. Here we will
present just a few of them that will help us later deal with our particular memory
fragments. From now on, we call a logic decidable if its satisfiability problem is
decidable.
Decidability via finite models
The path to choose to establish decidability depends much on the way we ‘know’
the logic we are working with. We may know a logic L purely semantically: we
have only the class of models and its satisfaction relationship. On the other hand,
we may also have a syntactic definition: L is the logic generated by some set of
axioms. In both cases, establishing that a logic has the finite model property is
a useful first step for proving decidability.
2.2.7. Definition. A model is finite if it has a finite domain, finitely many
nonempty relations, and a valuation function that assigns nonempty sets to
finitely many propositional symbols. L has the finite model property (f.m.p)
if every time a formula ϕ of L is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a finite model.
In this context, there are two possible strategies for establishing decidability.
We just give an informal argument for them, to see a rigorous analysis refer
to [BdRV01]. Suppose we only have a semantic specification of L, but we have
been able to prove that L has the finite model property. Even more, we have
been able to prove that for any formula ϕ ∈ L there is a computable function
f such that f(ϕ) is an upper bound on the size of the model that could satisfy
ϕ (this is usually called the strong or bounded finite model property). In this
scenario we can decide whether a formula ϕ is satisfiable as follows: we write
a Turing machine that takes ϕ as input, generates all the finite models up to
size f(ϕ), and tests for the satisfiability of ϕ on these models (assuming that the
model checking problem for L is decidable). Because the logic has the strong
finite model property, and the Turing machine explores all the models up to the
appropriate size, the machine decides the satisfiability of ϕ.
On the other hand, suppose L is given through a sound and complete axioma-
tization (assume also that the set of axioms and rules is recursively enumerable),
and we have been able to prove that L has the finite model property. First we
construct a Turing machine that uses the axiomatization to recursively enumerate
the theorems of L. Second, we construct another Turing machine that recursively
enumerates all the finite models. So now we can start the two machines at the
same time: if the formula is a L-validity, the first machine will eventually gen-
erates ϕ and stop. If that is not the case, the second machine will eventually
falsify ϕ on a finite model. Thus, we can decide in this way the validity of ϕ (and
therefore the satisfiability of ¬ϕ).
We described these two procedures to work with the class of all models of a
given logic. If we are dealing with the logic of a specific class of models C, observe
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that we also need to have a computable procedure to identify if a given finite
model M belongs to C.
Undecidability via tiling
A way to prove that the satisfiability problem of a logic L is undecidable is to
reduce it to some known undecidable problem. There are many candidates for
making the reduction, but the tiling problem is particularly suitable for modal
logic.
A tiling problem is essentially a jigsaw puzzle made of tiles. A tile T is a
square, each side of which has a color. The orientation of each tile is fixed, that
is, we cannot rotate a tile. In the following picture we show some tiles:
Figure 2.5: Some different tile types
A simple tiling problem would be: is it possible to arrange tiles of the types
shown in Figure 2.5 on a 2× 3 grid such that every pair of adjacent tiles have the
same color on the common side? The answer to this question is yes :
Figure 2.6: A 2× 3 tiling
The idea of solving a tiling gives rise to a family of problems which can be used
to analyze computational complexity and undecidability. Some tiling problems
vary the type of space to be tiled, or they add some additional constraints on
what counts as a successful tiling. We are going to mention just one type of
tiling, which we will use to prove undecidability for many of the memory logics
fragments. More details about tilings can be found in [vEB97]. The N×N tiling
problem is the following:
2.2.8. Definition. [N×N tiling problem] Given a finite set of tile types T , can
T tile N× N?
We have shown an example of a tiling of 2× 3, but the general case for N×N
is hard, and in fact the following theorem holds:
2.2.9. Theorem. [vEB97] The problem of determining the answer for the N×N
tiling problem is undecidable.
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How can we use the tiling problem to prove the undecidability of a given logic
L? Given a finite set of tiles T , we can try to construct a formula ϕT ∈ L such
that
T tiles N× N iff ϕT is satisfiable.
If we can construct such a formula, then the satisfiability problem for L is unde-
cidable. Why? Suppose that it was decidable. Then we could solve the N × N
tiling problem as follows: given T , we build ϕT and use the decision procedure
for L to decide whether ϕT is satisfiable. This would solve the tiling problem,
but that is impossible given Theorem 2.2.9.
2.2.3 Interpolation and Beth definability
Interpolation and Beth definability are properties that we are also going to study
in the context of memory logics. We say that a modal logic has interpolation
over propositional symbols on a frame class C, if for all formulas ϕ, ψ such that
C |= ϕ→ ψ, there is a modal formula δ (usually called the interpolant) such that
C |= ϕ→ δ and C |= δ → ψ, and props(δ) ⊆ props(ϕ)∩ props(ψ). Note that there
is no restriction on the modalities occurring in δ.
Why do we want to study interpolation? One answer is that interpolation is
important as a modularity principle. Suppose there are two system specifications,
represented as sets of formulas Σ and Γ, and these specifications contradict each
other. If we have compactness, then the interpolation property tells us that there
is a formula ϕ in the common language, on which Σ and Γ disagree. In other
words, there is going to be a witness of the contradiction expressed in terms of
a set of symbols that both logics talk about. Other reason is that interpolation
has been considered an indicator of the existence of a cut-free sequent calculus
for the logic in question [BFB85]. Also interpolation is often useful to prove the
Beth property, which we will discuss later.
Observe that in the setting of hybrid logics, there is a choice to make. Do
we want to include the nominals in the common language? The first choice is to
require that the interpolant of a valid implication must contain only proposition
letters occurring both in the antecedent and in the consequent. No restriction is
made on the occurrence of nominals in the interpolant. The other option would
be to require that both the proposition letters and the nominals occurring in
the interpolant occur both in the antecedent and the consequent. We will refer
to these options as interpolation over proposition letters and interpolation over
proposition letters and nominals respectively.
In this work we are going to study a type of interpolation (that is the one we
just have defined above) called local interpolation or arrow interpolation. There
is another type of interpolation called global or turnstile interpolation, that we
will not analyze. More information about the different types of interpolation
and motivations for studying interpolation in general can be found in Hoogland’s
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dissertation [Hoo01].
Let us talk now about the Beth property. First we need to introduce the con-
cept of global entailment. Recall that in Section 1.2 we introduced just the local
version of semantic consequence. A formula ϕ is a global semantic consequence
of a set of formulas Σ (notation: Σ |=glo ϕ) if for all models M, if M |= Σ,
then M |= ϕ. Clearly, local semantic consequence implies global semantic con-
sequence. For a set of formulas Σ(p) containing the proposition letter p (and
possibly other proposition letters), we say that Σ(p) implicitly defines p, relative
to a frame class C, if Σ(p)∪Σ(p′) |=gloC p↔ p
′. Here, p′ is a propositional symbol
not occurring in Σ, and Σ(p′) is the result of replacing all occurrences of p by
p′ in Σ(p). A modal logic is said to have the Beth property relative to a frame
class C, if whenever a set of modal formulas Σ(p) implicitly defines a proposition
letter p, then there is a modal formula δ in which p does not occur, such that
Σ |=gloC p↔ δ. The formula δ is called an explicit definition of p relative to Σ and
C.
These two properties are very much related, and usually they are both present
at the same time in a given logic (it is not easy to find a logic where one property
is present and the other is absent, refer to [Hoo01] for details). Observe also
that the definition of interpolation uses the notion of local semantic consequence,
while Beth definability uses global consequence. Intuitively, the notion of Beth
involves the synchronization between implicit and explicit definition, and implicit
definition involves a set of formulas Σ(p) on the left side of the turnstile. That
makes Σ(p) impose conditions on the models in a global way, since it does not
bound any specific point in the model. On the other hand, interpolation involves
being able to find an interpolant for ϕ → ψ, where this formula holds in a local
sense, at the right side of the turnstile: at every given point where ϕ holds, then
ψ must also hold.
Intuitively, if a logic has the Beth property this can be interpreted as a sign
that its syntax and semantics match well. Both interpolation and Beth defin-
ability are strongly connected to the expressivity of a logic. In Chapter 5 we are
going to see that many of the results we present in Chapter 3 are going to be
‘reused’, but now in connection with these properties.
2.2.4 Axiomatizations
Until now we have been mainly talking about model theoretical issues, but logic
has a substantial proof-theoretic perspective. In this dissertation we are going
to focus in Hilbert-style and tableau approaches to modal proof theory in the
context of memory logics. We are going to discuss semantic tableau in the next
section.
The general question related to the syntactic side of a logic L is: are there
syntactic mechanisms capable of generating all the valid formulas of L? We
present here a Hilbert-style axiom system called K. This axiomatic system can
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be thought of as a system for reasoning about the class of all Kripke models.
Stronger systems can be obtained by adding extra axioms. It is not a coincidence
then that K is the system corresponding to the basic modal logic. Let us define
first some basic concepts before we explain this in more detail.
2.2.10. Definition. Given an axiomatization A, an A-proof is a finite sequence
of formulas, each of which is an axiom of A, or follows from one or more earlier
items in the sequence by applying a rule of proof of A. Any element of the
sequence of a proof is called a theorem of A. We write T (A) for the set of all
theorems in A.
So let us present now the axiomatic system K, and try to understand it from
an intuitive point of view:
Axioms:
CT All instances of propositional tautologies
K ⊢ [r](p→ q)→ ([r]p→ [r]q)
Rules:
MP If ⊢ ϕ and ⊢ ϕ→ ψ then ⊢ ψ
Gen If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ [r]ϕ
Sub If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ ϕ[p/ψ] for any p ∈ prop
Figure 2.7: Axiomatization for ML.
The expression ϕ[a/b] is the result of uniformly replacing all occurrences of a
in ϕ by b. Note that instances of propositional tautologies will contain modalities,
for example, 〈r〉p∨¬〈r〉p is an instance of a propositional tautology, as it has the
same form as p∨¬p. Modus ponens (MP) is probably very familiar to everybody,
so we will not go into details here. The uniform substitution rule (Sub) reflects the
fact that validity does not depend on a particular assignment: if a formula is valid,
this is not because of a particular assignment on its propositional symbols, so we
should be able to replace these symbols with any other symbols. Let us turn now
to the genuinely modal components of the system. The axiom K is often called
the distribution axiom, and together with MP , let us transform a boxed formula
[r](ϕ→ ψ) in an implication [r]ϕ→ [r]ψ. The ability to distribute the box over
the implication allows further propositional reasoning to take place. Finally, the
generalization rule (Gen) enable us to stack boxes in front of validities. While
the axiom K let us apply purely propositional reasoning inside boxed formulas,
the generalization rule creates new modal contexts to work with.
We said before that the system K is the axiomatic system for the basic modal
logic. What is the exact meaning of that? In a nutshell, that the theorems
generated by K and the validities derived from the semantic definition are exactly
the same set of formulas. That is to say, that the syntactic and the semantic
definition perfectly match. Let us define this concepts formally.
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2.2.11. Definition. [Consistency, Soundness, Completeness] We say that a for-
mula ϕ is consistent with respect to an axiomatization A (or A-consistent) if ¬ϕ
is not a theorem of A. The notion of consistency can be extended to a set of
formulas Γ by requiring that for no finite subset Γf , the formula
∧
Γf → ¬⊤ be
a theorem of A.
Recall that given a class of models C, we denote T (C) the set of all valid for-
mulas in C. Given an axiomatization A and a class of models C we say that A is
sound for C if T (A) ⊆ T (C), and that it is complete for C if T (C) ⊆ T (A). Com-
pleteness can be equivalently defined in terms of consistency and satisfiability: A
is complete for C if every formula consistent in A is satisfiable in C.
Finally, we say that an axiomatization A is strongly complete with respect to
C, if every A-consistent set of formulas is satisfiable in C.
Reformulating what we said before with these new definitions, we can state
the following theorem:
2.2.12. Theorem. [BdRV01] K is sound and strongly complete with respect to
the class of all models.
We are interested in providing sound and complete axiomatizations for mem-
ory logics, and since memory logics are an extension of the basic modal logic, the
axiomatic systems we are going to give are extensions of the system K. As it will
be clear from the details that we present in Chapter 6, nominals and @ will play
a crucial role in these axiomatic characterizations.
2.2.5 Tableau calculus
Axiomatic systems can be regarded as forward reasoning systems, in the sense
that one starts with axioms and rules, and finishes with the desired theorem.
They show in a very clear way the interaction among different logic operators,
and many of them are very elegant systems. As we have seen, the basic modal
logic can be described just by extending a propositional axiomatic system with the
K axiom and the Generalization rule. On the other hand, axiomatic systems are
often badly suited to proof discovery, and they are not usually good candidates
for automated deduction. In contrast, semantic tableau (or tableau for short)
is a backward reasoning system: it begins with the desired result and works
backward from there to create a proof. Tableaus were introduced in [Bet55], and
further developed in [Smu68]. They have shown to be a very flexible method for
a rich variety of logics, with many successful implementations. There are other
backward reasoning systems (one can mention resolution-based calculus, natural
deduction, Gentzen systems, sequent calculus, etc. [RV01]), but in this thesis we
are going to restrict ourselves to tableau calculus. We are just going to present
the tableau method from an intuitive point of view without giving full details.
For further references see [DGHP99].
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As a warming up for Chapter 7, we present a tableau calculus for the basic
modal logic ML. This result was originally presented in [Fit72]. To simplify the
presentation of the tableau rules, we are going to work with formulas in negation
normal form (NNF). A formula is in negation normal form if negation occurs only
immediately in front of atomic symbols. For the case of the basic modal logic,
each formula can be brought into this form by using standard De Morgan’s laws
to push negation inside propositional connectives, eliminating double negations
and applying the rewriting rules ¬〈r〉ϕ ≡ [r]¬ϕ and ¬[r]ϕ ≡ 〈r〉¬ϕ. Just for the
sake of convenience, we are going to work with ML fixing the language to the
propositional connectives ∨,∧ and ¬, plus the modal operators 〈r〉 and [r]. We
are also going to assume that the formulas we work with are already in NNF.
(∧)
w:ϕ ∧ ψ
w:ϕ
w:ψ
(∨)
w:ϕ ∨ ψ
w:ϕ | w:ψ
(〈r〉)
w:〈r〉ϕ
v:ϕ
wRrv
† ([r])
w:[r]ϕ wRrv
v:ϕ
(⊥)
w:p w:¬p
v:⊥
Key: † v is fresh.
Figure 2.8: A prefixed tableau for the basic modal logic
In Figure 2.8 we present a prefixed tableau calculus for ML. The term “pre-
fixed” means that the formulas occurring in the tableau rules are prefixed formulas
of the form τ :ϕ where ϕ is a formula and τ belongs to some fixed countably infinite
set of symbols called prefixes. The intended interpretation of a prefixed formula
τ :ϕ is that τ denotes a point at which ϕ holds. In addition to prefixed formu-
las, the tableau rules contain accessibility formulas of the form τ1Rrτ2, where τ1
and τ2 are prefixes. An accessibility formula τ1Rrτ2 represents that the point
denoted by τ1 is related through Rr with the point denoted by τ2. Observe that
prefixes are not part of the object language, they are just a way to “guide” the
construction of the tableau. Formally,
2.2.13. Definition. Let W = {w1, w2, . . . , } be an infinite enumerable set of
labels. Then w:ϕ is a prefixed formula, where ϕ ∈ ML and w ∈ W . wRrw
′ is
an accessibility formula for r ∈ rel, and w,w′ ∈ W . In this context, we will use
the term formula to denote either a formula of ML, a prefixed formula, or an
accessibility formula.
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The rules are presented in the standard format: each rule has a name on the
left and is divided in an upper (the antecedent) and lower (the consequent) part.
Whenever there are formulas in a branch that match the antecedent, the rule can
be applied following the constraints specified for each rule. If the rule is applied,
the formulas of the consequent are added to the same branch, except in the case
of (∨), where two different branches are created.
Let us analyze the rules from an intuitive point of view. Having in mind that
each branch of the tableaux represents an attempt to satisfy the root formula,
the propositional rules (∧) are (∨) are self-explanatory. Consider the (〈r〉) rule.
This rule decomposes the existential request made by the 〈r〉 operator in two:
first, there should be a w-successor point v and, second, the successor point v
must satisfy ϕ. Since there should be no a priori additional constraints set on
the successor of w, the prefix introduced by this rule is requested to be new. Let
us analyze now the ([r]) rule. In essence, this rule treats formulas of the form
w:[r]ϕ as constraints on all the successors of the point labeled by w. Every time
this type of formula is present and there is a prefix wRv, this rule imposes ϕ on
the point labeled by v. Finally, the (⊥) rule is a typical clash rule. A clash is
an indicator that the current attempt to satisfy the root formula is not possible.
When a propositional symbol p and its negation ¬p are found in the same branch,
holding at the same point, this rules inject a ⊥ in the branch, to prevent further
extensions.
As is the case also for axiomatic systems, the ultimate aim of a tableau calculus
is to characterize the set of valid formulas of a given logic. What is the meaning
of that in terms of a tableau? Let us define that formally.
2.2.14. Definition. A saturated tableau is a tableau in which no new formulas
can be added by applying the rules. A saturated branch is a branch of a saturated
tableau. A branch of a tableau is called closed if it contains ⊥. Otherwise the
branch is called open. A closed tableau is one in which all branches are closed,
and an open tableau is one in which at least one branch is open.
We call a tableau calculus T sound for a language L respect to a class of
models C if whenever ϕ ∈ L is C-satisfiable, then every saturated tableau T with
root ϕ has an open branch. We say that it is complete if whenever ϕ ∈ L is not
C-satisfiable, then every saturated tableau T with root ϕ is closed.
We said that the tableau calculus we presented characterizesML in the same
way the Hilbert-style axiomatic systemK does. Now we can restate that formally
as follows.
2.2.15. Theorem ([BN07]). The tableau calculus presented in Figure 2.8 is
sound and complete for ML with respect to the class of all models. More pre-
cisely, given ϕ ∈ML, ϕ is satisfiable iff any saturated tableau for ML with root
w:ϕ has an open branch.
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Using that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if ¬ϕ is not valid, we can use this method
to characterize both satisfiability and validity.
As we said before, tableaus showed to be a nice method to perform automated
deduction. Given that the basic modal logic is decidable, one expects the tableau
we presented to be a terminating tableau calculus, that is to say, that every
tableau derivation is finite. Since the tableau rules are all finitely branching, by
Ko¨nig lemma it suffices to see that the construction of every branch terminates,
or in other words, that every saturated branch has finite length.
Observe that the tableau calculus we presented does not necessarily terminate.
One reason is quite obvious: we have to restrict adding the same formula twice in
the same branch. But there is a more subtle reason. Note that the (〈r〉) rule can
be applied infinitely many times, generating a new prefix in every application.
To avoid that, we are going to impose two constraints on the construction of a
tableau:
1. A formula is never added to a tableau branch where it already occurs.
2. The rule 〈r〉 is never applied twice to a formula on a given branch.
Of course, these restrictions do not affect soundness. But it can also be shown
(see [BN07]) that the resulting tableau is terminating and complete.
Returning to the memory logic family, we are interested in providing sound
and complete tableau calculus for some of its members. In Chapter 7 we are
going to present these results. We will see that the use of prefixed tableaus is
an effective method to gain a finer-grained control on tableau derivations. This
will help to overcome some difficulties, like the ones we found with Hilbert-style
systems and the lack of nominals.
2.3 How memory logics were born?
We finish this chapter giving a brief historical recap about how memory logics
were conceived.
Memory logics where initially defined for purely theoretical reasons (related
to questions concerning binding and decidability), but it soon became clear that
they could provide an interesting perspective on the question of how can a formula
modify the model in which the formula is being evaluated, as we discussed above.
They were inspired by hybrid logics like HL(↓), but while the ↓ operator was
introduced to investigate dynamic naming of elements in a model, memory logics
include operators that let us store and retrieve information from some kind of
information structure or memory. But as we will see, properly viewed, HL(↓)
could be considered a memory logic.
As we saw in Section 1.3.3, one way of looking at the semantic condition for
↓i.ϕ is that it dynamically creates a name for the current point (by linking the
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nominal i to it), so that we can later refer to it during the evaluation of ϕ. An
alternative perspective is to see ↓i as an instruction to modify the model (by
storing the current point of evaluation into i), and continue the evaluation of ϕ
in the modified model. The difference between the two perspectives is subtle, but
important in this context. In the latter, we are considering the assignment g as
a kind of memory in our model, while ↓i and i are the tools we use to access the
memory for reading and writing. The question then presents itself naturally: are
there other kinds of interesting memory structures and memory operators?
We could say that the assignment g is a very sophisticated memory structure:
it has unbounded size, it provides direct access to all its memory cells, and each
stored element can be unequivocally retrieved. The set S we discussed above,
together with the operators©r and©k , provides a much simpler memory structure.
Intuitively, these operators cannot discern between different points stored in S,
while an assignment g keeps a complete mapping between points and nominals.
On the other hand, we can turn things around and think of©r as a binder that
effectively binds instances of©k appearing in its scope. In other words, as we can
see ↓i and nominals as memory operators which store and retrieve information
from a memory structure, we could see ©r as a binder that binds occurrences
of ©k in its scope. Because the memory structure used by ©r and ©k has smaller
discerning power, we would expect that the new operators are less expressive than
HL(↓).
Actually, as we are going to see in the next chapters, with ©f , ©e , ©r and ©k
we can express properties similarly as how it is done using binders in different
hybrid languages [AtC06, Bla00].
Chapter 3
Expressiveness
No se´ distinguir entre besos y ra´ıces
no se´ distinguir lo complicado de lo simple
“Las chispa adecuada”, He´roes del Silencio.
In this chapter we are going to formally measure the expressive power of
several memory logic fragments. To be able to do that, we will investigate the
notion of model equivalence and develop appropriate notions of bisimulation (both
the structural and the game versions). Then we will use these tools to compare
different memory fragments among them, and to examine them in contrast with
ML and HL(↓).
As we said before, it is not our intention to be completely exhaustive and
explore all possible combinations of memory operators. We just show the com-
parison between some fragments that we consider interesting for exposing the
impact of each different ‘memory ingredient’. In many cases, the results shown
for some fragments can be easily transfered to other fragments, not explicitly
analyzed.
3.1 Model equivalence
Now we want to extend the notion of bisimulation we gave in Section 2.2.3 to
include memory operators. In this context we also need to take care of the
memory, so bisimulations will not simply link points but pairs (S,m), where S is
the current memory and w a point. We start by defining the notion of bisimulation
for the simplest memory logicMLm(〈r〉), that is, the basic modal logic extended
with ©r and ©k .
Given two models M1 and M2, and points w1 ∈ W1 and w2 ∈ W2, we say
that they agree when props(w1) = props(w2) and w1 ∈ S1 iff w2 ∈ S2.
3.1.1. Definition. [Memory bisimulation] LetM1 andM2 be two models. Let
∼ be a binary relation between 2W1 × W1 and 2
W2 × W2. So ∼ relates tuples
〈{m1,m2, . . . },m〉 with 〈{n1, n2, . . . }, n〉. We write these tuples as 〈S,m〉. The
bisimulation relationship should satisfy the following properties:
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(nontriv) ∼ is not empty.
(agree) If 〈S,m〉 ∼ 〈S ′, n〉, then m and n agree.
(zig) If 〈S,m〉 ∼ 〈S ′, n〉 and mR1rm
′, then there exists
n′ ∈ W2 such that nR
2
rn
′ and 〈S,m′〉 ∼ 〈S ′, n′〉.
(zag) If 〈S,m〉 ∼ 〈S ′, n〉 and nR2rn
′, then there exists
m′ ∈ W1 such that mR
1
rm
′ and 〈S,m′〉 ∼ 〈S ′, n′〉.
(remember) If 〈S,m〉 ∼ 〈S ′, n〉, then 〈S ∪ {m},m〉 ∼ 〈S ′ ∪ {n}, n〉.
It is worth making some remarks here. First note that this definition extends
the one given in Definition 2.2.3. The condition (agree) extends atomic harmony
to include the memory, and therefore shows that now we have the ability to check
whether a point is memorized using©k . The conditions (zig) and (zag) are exactly
the same conditions than for the basic modal case. The new condition (remember)
reflects the fact that now we can add points to the current memory using ©r .
Second, observe the modular character of the definition of bisimulation, in which
each operator in the logic has a clause (or set of clauses) directly associated to
it. That means that in fact we have defined conditions that any definition of
bisimulation for a memory logic including the operators 〈r〉, ©r and ©k (and the
standard boolean operators) must fulfill.
We can exploit this modular character, and define the notion of bisimulation
forMLm(〈〈r〉〉). Since in this logic the only change involves replacing 〈r〉 for 〈〈r〉〉,
then resulting definition behaves as expected: we should change only the (zig)
and (zag) rules, and replace them with the following two conditions:
(mzig) If 〈S,m〉 ∼ 〈S ′, n〉 and mR1rm
′, then there exists n′ ∈ W2
such that nR2rn
′ and 〈S ∪ {m},m′〉 ∼ 〈S ′ ∪ {n}, n′〉.
(mzag) If 〈S,m〉 ∼ 〈S ′, n〉 and nR2rn
′, then there exists m′ ∈ W1
such that mR1rm
′ and 〈S ∪ {m},m′〉 ∼ 〈S ′ ∪ {n}, n′〉.
In the same way as before, not only we defined a bisimulation forMLm(〈〈r〉〉),
but a set of conditions that any full Boolean memory logic including the operators
〈〈r〉〉, ©r and©k must fulfill. We only have left outside the operators©e and©f , so
let us define the associated bisimulation conditions for each of them now:
(erase) If 〈S,m〉 ∼ 〈S ′, n〉, then 〈∅,m〉 ∼ 〈∅, n〉
(forget) If 〈S,m〉 ∼ 〈S ′, n〉, then 〈S \ {m},m〉 ∼ 〈S ′ \ {n}, n〉.
With these definitions, we have presented the bisimulation notions for all the
fragments introduced in Definition 2.1.1. Every time we pick a specific memory
fragment, we need to select the associated clauses from the definition of bisimu-
lation to obtain the appropriate notion for it.
In the same manner we did with the bisimulation for the basic modal logic,
given two pointed models 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M2, w2〉 we write 〈M1, w1〉 ↔ 〈M2,
w2〉 if there is a bisimulation linking 〈S1, w1〉 and 〈S2, w2〉. The exact type of
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bisimulation involved will usually be clear from the context, and we will write
↔L when we need to specify that the bisimulation corresponds to the logic L.
In Section 2.2.1 we said that an equivalent notion of bisimulations can be pre-
sented from the perspective of games. In many contexts this alternative notion
will be very useful for our purposes, so we present here the Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´
games for the fragments we are going to study. In the same way as with bisimula-
tions, the possible moves for both players can also be presented in a modular way.
Each type of move is associated with an operator, and picking a concrete set of
operators automatically defines the set of possible moves in the game. Moreover,
observe that the following definition extends the one we gave for the basic modal
logic.
3.1.2. Definition. [Memory Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ Games] Let M1 and M2 be
two models and let w1 ∈ W1 and w2 ∈ W2.
An memory Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game EF (M1,M2, w1, w2) is defined as fol-
lows. There are two players called Spoiler and Duplicator. Duplicator immedi-
ately loses if w1 and w2 do not agree. Otherwise, the game starts, with the players
moving alternatively. Spoiler always makes the first move in a turn of the game,
starting by choosing in which model he will make a move. Let us set s = 1 and
d = 2 in case he chooses M1; otherwise, let s = 2 and d = 1.
For the fragments including the operators {〈r〉,©r ,©k } the possible moves are
as follows:
1. Make a memorizing step. I.e., Spoiler extends Ss to Ss ∪ {ws}. The next
turn then starts with EF (M1[w1],M2[w2], w1, w2) (Duplicator does nothing
in this case).
2. Make a move step. I.e., Spoiler chooses r ∈ rel, and vs, an R
s
r-successor
of ws. If ws has no R
s
r-successors, then Duplicator wins. Duplicator has
to chose vd, an R
d
r-successor of wd, such that vs and vd agree. If there
is no such successor, Spoiler wins. Otherwise the game continues with
EF (M1,M2, v1, v2).
The moves for the fragments that have the 〈〈r〉〉 operator instead of 〈r〉 are
similar, except that during a move step Spoiler always remembers the current
world, i.e., the game goes on with EF (M1[w1],M2[w2], v1, v2) after Duplicator
response.
If we want to include the operators©e and©f , we should add the corresponding
moves for the players. The associated moves for them are the following:
• Make a erasing step. I.e., Spoiler wipes out Ss, that is, sets Ss = ∅.
The next turn then starts with EF (〈W1, (R
1
r)r∈rel, V1, ∅〉, 〈W2, (R
2
r)r∈rel, V2,
∅〉, w1, w2).
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• Make a forgetting step. I.e., Spoiler deletes ws from Ss, that is, sets Ss =
Ss \{ws}. The next turn then starts with EF (〈W1, (R
1
r)r∈rel, V1, S1 \{w1}〉,
〈W2, (R
2
r)r∈rel, V2, S2 \ {w2}〉, w1, w2).
The winning conditions for the game EF (M1,M2, w1, w2) are the same we
used for the basic modal logic: before the game begins, Duplicator immediately
loses if w1 and w2 do not coincide in the propositional symbols. In subsequent
rounds, if Duplicator responds with a successor that differs in the atomic propo-
sitions with respect to the point chosen by Spoiler, Duplicator loses. If one player
cannot move, the other wins, and Duplicator wins on infinite runs of which Spoiler
does not win. We also assume that both players always make a move if they can.
Given these conditions, observe that exactly one of Spoiler or Duplicator wins
each game.
3.1.3. Lemma. Every play in a game EF (M1,M2, w1, w2) has exactly one win-
ner.
Proof. This is quite easy to see looking at the winning conditions we have just
defined. If the two players play inifinitely often, Duplicator wins by definition.
The other case is that there is a final move in the game. If the final move is made
by Spoiler, that means that Duplicator could not move, and therefore Spoiler
wins. If the final move is made by Duplicator, then there are two posibilities. If
Duplicator answered with a matching successor, and Spoiler could not continue
playing, the only possible reason is that Spoiler could not move, and therefore
Duplicator wins. The other case is that Duplicator answered with a disagreeing
successor, and in that case Spoiler wins. ✷
Following the same notation we already gave, given two pointed models 〈M1,
w1〉 and 〈M2, w2〉 we will write 〈M1, w1〉 ≡
EF 〈M2, w2〉 when Duplicator has a
winning strategy for EF (M1,M2, w1, w2) (the exact type of game involved will
usually be clear from the context, and we will write ≡EFL when we need to specify
that the game corresponds to the logic L).
As we said before, the notions of Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games and bisimulations
coincide, as indicated in the following theorem. We just prove it for MLm(〈r〉),
since the cases when we have 〈〈r〉〉, ©e or ©f are quite similar.
3.1.4. Theorem. Let 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M2, w2〉 be two pointed models. Then
〈M1, w1〉 ≡
EF
MLm(〈r〉) 〈M2, w2〉 if and only if 〈M1, w1〉 ↔MLm(〈r〉) 〈M2, w2〉.
Proof. For the right to left direction. Assume that 〈S1, w1〉 and 〈S2, w2〉 are
bisimilar. We will prove that there is a strategy for Duplicator in the game
EF (M1,M2, w1, w2). First note that the game EF (M1,M2, w1, w2) is well
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defined, since by (agree) w1 and w2 are agreeing points. We show that there
is a strategy for Duplicator by proving that (1) for any pair of tuples 〈S,w〉
and 〈Q, v〉 such that 〈S,w〉 ∼ 〈Q, v〉, and for any Spoiler step in the game
EF (M1[S],M2[Q], w, v), there is always an appropriate answer for Duplicator
such that the next step of the game is EF (M1[S
′],M2[Q
′], w′, v′) and 〈S ′, w′〉 ∼
〈Q′, v′〉. Given the initial assumptions, the fact that Duplicator has a winning
strategy on the game EF (M1,M2, w1, w2) easily follows from (1). So let us
suppose that 〈S,w〉 ∼ 〈Q, v〉 and consider the game EF (M1[S],M2[Q], w, v).
Without loss of generality, we assume that Spoiler choosesM1 to make his move.
There are two kinds of moves Spoiler can do:
• Spoiler chooses to make a memorizing step, so the game goes on with
EF (M1[S ∪ {w}],M2[Q ∪ {v}], w, v). By the (remember) condition, we
know that 〈S ∪ {w}, w〉 ∼ 〈Q ∪ {v}, v〉.
• Spoiler chooses to make a move step, so he chooses an R-successor w′ of w.
By the (zig) condition (we should use (zag) here if we would have supposed
that Duplicator chooses M2 to make his move), there is an R-successor v
′
of v such that 〈S,w′〉 ∼ 〈Q, v′〉. Using (agree), we know that w′ and v′
agree, so v′ is a good choice for Duplicator, the next step of the game is
EF (M1[S],M2[Q], w
′, v′) and 〈S,w′〉 ∼ 〈Q, v′〉.
For the other direction, let us suppose that Duplicator has a winning strat-
egy S on the game EF (M1,M2, w1, w2), where M1 = 〈W1, R1, S1, V1〉 and
M2 = 〈W2, R2, S2, V2〉. We are going to define a bisimulation relation ∼ in
the following way: 〈S,w〉 ∼ 〈Q, v〉 iff EF (M1[S],M2[Q], w, v) is some stage of
the game EF (M1,M2, w1, w2) reached by the players when Duplicator follows
the strategy S.
So now we have to see that the relation ∼ we defined is actually a bisimula-
tion. Suppose that 〈S,w〉 ∼ 〈Q, v〉. Using the definition of ∼, that means that
EF (M1[S],M2[Q], w, v) is a reachable game state from EF (M1,M2, w1, w2)
when Duplicator uses the strategy S. Let us check the bisimulation conditions:
• The condition (agree) is easy to see, given that the definition of ∼ implies
that if 〈S,w〉 ∼ 〈Q, v〉 then w and v are agreeing points.
• To see that the (zig) condition holds, suppose thatRM(m,m′). One possible
move for Spoiler in the game EF (M1[S],M2[Q], w, v) is to choose m
′ from
M1, and because Duplicator uses the winning strategy S, he can answer
with a point v′ ∈M2, a successor of v, such that w
′ and v′ agree. Therefore,
the next step of the game is EF (M1[S],M2[Q], w
′, v′), and by definition,
〈S,w′〉 ∼ 〈Q, v′〉. The (zag) condition is equivalent.
• For the (remember) condition, note that in the game EF (M1[S], M2[Q],
w, v) Spoiler can choose to make a memorizing step, and therefore the next
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step of the game is EF (M1[S ∪ {w}],M2[Q ∪ {v}], w, v). By definition,
that means that 〈S ∪ {w}, w〉 ∼ 〈Q ∪ {v}, v〉.
Therefore, ∼ is actually a bisimulation. Because the game EF (M1,M2, w1, w2)
is a (trivial) reachable stage of itself, 〈S1, w〉 ∼ 〈S2, v〉 as desired. ✷
The previous theorem shows that both notions are interchangeable, so using
↔L or ≡
EF
L is going to be exactly the same from now on. But what really matters
is that these notions preserve the truth values of formulas. Again, we are only
going to give this proof forMLm(〈r〉), but the same result can be easily extended
for the other memory fragments.
3.1.5. Theorem. Let 〈M1, w1〉 and 〈M2, w2〉 be two pointed models. Then
〈M1, w1〉 ≡
EF
MLm(〈r〉) 〈M2, w2〉 implies 〈M1, w1〉 !MLm(〈r〉) 〈M2, w2〉.
Proof. We prove that if w1 and w2 agree and Duplicator has a winning strategy
on EF (M1,M2, w1, w2) then ∀ϕ ∈ ML
m(〈r〉), M1, w1 |= ϕ iff M2, w2 |= ϕ.
We proceed by induction on ϕ.
• The propositional and boolean cases are trivial.
• ϕ =©k . This case follows from the semantic definition in 2.1.3 and because
w1 and w2 agree.
• ϕ = 〈r〉ψ. This is the standard modal case. Preservation is ensured thanks
to the move steps in the definition of the game.
• ϕ = ©rψ. We prove that M1, w1 |= ©rψ implies M2, w2 |= ©rψ. Suppose
M1, w1 |=©rψ then M1[w1], w1 |= ψ. The following claim is clear.
Claim. LetM1,M2 be two models, w1 ∈M1, w2 ∈M2. If Duplicator has
a winning strategy on EF (M1,M2, w1, w2) then he has a winning strategy
on EF (M1[w1],M2[w2], w1, w2).
Following this claim, Duplicator has a winning strategy on EF (M1[w1],
M2[w2], w1, w2). Applying inductive hypothesis and the fact thatM1[w1],
w1 |= ψ, we conclude M2[w2], w2 |= ψ and then M2, w2 |=©rψ. The other
direction is identical.
This concludes the proof. ✷
One final remark. We have proved that bisimulations preserve satisfiability,
but a valid question one can pose is: are these definitions too strong? That is,
could we present weaker definitions that also preserve satisfiability? There is usu-
ally a mismatch between structural preserving morphisms and logic equivalence.
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This issue is not exclusive to the modal logic area, and it is the same mismatch
one can find between partial isomorphisms and first order logic equivalence. For
more information about this in the context of modal logic, see [BdRV01].
But there is something we can say in favor of the definitions we gave. In the
class of image-finite models, we can establish the equivalence between bisimula-
tions and logic equivalence. This is usually seen as a good sign that bisimulations
are well defined.
3.1.6. Definition. A model M is image finite if for all points w ∈ M, the set
{v | wR∪v, where R∪ =
⋃
r∈rel Rr} is finite.
We prove the image finite property for the case of MLm(〈r〉), assuming a
unique modal relation Rr. The cases for the other memory operators and the
generalization for the multi-modal case are quite easy to establish.
3.1.7. Theorem. If M1 and M2 are image finite then 〈M1, w1〉 !MLm(〈r〉)
〈M2, w2〉 implies 〈M1, w1〉 ≡
EF
MLm(〈r〉) 〈M2, w2〉.
Proof. We prove that the relation ! of modal equivalence induces, at any stage
of the game, the next step in Duplicator’s strategy (throughout this proof, we are
going to work with MLm(〈r〉), so we will drop the subscripts in ! and ≡EF ).
We show that for anyM′1,M
′
2, w
′
1 ∈M
′
1, w
′
2 ∈M
′
2 such thatM
′
1, w
′
1 ! M
′
2, w
′
2,
and for any v1 ∈M
′
1 that Spoiler selects, Duplicator can always answer v2 ∈M
′
2
such thatM′1, v1 ! M
′
2, v2 (and symmetrically in the case Spoiler choosesM
′
2).
Suppose Spoiler chooses M′1 to play.
1) Suppose Spoiler decides to take a move step. He chooses v1, an Rr-successor
of w′1. Assume by contradiction that Duplicator cannot respond back. This
means that he cannot exhibit v2, an Rr-successor of w
′
2, such that M
′
1, v1 !
M′2, v2. Suppose {u1, . . . , un} are the successors of w
′
2. Let ψ1, . . . , ψn be
formulas such that M′2, ui 6|= ψi and M
′
1, v1 |= ψi. It follows that M
′
1, w
′
1 |=
〈r〉(ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn) and M
′
2, w
′
2 6|= 〈r〉(ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn). This is a contradiction,
since we supposed M′1, w
′
1 ! M
′
2, w
′
2.
2) Suppose Spoiler decides to remember w′1. As in the above case, there are for-
mulas ψ1, . . . , ψn such thatM
′
1[w
′
1], w
′
1 |= 〈r〉(ψ1∧· · ·∧ψn) andM
′
2[w
′
2], w
′
2 6|=
〈r〉(ψ1∧· · ·∧ψn). By definition,M
′
1, w
′
1 |=©r 〈r〉(ψ1∧· · ·∧ψn) andM
′
2, w
′
2 6|=
©r 〈r〉(ψ1∧· · ·∧ψn) and we arrive to the same contradiction as in the previous
case.
This concludes the proof. ✷
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3.2 Expressive power
In this section we are going to compare the expressive power of different memory
logic fragments. We want to make a comparison among them, and also with re-
spect to both the basic modal logic and the hybrid logicHL(↓), in order to have a
general picture of where these fragments are situated. To do this, we will have to
find a natural mapping between models of each logic, similar to the natural map-
ping that exists between Kripke models and first order models [BdRV01]. Such a
mapping is easy to define in the case of the ML∅ logics, where we only consider
models with S = ∅: each Kripke model 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉 can be identified with the
memory model 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, ∅〉. Similarly, for sentences, the memory model
〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, ∅〉 can be identified with the hybrid model 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, g〉
(for g arbitrary).
To improve the presentation of this section, sometimes we are going to present
theorems that are later subsumed by stronger results. The reasons for doing this
are in some cases just for the sake of clarity. In others it is because we believe
that the proofs of some results are interesting by themselves.
We start by defining a way to compare the expressive power of two logics:
3.2.1. Definition. [L ≤ L′] We say that L′ is at least as expressive as L (no-
tation L ≤ L′) if there is a function Tr between formulas of L and L′ such that
for every model M, every w ∈M and every formula ϕ of L we have that
M, w |=L ϕ iff M, w |=L′ Tr(ϕ).
(here it should be understood that the model M is seen as a model of L on the
left and as a model of L′ on the right).
We say that L′ is strictly more expressive than L (notation L < L′) if L ≤ L′
but not L′ ≤ L. And we say that L and L′ are equally expressive (notation
L = L′) if L ≤ L′ and L′ ≤ L.
3.2.1 Logics with an initially empty memory
Here we will compare the logics MLm∅ (〈r〉) and ML
m
∅ (〈〈r〉〉) between them, and
with the basic modal logic and the hybrid logic HL(↓). Summarizing the results,
we are going to establish that ML <MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) <ML
m
∅ (〈r〉) < HL(↓).
First we are going to show that the freedom to decide when to remember a
point gives MLm∅ (〈r〉) more expressive power when compared to ML
m
∅ (〈〈r〉〉).
3.2.2. Theorem. MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) <ML
m
∅ (〈r〉).
Proof. [MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) ≤ML
m
∅ (〈r〉)]: It is easy to see that there is a translation Tr
fromMLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) toML
m
∅ (〈r〉)-formulas which maps 〈〈r〉〉ϕ to©r 〈r〉ϕ and verifies
M, w |= ϕ iff M, w |= Tr(ϕ) for all model M and all w ∈M.
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[MLm∅ (〈r〉) 6≤ ML
m
∅ (〈〈r〉〉)]: Let M1 = 〈{w, v, r}, R1, ∅, ∅〉 and M2 = 〈{w, v,
r}, R2, ∅, ∅〉 such that R1 = {(w, v), (v, r), (r, w)}, R2 = {(w, v), (v, r), (r, v)}, as
shown below:
w v r
M1
w v r
M2
We claim 〈M1, w〉 ≡
EF
MLm(〈〈r〉〉) 〈M2, w〉. As every point in both models has a
unique successor, Duplicator has only one way of playing, which is actually a win-
ning strategy. Hence 〈M1, w〉 ≡MLm(〈〈r〉〉) 〈M2, w〉. But M1, w 6|= 〈r〉©r 〈r〉〈r〉©k ,
while M2, w |= 〈r〉©r 〈r〉〈r〉©k . ✷
We will now compare the expressive power of memory logics with the basic
modal logic ML. It is not difficult to see intuitively that ©r and ©k do bring
additional expressive power into the language of ML: with their help we can
detect cycles in a given model, while formulas of K are invariant under unraveling.
3.2.3. Theorem. ML <MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉).
Proof. It is quite easy to see that ML ≤MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) taking Tr to be a trans-
lation that maps 〈r〉 to 〈〈r〉〉, and that acts as the identity function for the rest of
the operators.
To see that MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) 6≤ ML, let M1 = 〈{w}, {(w,w)}, ∅〉 and M2 =
〈{u, v}, {(u, v), (v, u)}, ∅〉 be two Kripke models as shown below:
w
M1
u v
M2
It is easy to see that both models areML bisimilar using the bisimulation with
the pairs (w, u), (w, v). However, they can be distinguished by the MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-
formula 〈〈r〉〉©k . ✷
We will now compare the expressive power of memory logics with respect to
hybrid logics. The most natural choice for the comparison is the hybrid logic
HL(↓). We will prove that HL(↓) is strictly more expressive than MLm∅ (〈r〉).
Intuitively, ↓ can easily simulate©r , but©k does not distinguish between different
memorized points (while nominals bound by ↓ do).
3.2.4. Theorem. MLm∅ (〈r〉) < HL(↓).
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Proof. We first prove that MLm∅ (〈r〉) ≤ HL(↓). We define the translation Tr,
taking MLm∅ (〈r〉)-formulas over the signature 〈prop, rel〉 to HL(↓) sentences
over the signature 〈prop,rel,nom〉. The intuitive idea of the translation is that
©r appears a finite number of times within a formula, and each time we can use
↓ to create a name for that point. Then, ©k can be thought of as the (finite)
disjunction of the names of the points memorized by ©r . Formally, Tr is defined
for any finite set N ⊆ nom as follows:
TrN(p) = p p ∈ prop
TrN(©k ) =
∨
i∈N i
TrN(¬ϕ) = ¬TrN(ϕ)
TrN(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = TrN(ϕ1) ∧ TrN(ϕ2)
TrN(〈r〉ϕ) = 〈r〉TrN(ϕ)
TrN(©rϕ) = ↓i.TrN∪{i}(ϕ) where i /∈ N .
A simple induction shows that M, w |= ϕ iff M, g, w |= Tr∅(ϕ), for any g.
Now we prove that HL(↓) is strictly more expressive than MLm∅ (〈r〉). Let
M1 = 〈N, R1, ∅, ∅〉 and M2 = 〈N, R2, ∅, ∅〉, where R1 = {(n,m) | n 6= m} ∪
{(0, 0)} and R2 = R1 ∪ {(1, 1)}. Graphically,
0
. . .
...
.
.
.
. . .
M1
0
1 . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
M2
where the accessibility relation is the transitive closure of the arrows shown but
without reflexive loops except those explicitly marked.
We prove that 〈M1, 0〉 ≡
EF
MLm∅ (〈r〉)
〈M2, 0〉 showing a winning strategy for Du-
plicator. Intuitively, the strategy for Duplicator is as follows: whenever one player
is in 〈M1, 0〉 the other will be in 〈M2, 0〉 or 〈M2, 1〉, and conversely whenever
a player is in 〈M1, n〉, n > 0, the other will be in 〈M2,m〉, m > 1. This is
maintained until Spoiler (if ever) decides to remember a point. Once this is done,
then any move leads to a win of Duplicator.
Formally, the winning strategy will have two stages:
1. While Spoiler does not remember any reflexive point, Duplicator plays as
follows: if Spoiler chooses 0 in any model, Duplicator chooses 0 in the other;
if Spoiler chooses n > 0 in M1, Duplicator plays n + 1 in M2; if Spoiler
chooses n > 0 in M2, Duplicator plays n− 1 in M1. Notice that with this
strategy Spoiler chooses a reflexive point if and only if Duplicator answers
with a reflexive one. This is clearly a winning strategy.
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2. If ever Spoiler decides to remember a reflexive point, Duplicator starts using
the following strategy: if Spoiler selects a point n, Duplicator answers with
an agreeing point m of the opposite model. Notice that this is always
possible since both n and m see infinitely many non-memorized points and
at least one memorized point.
On the other hand, let ϕ be the formula ↓i.〈r〉(i∧ 〈r〉(¬i∧ ↓i.〈r〉i)). It is easy to
see that M1, 0 6|= ϕ but M2, 0 |= ϕ. ✷
We have shown that MLm∅ (〈r〉) < HL(↓) but the proof seems to intrinsically
use infinite models, in contrast with the proofs for Theorems 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4
in which finite models are used. Actually, MLm∅ (〈r〉) < HL(↓) even on finite
models. For this purpose we will first introduce a version of the Ehrenfeucht-
Fra¨ısse´ game presented in Definition 3.1.2 where the number of turns is bounded.
3.2.5. Definition. The n-moves Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game for a given logic L,
denoted EF n(M1,M2, w1, w2), is the game in which Spoiler can only make at
most n moving steps in the game to beat Duplicator. In the case Duplicator has
a strategy to remain undefeated for n steps, he wins the game and we will write
〈M1, w1〉 ≡
EF
n
〈M2, w2〉.
We use the usual definition of modal depth, that essentially counts the maxi-
mum nesting of modalities. Anyway, we define it here for the sake of completeness
for the whole set of operators we presented:
3.2.6. Definition. We define the modal depth of modal formulas as follows:
depth(p) = 0
depth(©k ) = 0
depth(¬ϕ) = depth(ϕ)
depth(ϕ ∧ ψ) = max{depth(ϕ), depth(ψ)}
depth(〈r〉ϕ) = 1 + depth(ϕ)
depth(〈〈r〉〉ϕ) = 1 + depth(ϕ)
depth(©rϕ) = depth(ϕ)
depth(©eϕ) = depth(ϕ)
depth(©fϕ) = depth(ϕ)
There is an obvious connection between rounds in a game and modal depth
of a formula. We will state without a proof the following easy theorem.
3.2.7. Theorem. For any pair of pointed models, 〈M1, w1〉 ≡
EF
n
〈M2, w2〉 if
and only if for every formula ϕ with modal depth n, M1, w1 |= ϕ iff M2, w2 |= ϕ.
Now we can prove the desired result for finite models:
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w0
w1 w2
w3
M12
w0
w1 w2
w3
M22
Figure 3.1: Spoiler cannot win with only 2 moves.
3.2.8. Theorem. MLm∅ (〈r〉) < HL(↓) over the class of finite models.
Proof. We will prove that there is a property ϕ expressible in HL(↓) that
cannot be expressed in MLm∅ (〈r〉) over finite models. To do this, for every n we
will exhibit two finite models M1n,M
2
n such that M
1
n, w0 |= ϕ, M
2
n, w0 6|= ϕ but
〈M1n, w0〉 ≡
EF
n
MLm∅ (〈r〉)
〈M2n, w0〉. This implies that there is no ML
m
∅ (〈r〉)-formula
ψ capable of expressing this property.
Let ϕ = ↓i.〈r〉(i ∧ 〈r〉(¬i ∧ ↓i.〈r〉i)) as in the proof of Theorem 3.2.4, and
let, for n ≥ 1, M1n = 〈Wn, R1, ∅, ∅〉 and M
2
n = 〈Wn, R2, ∅, ∅〉 where Wn =
{w0, . . . , wn+1}, R1 = {(n,m) | n 6= m} ∪ {(w0, w0)}, and R2 = R1 ∪ {(w1, w1)}
(M12 and M
2
2 are shown in Figure 3.1). Clearly, for every n ≥ 1, M
1
n, w0 6|= ϕ
and M2n, w0 |= ϕ.
To prove that 〈M1n, w0〉 ≡
EF
n 〈M
2
n, w0〉, we will describe Duplicator’s winning
strategy:
1. While Spoiler does not remember any reflexive point, Duplicator plays with
the following strategy: whenever Spoiler is inwk, 2 ≤ k ≤ n+1 in one model,
Duplicator is in an agreeing point wk′ , 2 ≤ k
′ ≤ n + 1 in the other one. If
one player is in w0 in M
1
n then the other is in w0 or w1 in M
2
n. Finally, if
Spoiler plays w1 in M
1
n, Duplicator plays in an agreeing wk, 2 ≤ k ≤ n+ 1
in M2n. Note that with this strategy, Spoiler chooses a reflexive point iff
Duplicator answers with a reflexive one, and that Duplicator will always be
able to choose an agreeing point.
2. If ever Spoiler decides to remember a reflexive point, then for every point
wi chosen by Spoiler, Duplicator will always have an agreeing point wj on
the opposite model he can choose from. This happens because the models
have n+2 points, and therefore there is always at least two non-memorized
points. At each round the number of non-memorized points can only be
decremented by one, and then up to round n both players will always see
memorized and not memorized points from wi and well as from wj.
✷
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The HL(↓)-sentence we use in the proofs of Theorem 3.2.4 and 3.2.8 has only
one nominal. Hence, we have actually proved that HL1(↓) 6≤ ML
m
∅ (〈r〉), where
HL1(↓) is HL(↓) restricted to only one nominal. But actually, it is also the case
that MLm∅ (〈r〉) 6≤ HL1(↓). More generally, for any fixed number k of nominals,
the logics HLk(↓) and ML
m
∅ (〈r〉) are incomparable.
3.2.9. Theorem. For any fixed k, the logics HLk(↓) and ML
m
∅ (〈r〉) are incom-
parable in terms of expressive power.
Proof. We will show the proof for k = 1, the general case being similar.
HL1(↓) 6≤ ML
m
∅ (〈r〉) is a direct consequence of the proof of Theorem 3.2.4.
To proveMLm∅ (〈r〉) 6≤ HL1(↓), letM1 = 〈{1, 2, 3}, {(i, j) | 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3}, ∅, ∅〉
and M2 = 〈{1, 2}, {(i, j) | 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2}, ∅, ∅〉 (a clique of size 3 and 2 respec-
tively). It is easy to check that 〈M1, 1〉 ↔HL1(↓) 〈M2, 1〉. However, the formula
ϕ =©r 〈r〉(¬©k ∧©r 〈r〉(¬©k ∧©r 〈r〉¬©k )) distinguishes the models: M1, 1 |= ϕ but
M2, 1 6|= ϕ.
The proof for HLk(↓) is similar, taking cliques of the appropriate size. ✷
3.2.2 Erase and Forget operators
Now we want to include the operators ©e and ©f in the picture, and see which is
the expressive power associated to them. We are only going to consider here ©e
and ©f in the context of the class C∅, and with the usual interpretation for the
diamond operator.
The first result regarding these new operators says that independently adding
©e and ©f does increase the expressive power.
3.2.10. Theorem. MLm∅ (〈r〉) < ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©f ) and ML
m
∅ (〈r〉) < ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,
©e ).
Proof. It is trivial to see that MLm∅ (〈r〉) ≤ ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©f ),ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©e )
taking the identity translation. To see that MLm∅ (〈r〉) 6= ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©f ) and
MLm∅ (〈r〉) 6= ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©e ), let M1 and M2 be the models described in the
proof of Theorem 3.2.4. Recall that 〈M1, 0〉 is ML
m
∅ (〈r〉)-bisimilar to 〈M2, 0〉.
• To see that MLm∅ (〈r〉) 6= ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©f ), we show that these two pointed
models are distinguishable with an MLm∅ (〈r〉,©f )-formula. Let
ψ = [r]©f (〈r〉(©k ∧ 〈r〉©k ))
saying “no matter which accessible point I choose, I can move to it, then
forget it and finally move again to a memorized point connected with a
memorized point”. Now let
ϕ =©r 〈r〉(¬©k ∧©rψ)
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It is clear that M2, 0 |= ϕ, since one can remember the point 0, then move
to point 1 (which is not memorized), and remember it leaving the model
in the point M2[0, 1] and the evaluating point in 1. Then it is easy to see
that M2[0, 1], 1 |= ψ. However, one can verify that M1, 0 6|= ϕ. Indeed,
suppose that, after remembering the point 0, we move to point n > 0
and we remember it. By the definition of M1, the point n will not be
reflexive. Now, M1[0, n], n 6|= ψ because M1[0, n], 0 6|= ©f (〈r〉(©k ∧ 〈r〉©k )),
i.e. M1[n], 0 6|= 〈r〉(©k ∧ 〈r〉©k ).
• Showing thatMLm∅ (〈r〉) 6=ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©e ) is a bit easier. Define the formu-
las ψ′ = ©r 〈r〉©k and ϕ′ = ©r 〈r〉(¬©k ∧©eψ′). It is not difficult to see that
M2, 0 |= ϕ
′ but M1, 0 6|= ϕ
′.
✷
On the other hand, we are still below the expressive power of HL(↓):
3.2.11. Theorem. MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ,©f ) ≤ HL(↓).
Proof. In the line of the proof of Theorem 3.2.4, we define a truth-preserving
translation from formulas of MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ,©f ) into formulas of HL(↓). To define
our translation we use a finite sequence S of nominals in nom, where each nominal
i in the sequence is tagged with a superscript r (representing a remember) or with
a superscript f (representing a forget). We use the operation S ◦ i to denote the
operation of inserting the element i at the end of the sequence S.
TrS(p) = p p ∈ prop
TrS(¬ϕ) = ¬TrS(ϕ)
TrS(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = TrS(ϕ1) ∧ TrS(ϕ2)
TrS(〈r〉ϕ) = 〈r〉TrS(ϕ)
TrS(©rϕ) = ↓i.TrS◦{ir}(ϕ) where i /∈ S.
TrS(©fϕ) = ↓i.TrS◦{if}(ϕ) where i /∈ S.
TrS(©eϕ) = Trλ(ϕ)
TrS(©k ) = T (S)
Here, T is a translation from sequences of nominals toMLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ,©f )-formulas
is defined in the following way:
T (λ) = ⊥
T (S ◦ ir) = i ∨ T (S)
T (S ◦ if ) = ¬i ∧ T (S)
A simple induction shows that M, w |= ϕ iff M, g, w |= Trλ(ϕ), for any g. ✷
3.2.12. Corollary. MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ) ≤ HL(↓) and ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©f ) ≤ HL(↓).
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Now we will show that the logic MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ) is not more expressive than
the logic MLm∅ (〈r〉,©f ). The way to show this is following a game argument, as
we did for the case of MLm∅ (〈r〉).
3.2.13. Theorem. MLm∅ (〈r〉,©f ) 6≤ ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©e ).
Proof. LetM = 〈{s}∪N0 ∪N1 ∪ . . . , R, ∅, ∅〉, where each Ni is a different copy
of N, and R = {(n,m) | n ∈ Ni,m ∈ Nj, i ≤ j} ∪ {(n, s), (s, n) | for all n 6= s}.
We can imagine this model as the sequence of the natural numbers with the ≤
relationship between them and with a spy point s. But each natural number n is
actually an infinite reflexive clique in which every point there is connected with
every other point that belongs to a greater clique.
N0 N1 N2 N3
. . .
s
Figure 3.2: The modelM. The transitive connections between the cliques Ni are
not shown.
We prove that 〈M, w0〉 ≡
EF 〈M, w1〉 for ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©e ), where w0 ∈ N0 and
w1 ∈ N1. Given a point w, we define the neighborhood of w as N(w) = {v | wRv},
and we say that the neighborhood of a point w is memorized when N(w)∩S 6= ∅.
The strategy we are going to define observes the following invariant:
• Every time Spoiler has moved to a point w, then Duplicator has answered
with an agreeing point v such that N(w) was not memorized if and only if
N(v) was not memorized.
• Every time Spoiler has moved to a point w ∈ Ni, Duplicator has answered
with a point v ∈ Nj. And every time Spoilers has moved to s, Duplicator
has moved to s.
It is clear that this invariant holds at the beginning of the game. So let us see
that each step of the strategy preserves the invariant. One general remark: at
any stage of the game, the number of memorized points is always finite. Assume
that Spoiler is in a point w ∈ Ns and Duplicator in v ∈ Nd. The strategy for
Duplicator is the following:
1. If Spoiler decides to remember w, then the game continues with both w
and v memorized. So both N(w) and N(v) become memorized, and the
invariant is preserved.
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2. If Spoiler decides to forget all the points in the model, then both N(w) and
N(v) become not memorized, and the game continues with the invariant
preserved.
3. If Spoiler moves to s in one model, Duplicator moves to s in the other
model. Since every point of every Ni is connected to s, this is always a
possible move for Duplicator. Given the invariant and the fact that s is
connected with every other point in the model, it is easy to see that N(s) is
not memorized in one model iff N(s) is not memorized in the other model.
4. If Spoiler plays in a point w′ ∈ Ns′ such that N(w
′) is not memorized, then
Duplicator chooses a clique Nd′ and a point v
′ ∈ Nd′ such that N(v
′) is not
memorized. Note that by definition of neighborhood and the fact that every
Ni is a reflexive clique, w
′ and v′ are not in S. Furthermore, this is always
a valid move for Duplicator, given that there are infinitely many cliques Ni
connected with Nd and the fact that the number of memorized points is
finite. So Duplicator can always choose a sufficiently large d′ and a point
v′ ∈ Nd′ such that N(v
′) is not memorized.
5. If Spoiler plays in a point w′ ∈ Ns′ such that N(w
′) is memorized, then
Spoiler moves to an agreeing point v′ ∈ Nd′ . Let us see that there is always
such v′ and that the invariant is preserved. If N(w) is not memorized, given
the shape of the model, the only possibility is that w′ = s. Therefore v′ = s,
and we have already seen that the neighborhoods match in this case. The
other case is that N(w) is memorized. Given the invariant, we know that
N(v) is memorized, so if Spoiler chooses w′ ∈ S, we know that there is a
v′ ∈ S that Spoiler can move to. In this case it is trivial to see that N(v′)
is not memorized. On the other hand, if Spoiler chooses w′ 6∈ S, then a safe
choice for Duplicator is a non-memorized v′ ∈ Nd, that is, a point in the
same clique as v. Since each Ni is infinite, there is always such a v
′, and
also this choice guarantees that N(v′) is not memorized.
On the other hand let ϕ = ©r 〈r〉〈r〉(¬©k ∧ 〈r〉©k ∧ ©r 〈r〉(©k ∧ ©f [r]¬©k )) be a
formula of MLm∅ (〈r〉,©f ). It is easy to see that M, w1 |= ϕ but M, w0 6|= ϕ. ✷
3.2.14. Corollary. MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ) < HL(↓) and ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©e ) < ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,
©e ,©f )
Proof. This is a consequence of Theorems 3.2.13 and 3.2.11. ✷
To end this section, we want to observe that there are still some interest-
ing questions that remain open. For example, the relation between HL(↓) and
MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ,©f ):
3.2.15. Question. HL(↓) 6=MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ,©f ) ?
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We believe that the answer to this question is positive, but we have not found
yet a pair of models (in the same direction as Theorems 3.2.13 and 3.2.4) in which
the difference can be shown. The other natural question is the relation between
MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ) and ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©f ):
3.2.16. Question. MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ) 6≤ ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©f ) ?
The proof for this should also follow the same style as Theorem 3.2.13.
3.2.3 Memory logics with a stack
Here we want to analyze other memory containers different than a set. It seems
quite easy to see that replacing sets by lists gives us the same expressive power
as HL(↓). Another “classic” data structure is the stack, and in this case it is not
clear a priori how the resulting logic will behave in terms of expressive power.
We want to analyze then the outcome of using a stack as a storage structure.
Note that if we change the type of memory container we should also change the
memory operators accordingly. Therefore we will replace ©r and ©k by the usual
stack operators. Formally, the syntax is:
forms ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | 〈r〉ϕ | 〈〈r〉〉ϕ | (push)ϕ | (pop)ϕ | (top)
where p ∈ prop, r ∈ rel and ϕ, ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ forms. The semantics is the same
for the already presented operators, plus the following rules for the new stack
operators:
M, w |= (push)ϕ iff M[w], w |= ϕ
M, w |= (pop)ϕ iff 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S
′〉, w |= ϕ
for some S ′, w′ such that S = S ′ · [w′]
M, w |= (top) iff S = S ′ · [w] for some S ′
Given a model M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 and a list of points [w1, . . . , wn],
wi ∈ W , we define M[w1, . . . , wn] = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S · [w1, . . . , wn]〉, where · is
the concatenation operation on lists. We call this logic MLst∅ (〈r〉).
Here we are going to focus in the logic that starts evaluating a formula in
models with an empty stack and with the usual diamond operator. We will
compareMLst∅ (〈r〉) with HL(↓) and prove that they are equivalently expressive.
This might come as a surprise, as we could think that the restricted access to
the elements in the stack might actually limit the expressive power ofMLst∅ (〈r〉).
The proof below shows that it is the possibility to ‘make copies of the stack’ while
evaluating a formula what solves the problem.
3.2.17. Theorem. MLst∅ (〈r〉) = HL(↓).
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Proof. To prove MLst∅ (〈r〉) ≤ HL(↓), we define the translation mapping an
MLst∅ (〈r〉)-formula and a list of nominals N into an HL(↓)-formula.
TrN(p) = p p ∈ prop
TrN(¬ϕ) = ¬TrN(ϕ)
TrN(〈r〉ϕ) = 〈r〉TrN(ϕ)
TrN(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = TrN(ϕ1) ∧ TrN(ϕ2)
TrN((push)ϕ) = ↓i.TrN ·i(ϕ) where i /∈ N
TrN ·i((pop)ϕ) = TrN(ϕ)
Tr[ ]((pop)ϕ) = ¬⊤
TrN ·i((top)) = i
Tr[ ]((top)) = ¬⊤
Let [ ] be the empty list, we can show by induction on ϕ that M, w |= ϕ iff
M, g, w |= Tr[ ](ϕ), for any g.
To prove HL(↓) ≤ MLst∅ (〈r〉) we define a translation mapping an HL(↓)-
formula and a list of nominals N into an MLst∅ (〈r〉)-formula. The translation
coincides with the translation above for the propositional, negation, conjunction
and modality cases. We translate ↓ and nominals as follows:
TrN(↓i.ϕ) = (push)TrN ·i(ϕ)
TrN(i) = (pop)
|N |−n(top) i ∈ nom, N [n] = i,∀m > n : N [m] 6= i,
where |N | represents the length of N and N [n] represents the n-th element of N .
It can be shown by induction in ϕ that if ϕ is an HL(↓)-sentence, M, g, w |= ϕ
iff M, w |= Tr[ ](ϕ) for any g. ✷
One natural question turns up here. Are there minimal conditions one can
impose to the storage structure (and its operators) in order to have a memory logic
equivalent to HL(↓)? It is clear that having a complete mapping of memorized
points is enough (as it is the case if we use a list). The case for the stack was
not that clear initially, but the ability to “clone” the current stack gave us the
capacity to keep a complete mapping of points. Establishing general conditions
does not seems easy, since the container and its associated operators may have,
a priori, any kind of structure and behavior. Being able to store and retrieve
memorized elements in an ordered way seems to be a necessary condition, but it
is not trivial to formalize this notion in a general way. We are not going to go
into more details here, but further research can follow this direction.
3.2.4 Comparing apples with oranges
Comparing the expressive power between the logics that start evaluating formulas
in C∅ and the ones that use an arbitrary memory poses a complication because,
strictly speaking, each of them uses a different class of models. It is not completely
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clear whether it is fair to make the comparison at all, but once one is convinced
to make it, the next step is to decide how to define the mapping between each
type of models. The most natural option seems to involve a shift in the signature
of the language, in order to preserve the information stored in the models.
We start by discussing the relation among the memory logics that use a set
as the storage structure.
3.2.18. Theorem.
1. The logicMLm∅ (〈r〉) over the signature 〈prop∪{known},rel〉 is equivalent
to the logic MLm(〈r〉) over the signature 〈prop,rel〉
2. The logic MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) over the signature 〈prop∪ {known},rel〉 is equiva-
lent to the logic MLm(〈〈r〉〉) over the signature 〈prop,rel〉
Proof. The argument for item 2 is exactly the same as the one for item 1.
Hence, let us prove MLm∅ (〈r〉) =ML
m(〈r〉) (over the appropriate signatures).
We start by associating every model M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 of the logic
MLm(〈r〉) over 〈prop,rel〉 with the model M′ = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V
′, ∅〉 of the
logicMLm∅ (〈r〉) over 〈prop∪{known},rel〉 where V
′ is identical to V over prop
and V ′(known) = S.
[MLm∅ (〈r〉) ≤ML
m(〈r〉)]: use the translation Tr that only rewrites the proposi-
tional symbol known as ©k in any formula ofMLm∅ (〈r〉). Clearly for any formula
ϕ ∈MLm∅ (〈r〉) we have that M
′, w |= ϕ iff M, w |= Tr(ϕ).
[MLm(〈r〉) ≤ MLm∅ (〈r〉)]: use the translation Tr that only rewrites ©k as (©k ∨
known) in any formula ofMLm(〈r〉). Clearly for any formula ϕ ∈MLm(〈r〉) we
have that M, w |= ϕ iff M′, w |= Tr(ϕ). ✷
The same expressivity diagram shown for the ML∅ logics can be established
for the logics with arbitrary memory, following equivalent arguments:
3.2.19. Theorem.
1. MLm(〈〈r〉〉) over the signature 〈prop,rel〉 is strictly more expressive than
ML over the signature 〈prop ∪ {known},rel〉.
2. MLm(〈〈r〉〉) <MLm(〈r〉).
3. HL(↓) over the signature 〈prop∪ {known},rel,nom〉 is strictly more ex-
pressive than MLm(〈r〉) over the signature 〈prop,rel〉.
Proof. The proof for (i) is the same as the proof for Theorem 3.2.3. The proof
for (ii) is the same as the proof for Theorem 3.2.2. To prove (iii) we adapt the
translation Tr defined in the proof of Theorem 3.2.4 with the following clause for
©k :
TrN(©k ) =
(∨
i∈N i
)
∨ known.
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HL(↓) 6≤ MLm(〈r〉) can be shown using the following models. Let M1 = 〈{w},
{(w,w)}, ∅, {w}〉 and M2 = 〈{u, v}, {(u, v), (v, u)}, ∅, {u, v}〉. Duplicator always
wins on EF (M1,M2, w, u) and thusM1, w ≡
EF
MLm(〈r〉) M2, u. On the other hand,
M1, w |= ↓i.〈r〉i but M2, u 6|= ↓i.〈r〉i. ✷
3.3 A general picture
As we said before, we have not explored all possible fragments exhaustively. We
tested different ingredients in the context of memory logics and we analyzed
through bisimulation the expressive power of several fragments, investigating dif-
ferent ways in which information can be stored and retrieved.
We mainly centered our work in using sets as the information container, but
we also studied the possibility of replacing the set with a “richer” structure, like
the stack. Given that we worked mostly with sets, we studied the operations that
one can naturally expect in this context: to add, test membership and delete
elements from sets. We also distinguished the case in which we start evaluating a
formula in an empty memory from the case where the storage container can come
with ‘a priori’ information. This distinction becomes quite natural when working
with models with state, in which starting from a “clean” configuration is a usual
need.
We have not mentioned the case of hybrid memory logics, but the compar-
isons we already established among the modal memory fragments can be easily
transfered to case when we have nominals and the satisfaction operator @.
We have proved that, in terms of expressive power, the memory logics we
presented lie between the basic modal logic K and the hybrid logic HL(↓). This
allows to transfer known results from HL(↓). For example, all these memory
fragments have compactness and the generated submodel property (as HL(↓)
has). Also, we can compose the translations we defined for each memory logic
with the standard translation from HL(↓) to first order logic (see [BdRV01] for
details) and build a standard translation that takes memory logics formulas to
first order logic formulas.
Furthermore, we observe that structures richer than a set, although being
still quite basic (like a stack, a list, etc.), give us already the expressive power
of HL(↓). The following picture summarizes the results we found in terms of
expressivity. We have only included in the picture the memory fragments defined
for the class C∅ since as we said before, these fragments seem the most reasonable
ones to compare between K and HL(↓).
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ML ML
m
∅ (〈〈r〉〉) ML
m
∅ (〈r〉)
MLm∅ (〈r〉,©f )
MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e )
MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ,©f )
HL(↓)
MLst∅ (〈r〉)
‖
≤6≤
6≤6≤
≤
6≤
The solid unlabeled arrows represent the < relationship, that is, L → L′
means that the logic L is strictly less expressive than the logic L′. In some cases
we specifically indicate other relations (like ≤ or 6≤), and the dashed arrows show
the suspected answers to the open questions 3.2.15 and 3.2.16 we have formulated.

Chapter 4
(Un)Decidability
She both advanced toward him and retreated, a difficult
maneuver which Mrs Frick alone could carry off.
It had taken her ten decades of practice.
“Ubik”, Philip K. Dick.
In Chapter 3 we showed some fragments which are all more expressive than
ML but less expressive than HL(↓) (with the exception of MLst∅ (〈r〉), which is
equally expressive as HL(↓)). Given that ML is decidable and HL(↓) undecid-
able [AtC06], exploring where the decidability line lies is an intriguing question.
The main goal of this chapter is to investigate this issue, together with the related
question of whether the logic is sufficiently expressive to force infinite models. To
study the decidability of a logic, we are going to use the techniques we outlined
in Section 2.2.2.
We start by investigating MLm(〈〈r〉〉) and MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉), the weakest memory
fragments we defined. We will show that the satisfiability problem forMLm(〈〈r〉〉)
is decidable (actually pspace-complete) whileMLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) is already undecidable.
As we will show in this chapter, the trick to prove decidability is to unravel a
model use a ‘dirty’ memory. On the other hand, inMLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉), we are restricted
to the class of models where the memory starts empty, and we can’t play this trick
anymore. ActuallyMLm(〈〈r〉〉) is really standing on the decidability line: adding
a single nominal to MLm(〈〈r〉〉), or restricting the class of models to C∅ pushes
the satisfiability problem over to undecidability. This will help us to establish a
general result that includes several memory fragments.
For all the undecidable fragments we analyze, we are also going to prove that
they lack the finite model property. This is not necessarily always true, but in a
given logic these two properties are usually present together.
4.1 The decidability of MLm(〈〈r〉〉)
We will first prove that ML and MLm(〈〈r〉〉) are expressively equivalent over
the class of tree-like models. We will then prove that MLm(〈〈r〉〉) has the tree
model property, that is to say, if a formula ϕ ∈ MLm(〈〈r〉〉) is satisfiable, then it
is satisfiable in a tree-like model. With those results at hand, decidability and
pspace-completeness of MLm(〈〈r〉〉) easily follows.
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4.1.1. Theorem. The logic ML over the signature 〈prop ∪ {known},rel〉 is
equivalent to MLm(〈〈r〉〉) over the class of tree models.
Proof. [ML ≤MLm(〈〈r〉〉)]: We can take the translation that maps known to
©k , 〈r〉 to 〈〈r〉〉, and it is the identity for the rest of the operators. In a similar way
we did in Theorem 3.2.18, we associate every modelM = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉 of the
logicML over 〈prop∪{known},rel〉 with the modelM′ = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V
′, S〉
of the logic MLm(〈〈r〉〉) over 〈prop,rel〉 where V ′ is identical to V over prop
and S = V (known). Since we are in the class of tree-like models, it is easy to see
that this translation is equivalence preserving.
[MLm(〈〈r〉〉) ≤ML]: We start by noticing that in MLm(〈〈r〉〉) we can eliminate
©k at modal depth zero from a formula like ©rϕ.
4.1.2. Claim. Let ϕ♯ be the result of replacing all the occurrences of©k that are
in ϕ ∈MLm(〈〈r〉〉) at modal depth zero by ⊤. ThenM, w |=©rϕ iffM, w |= ϕ♯.
Proof. We proceed by induction on ϕ. The case for ©k , the propositional
symbols and Booleans connectives are straightforward. We analyze the other
cases:
• ϕ = ©rψ. M, w |= ©r©rψ iff M, w |= ©rψ iff (by inductive hypothesis)
M, w |= ψ♯ iff M, w |= (ψ♯)♯ iff (by inductive hypothesis) M, w |= ©r (ψ♯)
iff M, w |= (©rψ)♯.
• ϕ = 〈〈r〉〉ψ. M, w |= ©r 〈〈r〉〉ψ iff (by definition) M[w], w |= 〈〈r〉〉ψ iff (by
definition of ♯) M[w], w |= (〈〈r〉〉ψ)♯ iff (by definition) M, w |= (〈〈r〉〉ψ)♯.
✷
We define now the following translation, takingMLm(〈〈r〉〉)-formulas over the
signature 〈prop,rel〉 toML-formulas over the signature 〈prop∪{known},rel〉:
Tr(p) = p p ∈ prop
Tr(©k ) = known
Tr(¬ϕ) = ¬Tr(ϕ)
Tr(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = Tr(ϕ1) ∧ Tr(ϕ2)
Tr(〈〈r〉〉ϕ) = 〈r〉Tr(ϕ)
Tr(©rϕ) = Tr(ϕ♯)
Let ϕ ∈ MLm(〈〈r〉〉), and let M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 be an arbitrary tree
model. Let M′ = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V
′〉 where V ′ is identical to V except that
V ′(known) = S. We can prove that M, w |= ϕ iff M′, w |= Tr(ϕ).
We proceed by induction on ϕ. The propositional and boolean cases are trivial.
The ©k case is also easy given the definitions. Let us consider ϕ = 〈〈r〉〉ψ. Given
thatM is tree-like, the remember operator has no effect beyond modal operators,
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so M, w |= 〈〈r〉〉ψ iff exists v such that R(w, v) and M, v |= ψ. By inductive
hypothesis, M′, v |= ψ iff M′, v |= Tr(ψ), and by definition M′, w |= 〈r〉Tr(ψ).
Finally, let us see the case for remember. By Claim 4.1.2, M, w |= ©rψ iff
M, w |= ψ♯. By inductive hypothesis, M, w |= Tr(ψ♯). ✷
We now prove thatMLm(〈〈r〉〉) has the tree model property. The idea is to use
a similar technique than the one used for the basic modal logic (see [BdRV01]),
in which each path in the original model is represented by a different point in the
tree-like model. The “already visited” points are simulated in the tree model by
points that are initially stored in the memory. The exact procedure to transform a
model in a tree-like equivalent model will be clear from the proof of Theorem 4.1.3,
but let us see first an example:
M
w0 w1
w2
. . .
M′
w0
w0w1
w0w2
w0w1w0
w0w1w0w1
w0w1w0w2
Figure 4.1: A model M and its corresponding tree-like model M′
Figure 4.1 shows a model M and the resulting tree-like model M′, taking
w0 as the starting point. The model M
′ is essentially the unraveling of M, in
which every point represents a path starting from w0 in the original model. But
additionally, the procedure takes into consideration the points that are memorized
during the exploration of the model, and these points are added to the initial
memory ofM′. The idea is to add to the initial memory the points that represent
paths whose last point is an already visited point. In the example above, that is
the case for w0w1w0 since w0 is visited twice there, but it is not for w0w1w0w2,
since w2 is visited just once.
4.1.3. Theorem (Tree model property). Let M be an MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-model,
w ∈M. Then there is a tree-like model M′ such that 〈M, w〉 ≡EF 〈M′, w〉.
Proof. We prove the result for the unimodal case, the generalization to the
multimodal case is straightforward. Let M = 〈W,R, V, S〉, define M′ = 〈W ′, R′,
V ′, S ′〉 as follows. Its domain W ′ consists of all finite sequences (u0, . . . , un)
such that u0 = w, n ≥ 0 and there is a path u0Ru1 . . . Run in M. Define
(u0, . . . , un)R(v0, . . . , vm) to hold if m = n + 1, ui = v1 for i = 0, . . . , n and
unRvm holds in M. The valuation V
′ is defined by setting (u0, . . . , un) ∈ V
′(p)
iff un ∈ V (p). Finally, (u0, . . . , un−1, un) ∈ S
′ iff un ∈ {u0, . . . , un−1} or un ∈ S.
Let si be the sequence (v0, . . . , vi). We show that Duplicator has a winning
strategy in the game EF (M,M′, w, w). It is sufficient to see that in the game
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EF (M[v0, . . . , vn], M
′[s0, . . . , sn], vn+1, sn+1), Duplicator can always answer suc-
cessfully to Spoiler’s moves.
• If Spoiler choosesM[v0, . . . , vn] and some vn+1, a successor of vn, Duplicator
chooses the sequence sn+1 = snvn+1.
• If Spoiler chooses M′[s0, . . . , sn] and sn+1 = snvn+1 (for some vn+1), a suc-
cessor of sn, Duplicator chooses the point vn+1.
By definition sn+1 and vn+1 agree. Observe that the memory of M[v0, . . . ,
vn] is S ∪ {v0, . . . , vn} and the memory ofM
′[s0, . . . , sn] is S
′ ∪ {s0, . . . , sn}. It is
also clear that vn+1 ∈ S iff sn+1 ∈ S
′. Formally, vn+1 ∈ S ∪ {v0, . . . , vn} implies
sn+1 ∈ S
′ by definition. And sn+1 ∈ S
′ ∪ {s0, . . . , sn}, then sn+1 ∈ S
′ (since there
are no cycles in M′) and by definition vn+1 ∈ S ∪ {v0, . . . , vn}. ✷
Observe that having the possibility to use a nonempty memory is crucial to
construct the tree-like model. As we are going to see later, when we restrict the
logic to the class C∅, not only the tree model property does not hold anymore,
but we cross the border of decidability and the resulting logic is undecidable.
We have just proved thatML andMLm(〈〈r〉〉) are equivalent over the class of
tree-like models and thatMLm(〈〈r〉〉) has the tree model property. Given that we
already know thatML also has the tree model property, the expected conclusion
would be that ML and MLm(〈〈r〉〉) are equivalent logics. On the other hand,
although we have not shown this explicitly in Chapter 3, ML < MLm(〈〈r〉〉)
is a result that can be easily transfered from Theorem 3.2.3: the two models
shown there areML-bisimilar, and distinguishable with theMLm(〈〈r〉〉)-formula
〈〈r〉〉©k . Where is the contradiction then? The answer is that the two logics are
equivalent over the class of tree models using a shift in the signature. Adding the
propositional symbol known to the signature of ML is crucial to establish the
equivalence, since it enables the ability to encode the memorized points. This
does not mean that the two logics are equivalent in the classic sense, when we fix
the same signature for both logics.
With the results shown in Theorems 4.1.3 and 4.1.1, the following theorem
easily follows.
4.1.4. Theorem. The satisfiability problem of MLm(〈〈r〉〉) is pspace-complete.
Proof. We first show the decidability of the satisfiability problem ofMLm(〈〈r〉〉)
proving that any satisfiable formula of MLm(〈〈r〉〉) is satisfiable in a recursively
bounded model.
Let ϕ be anMLm(〈〈r〉〉)-formula and supposeM1, w |= ϕ. By Theorem 4.1.3,
there is a tree-like model M2 such that M2, w |= ϕ. Using Theorem 4.1.1,
we know that M2, w |= Tr(ϕ) (here, M2 is taken as an ML model over the
appropriate signature). Now we can use the bounded tree model property for
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basic modal logic [BdRV01], so there must be a recursively bounded tree-like
model M3 = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V 〉 and v ∈ W such that M3, v |= Tr(ϕ). Finally, we
can use Theorem 4.1.1 again, and conclude 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, V (known)〉, v |= ϕ.
The pspace-completeness follows from the fact that the translation Tr is lin-
ear, that the satisfiability problem for the basic modal logic is pspace-complete
(refer to [BdRV01]), and that there is a linear translation from ML-formulas to
MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-formulas (that simply maps 〈r〉ϕ to 〈〈r〉〉ϕ). ✷
4.1.1 A linear encoding for MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f )
Now we show that adding ©f to MLm(〈〈r〉〉) keeps the logic decidable. In fact,
we will show that MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) can be encoded into MLm(〈〈r〉〉) using a linear
translation. We are going to see later in this chapter that this is not the case for
©e .
4.1.5. Theorem. The satisfiability problem for MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) is pspace-
complete.
Proof. We show that there is a linear equivalence preserving translation that
takes formulas from MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) to MLm(〈〈r〉〉). Intuitively speaking, the act
of forgetting a point w is equivalent to the act of replacing all the occurrences
of ©k by ⊥ at modal depth zero. As it was for the case of MLm(〈〈r〉〉), the efect
of forgetting a point has no real effect beyond the current world of evaluation.
Formally, let Tra be the following translation from ML
m(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) formulas to
MLm(〈〈r〉〉) formulas, where a ranges over {r, f}:
Tra(p) = p p ∈ prop
Trr(©k ) = ©k
Trf (©k ) = ¬⊤
Tra(¬ϕ) = ¬Tra(ϕ)
Tra(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = Tra(ϕ1) ∧ Tra(ϕ2)
Tra(〈〈r〉〉ϕ) = 〈〈r〉〉Trr(ϕ)
Tra(©rϕ) = ©rTrr(ϕ)
Tra(©fϕ) = Trf (ϕ)
We prove by mutual induction on ϕ these two properties:
1. M, w |= ϕ iff M, w |= Trr(ϕ).
2. M[−w], w |= ϕ iff M, w |= Trf (ϕ).
The only interesting cases for both properties are 〈〈r〉〉,©r and ©f . For the
property (i), let ϕ = 〈〈r〉〉ψ. M, w |= 〈〈r〉〉ψ iff (by definition) there is a w′ ∈
W , such that wRw′ and M[w], w′ |= ψ iff (by inductive hypothesis on (1))
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M[w], w′ |= Trr(ψ) iff (by definition) M, w |= 〈〈r〉〉Trr(ψ) iff (by definition)
M, w |= Trr(〈〈r〉〉ψ). The next case is ϕ = ©rψ. M, w |= ©rψ iff (by defini-
tion) M[w], w |= ψ iff (by inductive hypothesis on (1)) M[w], w |= Trr(ψ) iff
(by definition) M, w |= ©rTrr(ψ) iff (by definition) M, w |= Trr(©rψ). Finally,
let ϕ = ©fψ. M, w |= ©fψ iff (by definition) M[−w], w |= ψ iff (by inductive
hypothesis on (2)) M, w |= Trf (ψ) iff (by definition) M, w |= Trr(©fψ).
For the property (ii), let ϕ = 〈〈r〉〉ψ. M[−w], w |= 〈〈r〉〉ψ iff (by definition)
there is a w′ ∈ W , such that wRw′ andM[w], w′ |= ψ iff (by inductive hypothesis
on (1))M[w], w′ |= Trr(ψ) iff (by definition)M, w |= 〈〈r〉〉Trr(ψ) iff (by definition)
M, w |= Trf (〈〈r〉〉ψ). The next case is ϕ = ©rψ. M[−w], w |= ©rψ iff (by
definition) M[w], w |= ψ (by inductive hypothesis on (1)) M[w], w |= Trr(ψ)
iff (by definition) M, w |= ©rTrr(ψ) iff (by definition) M, w |= Trf (©rψ). The
last case is ϕ = ©fψ. M[−w], w |= ©fψ iff (by definition) M[−w], w |= ψ (by
inductive hypothesis on (2))M, w |= Trf (ψ) iff (by definition)M, w |= Trf (©fψ).
Therefore, property (i) shows that we have defined an equivalent preserving
translation. Observe that the linearity of the translation is trivial, and given
Theorem 4.1.4, we conclude the desired result. ✷
Given the above theorem, the tree model property for MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) easily
follows:
4.1.6. Corollary. Let ϕ be a formula of MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ). If ϕ is satisfiable,
then it is satisfied in a tree-like model.
Proof. LetM and w ∈M be such thatM, w |= ϕ. We can use the translation
defined in the proof of the above theorem, and therefore M, w |= Trr(ϕ), where
Trr(ϕ) is a formula of ML
m(〈〈r〉〉). Using Theorem 4.1.3, there is a tree-like
modelM′ such thatM′, w |= Trr(ϕ). Given that Trr is an equivalence preserving
translation, M′, w |= ϕ. ✷
4.2 Some undecidable neighbors of MLm(〈〈r〉〉)
While MLm(〈〈r〉〉) is decidable, it seems to be standing at the border of un-
decidability. The logic MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉), obtained from ML
m(〈〈r〉〉) by restricting
the models to the class C∅, is undecidable. Furthermore, if we take HL
m(〈〈r〉〉)
(MLm(〈〈r〉〉) with nominals), even if we restrict the signature to just one nominal,
the resulting logic is also undecidable. To prove undecidability we use the tiling
technique presented in Section 2.2.2.
4.2.1 Just one nominal is enough
First we are going to analyze the case of HLm(〈〈r〉〉) with just one nominal. We
call this logic HLm1 (〈〈r〉〉). We start by showing the failure of the finite model
property.
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4.2.1. Theorem. HLm1 (〈〈r〉〉) lacks the finite model property.
Proof. Let us suppose that the only nominal in nom is i. Consider the following
formulas:
(Back) i ∧ [[r]]¬i ∧ 〈〈r〉〉⊤ ∧ [[r]]〈〈r〉〉i
(Empty) [[r]]¬©k ∧ [[r]][[r]](¬i→ ¬©k )
(Spy) [[r]][[r]](¬i→ 〈〈r〉〉(i ∧ 〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ ¬〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ ¬i))))
(Succ) [[r]]〈〈r〉〉¬i
(No-3cyc) ¬〈〈r〉〉〈〈r〉〉(¬©k ∧ 〈〈r〉〉(¬©k ∧ 〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ ¬i)))
(Tran) [[r]]〈〈r〉〉(i ∧ [[r]](¬©k → 〈〈r〉〉(i ∧ 〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ 〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ ¬i))))).
Let Inf be Back∧Empty∧Spy∧Succ∧No-3cyc∧Tran. LetM = 〈W,R, V, S〉.
We claim that if M, w |= Inf, then W is infinite.
Suppose M, w |= Inf. Let B = {b ∈ W | R(w, b)}. Because Back is satisfied,
w 6∈ B, B 6= ∅ and for all b ∈ B, R(b, w). Note that Empty says that the one and
two-step neighbors of w are not in S, and also this implies that every point in B
is irreflexive. Because Spy is satisfied, if a 6= w and a is a successor of an element
of B then a is also an element of B. As Succ is satisfied at w, every point in B
has a successor distinct from w. No-3cyc disallow cycles of size 2 or 3 in B; and
together with Tran force R to transitively order B.
It follows that B is an unbounded strict partial order as showed in the picture
below, hence infinite, and so is W .
· · ·
i
✷
We now show that HLm1 (〈〈r〉〉) is undecidable by encoding the N × N tiling
problem. Following the idea in [BS95], we will construct a spy point over the
relation Rs; that is, the point of evaluation will have access in one Rs-step to
any reachable point in the model. The relations Ru and Rr represent moving up
and to the right, respectively, from one tile to the other. We code each type of
tile with a fixed propositional symbol ti. With this encoding we define for each
tiling problem T , a formula ϕT such that the set of tiles T tiles N×N iff ϕT has
a model.
4.2.2. Theorem. The satisfiability problem for HLm1 (〈〈r〉〉) is undecidable.
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Proof. Let T = {T1, . . . , Tn} be a set of tile types. Given a tile type Ti, u(Ti),
r(Ti), d(Ti), l(Ti) will represent the colors of the up, right, down and left edges
of Ti respectively. Let us suppose that i is the only nominal in nom. Define:
(Back) i ∧ [[s]]¬i ∧ 〈〈s〉〉⊤ ∧ [[s]]〈〈s〉〉i ∧ [[s]][[s]]i
(Empty) [[s]]¬©k ∧ [[s]][[†]]¬©k † ∈ {r, u}
(Spy) [[s]][[†]]〈〈s〉〉(i ∧ 〈〈s〉〉(©k ∧ ¬〈〈†〉〉©k )) † ∈ {r, u}
(Grid) [[s]]〈〈†〉〉⊤ † ∈ {r, u}
(Func) [[s]][[†]]〈〈s〉〉〈〈s〉〉(©k ∧ 〈〈†〉〉©k ∧ [[†]]©k ) † ∈ {r, u}
(Conf) [[s]]〈〈u〉〉〈〈r〉〉〈〈s〉〉〈〈s〉〉(©k ∧ ¬〈〈r〉〉©k ∧ 〈〈u〉〉©k∧
〈〈r〉〉(¬©k ∧ (〈〈u〉〉(©k ∧ ¬〈〈r〉〉©k )))
(UR-no-cyc) [[s]][[u]][[r]]¬©k ∧ [[s]][[r]][[u]]¬©k
(URU-no-cyc) [[s]][[u]][[r]][[u]]¬©k
(Unique) [[s]]
(∨
1≤i≤n ti ∧
∧
1≤i<j≤n(ti → ¬tj)
)
(Vert) [[s]]
∧
1≤i≤n
(
ti → 〈〈u〉〉
∨
1≤j≤n,u(Ti)=d(Tj)
tj
)
(Horiz) [[s]]
∧
1≤i≤n
(
ti → 〈〈r〉〉
∨
1≤j≤n,r(Ti)=l(Tj)
tj
)
Let the formula ϕT be the conjunction of all the above formulas. We show
that T tiles N× N iff ϕT is satisfiable.
SupposeM, w |= ϕT . Observe that Back and Spy, together with Empty make
w a spy via Rs (and also force Ru and Rr to be irreflexive and asymmetric). These
Rs-accessible points will represent the tiles. We will have that [[s]]ψ holds at w iff
ψ is true at every tile, and 〈〈s〉〉〈〈s〉〉ψ holds at tile v iff ψ is true at some (perhaps
the same) tile. Now, Grid states that from every tile there is another tile moving
up (that is, following the Ru-relation). The same holds for the right direction
(following the Rr-relation). Func (together with Back and Spy) forces Ru and
Rr to be functional. Conf ensures that the tiles are arranged as a grid, once we
force Ru◦Rr to be irreflexive (UR-no-cyc), and we forbid cycles via the RuRrRu
pattern (URU-no-cyc).
That completes the description of the grid. The last three formulas ensure
that every tile has a unique type ti, and that the colors of the tiles match properly.
From this, it easily follows that M is a tiling of N× N.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
. . .
i
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For the converse, suppose f : N× N → T is a tiling of N× N. We define the
model M = 〈W, {Rs, Ru, Rr}, V, ∅〉 as follows:
• W = N× N ∪ {w}
• Rs = {(w, v), (v, w) | v ∈ N× N} (hence w will act as the spy point)
• Ru = {((x, y), (x, y + 1)) | x, y ∈ N}
• Rr = {((x, y), (x+ 1, y)) | x, y ∈ N}
• V (p) = {w}; V (ti) = {x | x ∈ N× N, f(x) = Ti}
The reader may verify that, by construction, M, w |= ϕT . ✷
4.2.2 An empty memory is also enough
We now turn to the case for MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉). The ideas are similar to the case of
HLm1 (〈〈r〉〉), but this time we cannot use the nominal i to make the spy point. On
the other hand, we know that the memory is empty when we start evaluating a
formula, and this will help us to encode the tiling.
As we did before, we first show the failure of the finite model property.
4.2.3. Theorem. MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) lacks the finite model property.
Proof. Consider the following formulas:
(Back) p ∧ [[r]]¬p ∧ 〈〈r〉〉⊤ ∧ [[r]]〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ p)
(Spy) [[r]][[r]](¬p→ 〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ p ∧ 〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ ¬〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ ¬p))))
(Irr) ¬〈〈r〉〉(¬p ∧ 〈〈r〉〉(¬p ∧©k )))
(Succ) [[r]]〈〈r〉〉¬p
(No-3cyc) ¬〈〈r〉〉〈〈r〉〉(¬©k ∧ 〈〈r〉〉(¬©k ∧ 〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ ¬p)))
(Tran) [[r]](¬p→ 〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ p ∧ [[r]](¬p ∧ ¬©k → 〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ p∧
〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ ¬p ∧ 〈〈r〉〉(©k ∧ ¬p))))))
Let Inf be Back∧Spy∧ Irr∧Succ∧No-3cyc∧Tran, and letM = 〈W,R, V, ∅〉.
The proof thatM is infinite ifM, w |= Inf is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2.1.
Instead of using i to identify the spy point we now use p and ©k . ©k is needed to
distinguish the spy point from other points where p might hold.
Notice that Back, Spy, Succ, and No-3cyc are very similar to the ones in the
proof of Theorem 4.2.1, Irr forces R to be irreflexive and Tran says that every
pair of successors u and v are related (either R(u, v) or R(v, u)), and this together
with the other formulas, implies that R is transitive.
✷
In a similar way, we can encode the N× N tiling problem to show that satis-
fiability in MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) is undecidable.
78 Chapter 4. (Un)Decidability
4.2.4. Theorem. The satisfiability problem for MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) is undecidable.
Proof. The formula ϕT needed for the encoding of a tiling problem T in this
case is the conjunction of the following:
(Back) p ∧ [[s]]¬p ∧ 〈〈s〉〉⊤ ∧ [[s]]〈〈s〉〉(©k ∧ p) ∧ [[s]][[s]](©k ∧ p)
(Spy) [[s]][[†]](¬p ∧ 〈〈s〉〉(©k ∧ p ∧ 〈〈s〉〉(©k ∧ ¬〈〈†〉〉©k ))) † ∈ {r, u}
(Grid) [[s]]〈〈†〉〉⊤ † ∈ {r, u}
(Func) [[s]][[†]]〈〈s〉〉〈〈s〉〉(©k ∧ 〈〈†〉〉©k ∧ [[†]]©k ) † ∈ {r, u}
(Conf) [[s]]〈〈u〉〉〈〈r〉〉〈〈s〉〉〈〈s〉〉(©k ∧ ¬〈〈r〉〉©k ∧ 〈〈u〉〉©k∧
〈〈r〉〉〈〈u〉〉(©k ∧ ¬〈〈r〉〉©k ))
(URU-no-cyc) [[s]][[u]][[r]]¬©k ∧ [[s]][[r]][[u]]¬©k
(URU-no-cyc) [[s]][[u]][[r]][[u]]¬©k
(Unique) [[s]]
(∨
1≤i≤n ti ∧
∧
1≤i<j≤n(ti → ¬tj)
)
(Vert) [[s]]
∧
1≤i≤n
(
ti → 〈〈u〉〉
∨
1≤j≤n,u(Ti)=d(Tj)
tj
)
(Horiz) [[s]]
∧
1≤i≤n
(
ti → 〈〈r〉〉
∨
1≤j≤n,r(Ti)=l(Tj)
tj
)
✷
Now we turn to the case of MLm(〈r〉), making use of the results we just
presented. To prove failure of the finite model property for the case MLm(〈r〉),
observe that the following lemma is easy to establish (we only state it for the
mono-modal case; a similar result is true in the multimodal case). The idea is
that we can write a formula that forces a model to have a memory with a “clean
horizon” of size d from a given point, and then reuse the encoding we defined for
MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉). Failure of the finite model property is then a direct consequence.
4.2.5. Lemma. Let ϕ be a formula of modal depth d. If 〈W,Rr, V, S〉, w |=(∧d
i=0[r]
i¬©k
)
∧ ϕ then 〈W,Rr, V, ∅〉, w |= ϕ.
4.2.6. Corollary. MLm(〈r〉) lacks the finite model property.
Proof. Observe that an MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-formula can be easily translated to a
MLm(〈r〉)-formula. Therefore, using Lemma 4.2.5, one can see that the for-
mula
(∧4
i=0[r]
i¬©k
)
∧ Inf, where Inf is the one in the proof of Theorem 4.2.3,
forces an infinite model. ✷
4.2.7. Corollary. The satisfiability problem for MLm(〈r〉) is undecidable.
Proof. Using the idea of Lemma 4.2.5 and the formula ϕT in the proof of
Theorem 4.2.4, we can obtain a formula ψ such that if M, w |= ψ then M is a
tiling of N×N. For the converse, we can build exactly the same model as in the
proof of Theorem 4.2.4 and check that it satisfies ψ. ✷
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Now we want to briefly mention the case of erase with respect to decidability.
Given that ©e can be seen as an operator that internalizes the notion of starting
the evaluation of a formula with an empty memory, it is quite easy to establish
the following result:
4.2.8. Theorem. The satisfiability problem for MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©e ) is undecidable.
Furthermore, the logic lacks the finite model property.
Proof. Theorems 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 show that the logic MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) lacks the
finite model property and that its satisfiability problem is undecidable. It is
straightforward to see that just adding ©e in front of each encoding is enough to
achieve the same results for MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©e ). ✷
Summing up, MLm(〈〈r〉〉) and MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) are decidable (in fact, they are
pspace-complete). In contrast, from the results shown in Theorems 4.2.2, 4.2.4,
4.2.8 and Corollary 4.2.7, the undecidability of the remaining memory logics we
are studying easily follows.

Chapter 5
Interpolation and Beth definability
Basta, de hablar,
acuso que el lenguaje humano
desde siempre es inu´til
y esta´ todo mal.
“La logia”, Bersuit Vergarabat.
In the last chapters we presented some results regarding expressivity and de-
cidability for several memory logics. Now it is the turn to analyze interpolation
and Beth definability for those fragments. In contrast with expressive power
or decidability, where in many cases one can have some intuition about the ex-
pected results, interpolation and Beth definability are properties with a more
elusive behavior. Speaking in a general way, extending or restricting a logic may
cause to gain or lose these properties, and there is not a “general recipe” that
can be applied uniformly. We want to analyze how memory logics behave from
this perspective, and to see whether the standard techniques are fruitful in this
context.
As we said in Section 2.2.3, when we work with hybrid logics there is a choice
concerning the inclusion of nominals in the common language. In the context of
memory logics, we should also decide if we want to include ©k or not. The first
possibility is to keep the already defined notion of interpolation over propositional
symbols, where the common language restricts only the occurrences of proposi-
tional symbols. The other option is to include©k in the restrictions, and allow©k
to occur in the interpolant only when©k is present in both the antecedent and the
consequent. We will refer to this last option as interpolation over propositional
symbols and known. It is clear that this option is stronger than interpolation over
propositional symbols, since the interpolant must fulfill more requirements.
Naturally, in the context of hybrid memory logics we have to decide both
things: whether we want to consider nominals in the common language and,
independently, the ©k operator. We are not going to study every possible com-
bination here. We will cover just some memory fragments, and show how they
behave in terms of these properties.
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5.1 Interpolation fails
We are going to show that most of the memory logics we are studying lack inter-
polation (with the exception of MLm(〈〈r〉〉) and MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f )). We will use a
classic technique to prove this, whose general schema is the following. First, we
define ϕ and ψ such that ϕ → ψ is a valid formula. Then, we find two models
〈M, w〉 and 〈M′, w′〉, such that w and w′ are bisimilar in the common language
of ϕ and ψ, but M, w |= ϕ and M′, w′ |= ¬ψ. These conditions are enough to
claim that interpolation cannot hold. Why? For suppose not, then there is an
interpolant χ in the common language of ϕ and ψ such that ϕ→ χ→ ψ is valid.
Therefore χ holds at 〈M, w〉. Because w and w′ are bisimilar in the common
language, χ also holds at 〈M′, w′〉. This implies that ψ holds at 〈M′, w′〉 too,
but this is an absurd, since we assumed that ¬ψ holds there.
Some remarks before we begin presenting the results. When the context is
clear enough we just say “the common language” referring to one of the possible
definitions for this (i.e., over propositional symbols, over propositional symbols
and known, etc.). Second, observe that ⊤ can always occur in the interpolant,
since otherwise the definition of interpolation can be easily trivialized. Finally,
unless we explicitly say otherwise, we prove interpolation (or the lack thereof) for
the class of all models.
We begin by showing failure of interpolation for MLm∅ (〈r〉), and how this
can be transfered to other memory logics. Since we need to find two bisimilar
models in the common language of ϕ and ψ, this result is strongly based on the
bisimilar models we found in Section 3.2. We are going to prove the failure of
interpolation over propositional symbols. This implies, of course, the same failure
over propositional symbols and known.
5.1.1. Theorem. MLm∅ (〈r〉) lacks interpolation over propositional symbols.
Proof. Let ϕ = q ∧©r [r](¬©k → ϕ′). If M, w |= ϕ then q is true at w and any
successor of w different from w satisfies ϕ′. Now, let ϕ′ = ¬q ∧ ¬©r 〈r〉(©k ∧ ¬q).
With this definition of ϕ′, if M, w |= ϕ then for all v such that wRv and v 6= w
we have ¬vRv.
Let ψ = p ∧ 〈r〉(¬p ∧ ©r 〈r〉©k ). If M, w |= ψ then there is v 6= w such that
wRv and vRv. It is clear that ϕ ∧ ψ is a contradiction, so ϕ→ ¬ψ is valid.
Let M1 = 〈N, R1, ∅, ∅〉 and M2 = 〈N, R2, ∅, ∅〉, where R1 = {(n,m) | n 6=
m} ∪ {(0, 0)} and R2 = R1 ∪ {(1, 1)}. Graphically,
5.1. Interpolation fails 83
0
. . .
..
.
...
. . .
M1
0
1 . . .
...
...
. . .
M2
where the accessibility relation is the transitive closure of the arrows shown but
without reflexive loops excepts those explicitly marked. In Theorem 3.2.4 it was
shown that 〈M1, 0〉 and 〈M2, 0〉 are bisimilar over ML
m
∅ (〈r〉). Now, define the
models M′1 andM
′
2 as M1 andM2 respectively but with a nonempty valuation
in the following way: M′1 = 〈N, R1, V1, ∅〉 and M
′
2 = 〈N, R2, V2, ∅〉, where R1 =
{(n,m) | n 6= m} ∪ {(0, 0)}, R2 = R1 ∪ {(1, 1)}, V1(q) = {0} and V2(p) = {0}.
One can verify that 〈M′1, 0〉 and 〈M
′
2, 0〉 are bisimilar over the common language
and that M′1, 0 |= ϕ and M
′
2, 0 |= ψ.
Suppose there is an interpolant χ over the common language of ϕ and ψ for
the valid formula ϕ → ¬ψ. On the one hand, since ϕ is true at 〈M′1, 0〉 then
χ also is. On the other, since ψ is true at 〈M′2, 0〉 then ¬χ also is. Then we
have that M′1, 0 |= χ and M
′
2, 0 |= ¬χ, which is an absurd because 〈M
′
1, 0〉 and
〈M′2, 0〉 are bisimilar over the common language. ✷
From this result there are a couple of corollaries that can be formulated. First,
we can apply here the same idea we used in Lemma 4.2.5 (to force a “clean” zone
of depth d from a given point) to transfer the above result to MLm(〈r〉).
5.1.2. Corollary. MLm(〈r〉) lacks interpolation over propositional symbols.
Proof. Let ϕ and ψ be as in Theorem 5.1.1. Let θ = ¬©k ∧ [r]¬©k ∧ [r][r]¬©k .
Define ϕ′ = ϕ∧ θ and ψ′ = ψ ∧ θ and repeat the argument of the above proof. ✷
The second corollary uses the idea of the translation from MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) to
MLm∅ (〈r〉) we defined in Theorem 3.2.2.
5.1.3. Corollary. MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) lacks interpolation over propositional symbols.
Proof. Observe that in the proof of Theorem 5.1.1, instead of ψ, one could
use ψ′ = p ∧ ©r 〈r〉(¬p ∧ ©r 〈r〉(©k ∧ ¬p)) instead. Now, in both ϕ and ψ′, all
occurrences of 〈r〉 are of the form©r 〈r〉, and all occurrences of [r] are of the form
©r [r]. Therefore they can be translated to 〈〈r〉〉 and [[r]] preserving equivalence.
Since MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) is less expressive than ML
m
∅ (〈r〉), both models of the proof of
Theorem 5.1.1 are MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉)-bisimilar and therefore the argument is valid. ✷
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Now we are going to analyze interpolation when we add the operators©e and
©f (and we use the classic diamond 〈r〉). The case of ©e is not hard to deal with,
since we can reuse the models we already found in Section 2.2.1 to define a pair
of bisimilar models in the common language. In contrast, we will leave the case
of©f open, since we could not find an equivalent pair of models for this case. The
analysis of interpolation for this operator will probably have to wait until we find
an answer to Question 3.2.16.
5.1.4. Theorem. MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ) lacks interpolation over propositional symbols.
Proof. Let
θ(q) =©r 〈r〉(q ∧©k ∧ ¬〈r〉(¬q ∧©k )).
Suppose M is a model with S = {w} where M, w |= q and M, v |= ¬q. It is not
difficult to see that M, v |= θ(q) iff vRw and ¬wRv.
Now, let ϕ and ψ be the formulas
ϕ = q ∧©r 〈r〉〈r〉(¬q ∧ θ(q))
ψ = p ∧©r [r][r](¬©k → (¬p ∧ ¬θ(p)))
(here θ(p) is the result of replacing all occurrences of q by p in the formula θ(q)).
On the one hand, if ϕ is true at a point w then there are points u and v 6= w such
that wRuRv and vRw and ¬wRv. On the other hand, if ψ is true at a point w
then for all points u and v 6= w such that wRuRv it is not the case that and vRw
and ¬wRv. Hence |= ϕ→ ¬ψ.
Recall the model M we used in Theorem 3.2.13, where M = 〈{s} ∪ N0 ∪
N1 ∪ . . . , R, ∅, ∅〉, where each Ni is a different copy of N, and R = {(n,m) | n ∈
Ni,m ∈ Nj, i ≤ j} ∪ {(n, s), (s, n) | for all n 6= s}. Graphically,
N0 N1 N2 N3
. . .
s
In Theorem 3.2.13 we showed that 〈M, w0〉 and 〈M, w1〉 are ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©e )-
bisimilar, where w0 ∈ N0 and w1 ∈ N1. Let M
′ be as M but with a nonempty
valuation: V (p) = {w0}, V (q) = {w1}, and V (r) = ∅ for all r ∈ prop different
from p and q. It is straightforward to verify that M′, w0 |= ψ and M
′, w1 |= ϕ,
but 〈M′, w0〉 and 〈M
′, w1〉 are ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©e )-bisimilar in the common language.
✷
5.1.5. Corollary. MLm(〈r〉,©e ) lacks interpolation over propositional sym-
bols.
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Proof. Let ϕ and ψ be as in Theorem 5.1.4. It is easy to see that ©eϕ→ ¬©eψ
is a valid formula in the class ofMLm(〈r〉,©e )-models. The rest of the argument
is similar. ✷
5.2 Some positive results
In this section we are going to show that MLm(〈〈r〉〉) has interpolation over
propositional symbols and known with respect to a quite general frame class.
The technique we use here is similar to the one presented in [tC05]. To develop
the proof we will need some tools from the area of model theory so, before we
go into the main theorem, we are going to give some definitions and preliminary
results. For a more detailed treatment of these concepts, see [Doe96]. Once the
result is established, using the translation we defined in Section 4.1.1 we will show
that interpolation for MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) easily follows.
Throughout this section, ↔ will refer for MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-bisimulation. When we
want to refer to an ML-bisimulation, we will use ↔ML.
5.2.1 Preliminaries
The first notion we are going to introduce is that of ω-saturatedness. This is
a classic notion defined for first order models that we are going to apply to
Kripke models, using the correspondence between Kripke and first order models
we discussed in Section 2.2.1.
A 1-type is a set of first order formulas in one free variable. A 1-type Γ(x)
is realized in a first order model M if there is an element d of the domain of M
such that M, gxd |= Γ. A model is said to be 1-saturated if for all 1-types Γ(x),
if every finite subset of Γ(x) is realized in M, then Γ(x) itself is realized in M.
One can think of 1-saturatedness as a sort of compactness within a model.
Given a modelM and a finite sequence d1, . . . , dn of elements of the domain of
M, we use (M, d1, . . . , dn) to denote the expansion of M in which the elements
d1, . . . , dn are named by additional constants c1, . . . , cn (each new constant ck
denotes the corresponding element dk in the expanded model).
5.2.1. Definition. [ω-saturated model] A modelM is ω-saturated if every such
expansion (M, d1, . . . , dn) (with n ∈ ω) is 1-saturated.
As we said before, the concept of ω-saturatedness can be applied to Kripke
models. In the same way, it can also be applied to memory Kripke models: to talk
about a memory Kripke model 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 using first order logic we can
use the standard first order correspondence language to interpret W , (Rr)r∈rel
and V , plus a unary relation symbol known to interpret the memory S.
Now we are going to prove that ω-saturatedness is preserved under the oper-
ation of memorizing a finite set of elements.
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5.2.2. Lemma. Let M be an ω-saturated memory Kripke model. For any finite
A ⊆ W , M[A] is ω-saturated.
Proof. We will show that if every finite subset of Γ(x) is realized inM[A] then
Γ(x) is realized in M[A].
Let A = {a1, . . . , an} and let M(a1, . . . , an) denote the expansion of M in
which the elements a1, . . . , an are named by additional constants c1, . . . , cn (each
new constant ck denotes the corresponding element ak in the expanded model).
Since M is ω-saturated then M(a1, . . . , an) is 1-saturated.
We formulate the following easy claim, without a proof.
5.2.3. Claim. Let Γ(x) be a 1-type set of formulas. Let Γ˜(x) = {ϕ[known(y)/
known(y) ∨ y = c1 ∨ · · · ∨ y = cn] | ϕ ∈ Γ(x)}. Then M[A], g
x
d |= Γ iff
M(a1, . . . , an), g
x
d |= Γ˜.
Let Γ(x) be a 1-type set of formulas such that every finite Γ′(x) ⊆ Γ(x) is real-
ized inM[A]. By Claim 5.2.3, every finite subset of Γ˜ is realized inM(a1, . . . , an)
and, sinceM(a1, . . . , an) is 1-saturated, Γ˜ also is. Therefore again by Claim 5.2.3,
we conclude that Γ is realized in M[A]. Since M is ω-saturated, it is trivial to
see that M[A] also is. ✷
Why are we interested in ω-saturated models? We already seen that if two
points are bisimilar, then they are modally equivalent. The converse does not
hold in general, but ω-saturated models will allow us to turn modal equivalence
for MLm(〈〈r〉〉) into a bisimulation. The problem is that we are going to start
working with models that are not necessarily ω-saturated, so we will need to have
equivalent ω-saturated models. There is a classic theorem that guarantees that
this is always possible.
5.2.4. Definition. [Elementary extension] A first order modelN is an extension
of a modelM ifM is a subset of the domain of N and the interpretation of every
non-logical symbol in M is simply the restriction of its interpretation in N with
respect to the domain of M. We say that N is an elementary extension of M
if it is an extension and for all first order formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and elements
d1, . . . , dn of the domain ofM,M, g |= ϕ iff N , g
′ |= ϕ, where g(xi) = g
′(xi) = di
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
5.2.5. Theorem ([Doe96]). Every modelM has an ω-saturated elementary ex-
tension M+.
The next notion we are going to introduce is that of bisimulation products.
5.2.6. Definition. A bisimulation product of a set of frames {Fi | i ∈ I} is a
subframe B of the Cartesian product ΠiFi such that for each i ∈ I, the natural
projection function fi : B → Fi is a surjective bounded morphism.
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This operation, together with the following theorem, enable us to construct
a new frame using a total bisimulation between two given frames. This will be
helpful later to construct a model that will act as a witness for the interpolant.
5.2.7. Theorem ([MV97]). Let H be a submodel of the product F × G. Then
H is a bisimulation product of F and G iff the domain of H is a total frame
bisimulation between F and G.
Finally, we introduce the concept of total bisimulation in the context of mem-
ory logics. The intuitive notion is that it is a bisimulation in which every possible
pairs are related.
5.2.8. Definition. [Total MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-bisimulation] Let M = 〈W,R, V, S〉 and
N = 〈W ′, R′, V ′, S ′〉 be two models of MLm(〈〈r〉〉). We say that M, w and N , v
are totally bisimilar (M, w ↔T N , v) when there is bisimulation ∼ betweenM, w
and N , v and
1. for every A = {a1, . . . , ak} ⊆ W with aiRai+1, and every a ∈ W there is a
B = {b1, . . . , bk} ⊆ W
′ with biR
′bi+1 and b ∈ W
′ such that (A, a) ∼ (B, b)
2. for every B = {b1, . . . , bk} ⊆ W
′, and every b ∈ W ′ there is A = {a1, . . . , ak}
⊆ W with aiRai+1 and a ∈M such that (A, a) ∼ (B, b).
5.2.2 The main result
We first show a sketch of the proof. We start by supposing there are two
MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-formulas ϕ and ψ such that ϕ → ψ is valid, but it doesn’t have
an interpolant in the common language. In general, the bisimulations we discuss
here between a pair of models are always established with respect to the com-
mon language of ϕ and ψ. We first show that there are two models M and N
such that M, w |= ϕ and N , v |= ¬ψ. We next take ω-saturated models M+
and N+ of M and N respectively and show M+, w ↔T N+, v. According to
Proposition 4.1.3, we take equivalent tree MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-models M+T and N
+
T such
that M+, w ↔T M+T , w and N
+, v ↔T N+T , v. We conclude M
+
T , w ↔
T N+T , v.
Then we switch to the basic model logic ML. Let M+TML and N
+
TML
be the
corresponding ML-models of M+T and N
+
T respectively (shifting the signature
to 〈prop ∪ {known},rel〉). Being MLm(〈〈r〉〉) an extension of ML, we have
M+TML ↔
T
ML N
+
TML
. Using Theorem 5.2.7, one can show that there is a bisimu-
lation product H ∈ C of the frames of M′ and N ′, and a valuation V such that
(H, V ), 〈w, v〉 |= (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)[©k /known].
Since by its definition, H is tree like, we can return to MLm(〈〈r〉〉) and con-
clude that ϕ∧¬ψ is satisfiable in someMLm(〈〈r〉〉)-model of C, contradicting our
hypothesis. Graphically, the general schema is the following (the double headed
arrows represents total bisimulations):
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M N
M+ N+
M+
T
N+
T
≡ ≡
M+
TML
N+
TML
(H, V )
ML
ML ML
5.2.9. Theorem. Let C be any elementary frame class closed under generated
subframes and bisimulation products. Then MLm(〈〈r〉〉) has interpolation over
propositions and known relative to C.
Proof. Let ϕ and ψ such that C |= ϕ → ψ and let L be the common language
of ϕ and ψ. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is no interpolant of
ϕ and ψ in the language L. We first prove two easy lemmas.
5.2.10. Lemma. There is a model M based on a frame in C, with a world w,
such that M, w |= {χ | C |= ϕ→ χ and χ ∈ L} ∪ {¬ψ}.
Proof. By compactness, it suffices to show that every finite subset of cons(ϕ)∪
{¬ψ} is satisfiable on C. Consider any χ1, . . . , χn ∈ cons(ϕ). If {χ1, . . . , χn, ¬ψ}
wouldn’t be satisfiable on C, then χ1∧· · ·∧χn would be an interpolant for ϕ→ ψ.
By assumption, ϕ → ψ has no interpolant, and therefore, {χ1, . . . , χn,¬ψ} is
satisfiable on C. ✷
Since C is closed under generated subframes we may assume that M is gen-
erated by w.
5.2.11. Lemma. There is a model N based on a frame in C, with a world v, such
that N , v |= {χ | M, w |= χ and χ ∈ L} ∪ {ϕ}.
Proof. Recall that T (M, w) denotes the set of formulas satisfied at 〈M, w〉.
By compactness, it suffices to show that every finite subset of T (M, w) ∪ {ϕ} is
satisfiable on C. Consider any χ1, . . . , χn ∈ T (M, w). Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that {χ1, . . . , χn, ϕ} is not satisfiable on C. Then C |= ϕ→ ¬(χ1 ∧
· · ·∧χn). Hence, ¬(χ1∧· · ·∧χn) ∈ cons(ϕ), and therefore,M, w |= ¬(χ1∧· · ·∧χn).
This contradicts the fact that χ1, . . . , χn ∈ T (M, w). ✷
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Again we may assume that N is generated by v. Let M+ and N+ be ω-
saturated elementary extensions of M and N respectively. Let us suppose that
the first order modelsM+ and N+ have domains M and N and binary relations
R1 and R2 for the modal operator 〈r〉, respectively.
We define the relation ∼ between ℘(M)×M and ℘(N)×N in the following
way: for all finite A ⊆M and finite B ⊆ N ,
(A, a) ∼ (B, b) iff for all formulas χ in L, M+[A], a |= χ iff N+[B], b |= χ.
Notice that by construction (∅, w) ∼ (∅, v). We prove now that ∼ is indeed a
bisimulation. One remark first, in the proof below, STx is the standard translation
fromMLm(〈r〉) formulas to first order logic formulas we discussed in Section 3.3.
5.2.12. Lemma. ∼ is an MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-bisimulation between M+ and N+ with
respect to L.
Proof. By the definition of ∼, it is clear that the condition (agree) of Defini-
tion 3.1.1 is satisfied, restricted to L. Let us see (mzig). Suppose (A, a) ∼ (B, b)
and aR1a
′. Let
Γ = {STx(χ) | M
+[A ∪ {a}], a′ |= χ and χ ∈ L}.
Let cb be a new constant denoting the element b of N
+. We next show that
Γ∪{R(cb, x)} is realized in N
+[B∪{b}], where R is the first order binary relation
symbol for 〈〈r〉〉. Since, by Lemma 5.2.2, the expansion of N+[B ∪ {b}] with the
constant cb is 1-saturated, it suffices to show that every finite subset of Γ is realized
in N+[B ∪ {b}] by an R2-successor of b. Let STx(χ1), . . . , STx(χn) ∈ Γ. We have
M+[A], a |= 〈〈r〉〉(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χn), and therefore N
+[B], b |= 〈〈r〉〉(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χn),
which implies that there is an R2-successor of b which satisfies χ1 ∧ · · · ∧χn. I.e.,
in N+[B ∪ {b}] there is an R2-successor which realizes {STx(χ1), . . . , STx(χn)}.
Hence, there is b′, bR2b
′ such that N+[B ∪ {b}], gxb′ |= Γ. Therefore for every χ of
L, ifM+[A∪{a}], a′ |= χ then N+[B∪{b}], b′ |= χ. To see the other implication,
suppose by contradiction that N+[B ∪{b}], b′ |= χ butM+[A∪{a}], a′ 6|= χ (the
case M+[A ∪ {a}], a′ |= χ but N+[B ∪ {b}], b′ 6|= χ is similar). This would imply
that M+[A ∪ {a}], a′ |= ¬χ and hence N+[B ∪ {b}], b′ |= ¬χ which leads to a
contradiction. The (mzag) condition is similar.
In order to check (remember), suppose that M+[A], a |= χ iff N+[B], b |= χ
for all χ of L. Now, let χ be any formula of L. By hypothesis, M+[A], a |= ©rχ
iff N+[B], b |=©rχ. Applying the definition of©r , we obtainM+[A∪{a}], a |= χ
iff N+[B ∪ {b}], b |= χ. ✷
The following lemma helps prove that the bisimulation ∼ we have defined is
total.
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5.2.13. Lemma. For every a ∈ M there is b ∈ N such that (∅, a) ∼ (∅, b); also
for every b ∈ N there is a ∈M such that (∅, a) ∼ (∅, b)
Proof. We prove the first assertion, since the second is similar. Let a ∈M and
let
Γ = {STx(χ) | M
+, a |= χ and χ ∈ L}
We need to show that Γ is realized in N+. By ω-saturatedness, it suffices to
show that every finite subset of Γ is realized in N+. Let STx(χ1), . . . , STx(χn)
∈ Γ. Then, if θ = STx(χ1) ∧ · · · ∧ STx(χn), the formula (∃x)θ is true at M
+ and
therefore also atM (recall thatM+ is an elementary extension ofM). SinceM
is generated by w, there is n ≥ 0 such thatM, w |= 〈〈r〉〉(n)θ. Since (∅, w) ∼ (∅, v),
we have thatN , v |= 〈〈r〉〉(n)θ. SinceN+ is an elementary extension ofN it follows
that N+, v |= 〈〈r〉〉(n)θ. We conclude that there is b ∈ N such that N+, b |= θ,
and so {STx(χ1), . . . , STx(χn)} is realized in N
+. ✷
5.2.14. Corollary. The MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-bisimulation ∼ is total.
Proof. By a straightforward induction, using (mforth) and (mback) conditions
of ∼. ✷
Applying the tree model property for MLm(〈〈r〉〉) (see Theorem 4.1.3), let
M+T and N
+
T be tree ML
m(〈〈r〉〉)-models such that M+, w ↔T M+T , w and
N+, v ↔T N+T , v. By Corollary 5.2.14, M
+, w ↔T N+, v, and by transitivity
of total bisimulations, we conclude M+T , w ↔
T N+T , v.
Now, let M+TML and N
+
TML
be the ML equivalent models for M+T and N
+
T .
Since MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-bisimulation implies ML-bisimulation, M+TML ↔
T
ML N
+
TML
.
Let F and G be the underlying frames of M+TML and N
+
TML
respectively. Using
Theorem 5.2.7, we know there is a bisimulation product H ∈ C of F and G of
which the domain is ∼. By the definition of bisimulation products, the natural
projections f : H → F and g : H → G are surjective bounded morphisms. For
any proposition letter p ∈ props(ϕ), let V (p) = {u | MTML , f(u) |= p}, and for
any proposition letter p ∈ props(ψ), let V (p) = {u | N+TML , g(u) |= p}. The
properties of ∼ guarantee that this V is well-defined for p ∈ props(ϕ)∩ props(ψ).
By a standard argument, the graph of f is a bisimulation between (H, V ) and
M+TML with respect to props(ϕ), and the graph of g is a bisimulation between
(H, V ) and N+TML with respect to props(ψ).
Now we have the appropriate model in which the contradiction is made ex-
plicit, but we have to be able to raise this result to MLm(〈〈r〉〉). Notice that
the model (H, V ) is a tree, since it is the bisimulation product of two trees, and
also that the signature of (H, V ) is 〈prop ∪ {known},rel〉. Therefore, we can
define the MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-model (H, V ′, S) over 〈prop,rel〉 where V ′ = V for all
p ∈ prop and w ∈ V (known) iff w ∈ S. It is easy to see that the equivalent
ML-model for (H, V ′, S) is (H, V ). So now we need some claim that guarantees
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us that we can build two relations ∼f and ∼g from the graphs of f and g respec-
tively, such that ∼f is an ML
m(〈〈r〉〉)-bisimulation between (H, V ′, S) and M+T
and ∼g is anML
m(〈〈r〉〉)-bisimulation between (H, V ′, S) and N+T . We will leave
this as a lemma to be proved later. Assuming that we can actually build those
relations, it follows that (H, V ′, S), 〈w, v〉 |= ϕ ∧ ¬ψ. This contradicts our initial
assumption that C |= ϕ→ ψ. ✷
We only left to prove the following lemma.
5.2.15. Lemma. LetM and N be two treeMLm(〈〈r〉〉)-models over 〈prop, rel〉
such that M′ and N ′ are their corresponding tree ML-models over the signature
〈prop ∪ {known},rel〉 (recall the association we defined in Section 3.2.4). Let
∼ML be an ML-bisimulation between 〈M
′, w〉 and 〈N ′, v〉 where w and v are
their corresponding tree roots. Let Z ⊆ (℘(M)×M)× (℘(N)×N) be the relation
(A,wn) Z (B, vn) iff wn ∼ML vn, and either A = {w0, . . . , wn−1} and B =
{v0, . . . , vn−1}, or A = {w0, . . . , wn−1, wn} and B = {v0, . . . , vn−1, vn}, where
w0 = w, v0 = v and wiRwi+1 and viRvi+1 for i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Then Z is an
MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-bisimulation between 〈M, w〉 and 〈N , v〉.
Proof. We should check that Z is an MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-bisimulation between M, w
and N , v. The relation Z satisfies non-triv since w ∼ML v, and therefore
by definition (∅, w)Z(∅, v). By definition of Z, we have only two cases where
(A,w)Z(B, v), so let us suppose that (1) ((w0, . . . , wn−1), wn)Z((v0, . . . , vn−1),
vn), or (2) ((w0, . . . , wn), wn) Z ((v0, . . . , vn), vn), and let check the rest of the
conditions. Since wn ∼ML vn, we know that wn and vn coincide in the proposi-
tional symbols, and that includes the proposition known. So, to check that agree
holds we only have to see what happens with ©k . If we are in case (1), by the
correspondence between a MLm(〈〈r〉〉) model and an ML model, we know that
M, w |=MLm(〈〈r〉〉) ©k iffM
′, w |=ML known (and the same for N and v). Since we
have tree-like models, we know that w0, . . . , wn−1, wn are all different points, and
therefore M[w0, . . . , wn−1], wn |= ©k iff M, wn |= ©k . Therefore, wn and vn coin-
cides in the propositional symbols and known, and agree is satisfied. If we are in
case (2),©k holds both inM[w0, . . . , wn], wn and N [v0, . . . , vn], vn, and so agree is
also satisfied. To see mforth, let suppose that RM(wn, wn+1). Since wn ∼ML vn,
we know that there is a vn+1 such that RN (vn, vn+1) and wn+1 ∼ML vn+1. By
definition,
((w0, . . . , wn), wn+1) Z ((v0, . . . , vn), vn+1) and
((w0, . . . , wn, wn+1), wn+1) Z ((v0, . . . , vn, vn+1), vn+1) ,
and that satisfies mforth for cases (1) and (2). The case for mback is analogous.
The remember condition holds trivially by definition of Z. ✷
From this result, interpolation for MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) is straightforward using
the equivalence preserving translations we defined in Theorem 4.1.5 between
MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) and MLm(〈〈r〉〉).
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5.2.16. Theorem. Let C be any elementary frame class closed under generated
subframes and bisimulation products. ThenMLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) has interpolation over
propositions and known relative to C.
Proof. Let Tr be the equivalence preserving translation defined in Theorem 4.1.5
that takes MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f )-formulas to MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-formulas. Observe that Tr
preserves propositional symbols and known, that is, given ϕ ∈ MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ),
©k occurs in ϕ if and only if ©k occurs in Tr(ϕ) and props(ϕ) = props(Tr(ϕ)).
Let ϕ and ψ be two MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f )-formulas such that ϕ → ψ is valid. Us-
ing Tr, we know that Tr(ϕ) → Tr(ψ) is a valid MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-formula. By The-
orem 5.2.9, we know that there is an interpolant χ for Tr(ϕ) and Tr(ψ) in the
common language. Since Tr preserves equivalence, χ is also an interpolant for ϕ
and ψ. Furthermore, given that Tr preserves propositional symbols and known,
χ is in the common language of ϕ and ψ. ✷
5.3 The quest for Beth definability
In this section we want to analyze the Beth property for some of the memory
fragments we are working with. As we said in Section 2.2.3, the Beth property is
present usually when interpolation also is (see [Hoo01] for examples). Therefore,
the expected result would be to have the Beth property forMLm(〈〈r〉〉), while for
other memory fragments we studied, it should not be present.
Having proved interpolation for a given logic, the usual technique to prove
Beth is based on “simulating” global satisfiability using local evaluations. This
technique works for logics that have the generated submodel property. Let us
give an intuitive idea of how to do this. Suppose that we are interested in models
that globally satisfy a given set of formulas Σ, but we want to describe this
condition by evaluating a formula locally, at a given point. How can we accomplish
this? The idea is to take each formula of Σ and stack in front of it enough
boxes to reach every possible point. More formally, we can construct a new set
Γ = {✷nϕ | ϕ ∈ Σ, n ∈ N}, and using the generated submodel property, take
a submodel Mw of M generated from w, and evaluate Γ at w. Observe that
there are always formulas in Γ with enough stacked boxes to reach from w every
point in Mw. Thus, if Γ is satisfied at w, Σ must hold globally. In this way, we
can transform global semantic consequence in local semantic consequence, where
interpolation can be applied to construct an explicit definition from an implicit
one. Several examples of this type of proof can be found in [tC05].
The problem we face when we try to apply this technique for the case of
MLm(〈〈r〉〉) is that we do not have the usual [r] operator, but we have [[r]] in-
stead. Recall that the operator [[r]] remembers the current point before making a
modal transition, and therefore it is not clear that Γ works now to ensure global
satisfiability. Why? The reason is that in this context, when a certain point is
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reached the model may have several memorized points due to [[r]], and the original
set might not hold there.
Nevertheless, the interaction between global satisfiability and the memory
operators seems to leave a gap where this technique can be still applied. We
could not find a proof of the Beth property forMLm(〈〈r〉〉), but we think that this
property indeed holds. The proof for Beth depends on the following conjecture:
5.3.1. Conjecture. Let Σ be a set of MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-formulas. If there is a model
〈M, w〉 such that M |= Σ and there is not an acyclic model 〈M′, w〉 such that
M, w ↔ M′, w and M′ |= Σ, then for all M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 such that
M |= Σ, S = ∅.
Intuitively, this property says that if a set of formulas Σ imposes a cycle to
all the models that satisfy Σ globally, then Σ also constraints the memory of the
models to be empty.
We now show how Beth can be proved, assuming that the conjecture is correct.
We give these results for the unimodal case, so we use 〈✸〉 and [✷] instead of 〈〈r〉〉
and [[r]].
5.3.2. Lemma. Let Γ be a set of MLm(〈〈r〉〉)-formulas such that Γ(p) ∪ Γ(p′) |=
p↔ p′. Then there is a finite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ and a formula δ in which p does not
occur such that Γ0(p) |= p↔ δ.
Proof. By compactness, we know that there is a subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that
Γ0(p) ∪ Γ0(p
′) |= p ↔ p′. It follows that |= (p ∧
∧
Γ0(p)) → (
∧
Γ0(p
′) → p′). By
Theorem 5.2.9, there is an interpolant δ for the implication such that p and p′ do
not occur in δ. Hence, on one hand we have |= (p ∧
∧
Γ0(p))→ δ. On the other
hand, |= δ → (
∧
Γ0(p
′) → p′), and by uniform substitution, |= δ → (
∧
Γ0(p) →
p). Therefore, we conclude |= δ ↔ (
∧
Γ0(p) → p). This implies Γ0(p) |= δ ↔ p
as desired. ✷
5.3.3. Theorem. If Conjecture 5.3.1 is correct, then MLm(〈〈r〉〉) has the Beth
property with respect to the class of all models.
Proof. Let Σ be a set ofMLm(〈〈r〉〉)-formulas such that Σ implicitly defines the
propositional letter p. Then, by definition of implicit definability, Σ(p)∪Σ(p′) |=glo
p ↔ p′. The first case is that for all M such that M |= Σ, and for all w in M,
there is an acyclic model 〈M′, w〉 such that M, w ↔ M′, w and M′ |= Σ. Let
Γ = {[✷]nϕ | ϕ ∈ Σ, n ∈ N}. The following claim can be proved:
5.3.4. Claim. Γ(p) ∪ Γ(p′) |= p↔ p′.
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Proof. Suppose M, w |= Γ(p) ∪ Γ(p′) for some model M. By Theorem 4.1.3,
letMT be a tree-like model such thatMT , w ↔M, w. SinceMT is tree-like, we
know thatMT [v], v |= 〈✸〉ϕ iff MT , v |= 〈✸〉ϕ for all ϕ and v inMT . Therefore,
by construction of Γ, MT globally satisfies Σ(p) and Σ(p
′). Then it follows that
MT |= p↔ p
′. Hence, MT , w |= p↔ p
′, and therefore M, w |= p↔ p′. ✷
By Lemma 5.3.2, there is a formula δ in which p does not occur such that
Γ0(p) |= p ↔ δ. Let us see now that Σ(p) |=
glo p ↔ δ. Suppose there is a model
M such thatM |= Σ(p). Then for all w inM, there is an acyclic model 〈M′, w〉
such that M, w ↔M′, w and M′ |= Σ. Using again the fact that M′ is acyclic,
by construction of Γ we know that M′, w |= Γ0. Therefore M
′, w |= p ↔ δ and
we conclude that M, w |= p↔ δ. Therefore M |= p↔ δ.
Let analyze now the other case. By Conjecture 5.3.1, we know that for all
model M, if M |= Σ, then M has an empty memory. Let Γ = {[✷]n(¬©k → ϕ) |
ϕ ∈ Σ, n ∈ N}. We can prove a similar lemma as we did for the previous case:
5.3.5. Claim. Γ(p) ∪ Γ(p′) |= p↔ p′.
Proof. Suppose M, w |= Γ(p) ∪ Γ(p′) for some model M. Let Mw be the
submodel ofM generated by w. Since the memory ofM is empty, by construction
of Γ, Mw globally satisfies Σ(p) and Σ(p
′). Then it follows that Mw |= p ↔ p
′.
Hence, Mw, w |= p↔ p
′, and therefore M, w |= p↔ p′. ✷
Thus, in this case we can apply again Lemma 5.3.2 and conclude that there is
a formula δ in which p does not occur and Γ0(p) |= p↔ δ. Therefore, Σ(p) |=
glo
p↔ δ. ✷
5.3.1 Some negative results
Here we show an example of a quite general elementary frame class on which all
the modal memory logics we presented lack the Beth property.
Given a frame F , the connected components of F are the maximal connected
submodels of F (in the sense of graph theory, that is, taking the underlying
undirected graph induced by F). It is quite easy to see that the class of frames
such that all the connected components are of size greater than 1 is first order
definable with the formula (∀w)(∃v)(w 6= v ∧ (wRv ∨ vRw)).
5.3.6. Theorem. Let C be a class of frames such that all the connected compo-
nents are of size greater than 1. ThenMLm(〈〈r〉〉) lacks the Beth property relative
to C.
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Proof. Consider the following formulas:
¬©k , t→ 〈〈r〉〉©k ,
t→ 〈〈r〉〉¬t, t→ [[r]]¬t,
¬t→ [[r]]⊥, p→ [[r]]q,
¬p→ [[r]]¬q.
Let Σ be the set defined by these formulas. Let us see first that in a model
based on a frame in C, Σ implicitly defines q in terms of p. Let us take any model
M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 based on a frame in C such thatM |= Σ. Let w be any
point in M. First notice that by ¬©k , S = ∅. If w ∈ V (t), by t→ 〈〈r〉〉©k , wRw.
Then, by t→ [[r]]¬t and t→ 〈〈r〉〉¬t, w has at least one successor v such that ¬t
holds at v, and at every w-successor ¬t holds. Furthermore, by ¬t→ [[r]]⊥, every
successor of w is a dead end.
The other case is that w 6∈ V (t). By ¬t → [[r]]⊥, w has no successors. Since
all the connected components in M has a size greater than 1, there must be a v
such that vRw. By ¬t → [[r]]⊥ again, t must hold in v, and we are again in the
previous case. Therefore, M looks like a collection of patterns with this shape:
.
.
.t
¬t
¬t
¬t
Clearly, by ¬p → [[r]]¬q and p → [[r]]q, fixing p in the points where t holds,
defines q for all the points in M. That means that Σ implicitly defines q. Let us
see now that there is no explicit definition of q. Let us take these two models
M1
t, p, q
w
¬t, p, q
v
M2
t,¬p,¬q
w
¬t, p,¬q
v
Clearly both models belong to C and globally satisfy Σ. Let us suppose that
there is a formula δ such that q does not occur in δ and such that Σ |=gloC q ↔ δ.
A trivial bisimulation argument shows that for any formula ϕ in which q does not
occur, M1, v ↔M2, v. Therefore δ cannot exist. ✷
5.3.7. Corollary. All the memory logics we presented in Section 2.1.3 lack the
Beth property with respect to C.
Proof. This is quite easy to see. SinceMLm(〈〈r〉〉) is the weakest of the memory
logics in terms of expressive power, one can translate Σ to every other memory
fragment. Since all the memory logics presented in Section 2.1.3 have the gener-
ated submodel property, the bisimulation argument we used forMLm(〈〈r〉〉) also
works for all of them. ✷
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5.4 Observations
We have not analyzed the interpolation property for hybrid memory logics. There
is a general negative interpolation result in [tC05], that states that HL(@, ↓) is
the least expressive logic with interpolation extending HL(@). Using what we
have learnt from Chapter 3, we know that all the hybrid memory fragments we
presented that extend HL(@) are strictly less expressive than HL(@, ↓). There-
fore, we expect these hybrid memory fragments to be good candidates to fall into
this negative result, and therefore lack interpolation over propositional symbols
and nominals.
With respect to the Beth property, much work is left to be done. We would
like to confirm (or disprove!) Conjecture 5.3.1. One way to try to prove this is
to use the tableau system for MLm(〈〈r〉〉) we are going to present in Chapter 7,
and modify it to perform a model search for global satisfiability. We also want to
explore more general classes of models for the remaining memory fragments, and
determine the behavior of the Beth property there.
Chapter 6
Axiomatizations
Recuerda que las horas
se construyen
con los ladrillos
de tu alma de cristal.
“Vac´ıo sideral”, Luis Alberto Spinetta.
In this chapter we will present a number of axiomatizations and prove them
(strongly) complete with respect to several memory logics. As we are going to
see, nominals turn out to be a very useful tool to achieve completeness, so we will
mostly focus on axiomatizations for hybrid memory logics.
Finding a sound and complete axiomatization for fragments where nominals
are not present does not look easy to achieve, mainly because it seems hard to
describe the interaction between the memory operators©r and ©k and the modal
operator 〈r〉. The difficulty of finding these axiomatizations lies on the fact that
there is no easy way to name a point w without nominals, and therefore to describe
the act of remembering w in terms of the other operators. This difficulty does not
seem to be overcame with the additional expressive power that©e or©f provides.
On the other hand, nominals are a useful device we can use to accomplish
this. The ability to use nominals to name points, and the use of techniques bor-
rowed from classical hybrid modal logics allow us to obtain sound and strongly
complete axiomatizations for several hybrid memory logic fragments. All the hy-
brid memory fragments we are going to analyze include the satisfaction operator
@. The reason for this is due mainly for “hybrid reasons” rather than “memory
reasons”: the axiomatic system for HL (that is, the basic modal logic augmented
with nominals without @) involves adding an infinite number of rules of proof
(see [BT98] for details). On the other hand, including the @ operator produces
a much nicer axiomatic system, that we take as a starting point to develop the
axiomatizations we need.
In the last section of this chapter we are going to see that there are some cases
where we can provide axiomatizations even in the absence of nominals. The trick
to do this is to concentrate on fragments that have the tree model property, as
shown in Theorem 4.1.3 and Corollary 4.1.6. This allows us to describe the effect
of memorizing a point restricted just to a propositional level, since the expressive
power of ©r in these cases is quite weak.
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6.1 Completeness for HLm(@, 〈r〉)
This section is devoted to prove a completeness result for HLm(@, 〈r〉). We are
going to use the same techniques presented in [BdRV01] for the hybrid logic
HL(@), and the ability to construct a canonical named model will allow us to
generalize the result for pure extensions. We are going to give a precise definition
of these concepts later.
Our axiomatization is shown in Figure 6.1. It is an extension of the axioma-
tization for HL(@) presented in [BdRV01].
Axioms:
CT All classical tautologies Intro ⊢ (i ∧ p)→ @ip
K@ ⊢ @i(p→ q)→ @ip→ @iq Self-dual@ ⊢ @ip↔ ¬@i¬p
K[r] ⊢ [r](p→ q)→ ([r]p→ [r]q) Ref ⊢ @ii
Sym ⊢ @ij ↔ @ji Nom ⊢ (@ij ∧@jp)→ @ip
Agree ⊢ @j@ip↔ @ip Back ⊢ 〈r〉@ip→ @ip
Rem ⊢ @i(©rϕ↔ ϕ[©k /(©k ∨ i)])
Rules:
MP If ⊢ ϕ and ⊢ ϕ→ ψ then ⊢ ψ Gen[r] If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ [r]ϕ
Name ⊢ j → ϕ then ⊢ ϕ (j not in ϕ) Gen@ If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ @iϕ
Paste If ⊢ (@i〈r〉j ∧@jϕ)→ ψ then ⊢ (@i〈r〉ϕ)→ ψ
(j 6= i and j is not in ϕ or ψ)
SortedSub1 If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ ϕ[p/ψ] for any p ∈ prop
SortedSub2 If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ ϕ[i/j] for any i, j ∈ nom
The expression ϕ[a/b] is the result of uniformly replacing all occurrences of a in ϕ by b.
Figure 6.1: Axiomatization for HLm(@, 〈r〉).
The axiom characterizing the behavior of the memory operator is Rem. All
the other axioms and rules are from HL(@). Therefore, to show soundness of the
axiomatization, we only have to look at this new axiom. Intuitively, the axiom
says that, when standing in a point named by i, the act of remembering the
current point is equivalent to increase the extension of ©k with i throughout the
formula. Formally:
6.1.1. Lemma. Let M be a model and w ∈ M such that M, w |= i. Then, for
all v ∈M, M[w], v |= ϕ iff M, v |= ϕ[©k /(©k ∨ i)].
Proof. By induction on ϕ. For the base case, if ϕ is a proposition symbol or a
nominal, then since ϕ = ϕ[©k /(©k ∨ i)] we have M[w], v |= ϕ iff M, v |= ϕ. For
the ©k case we have to prove M[w], v |=©k iff M, v |=©k ∨ i.
⇒) Assume that M[w], v |= ©k . If v = w, then M, v |= i, and therefore
M, v |=©k ∨ i. If v 6= w, then M, v |=©k , and hence M, v |=©k ∨ i.
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⇐) Let us assume that M, v |=©k ∨ i. If v = w, then M[w], v |=©k . On the
other hand, if v 6= w, then we know thatM[w], v |= ¬i, and thereforeM, v |=©k .
We conclude M[w], v |=©k .
The conjunction, negation, diamond, @ and remember cases are straightfor-
ward, using the inductive hypothesis and the fact that the replacement operation
[©k /(©k ∨ i)] distributes over ∧, ¬, 〈r〉, @ and ©r . ✷
6.1.2. Corollary. Rem is sound over the class of all models.
Proof. Take an arbitrary modelM and let w ∈M be such thatM, w |= i. By
definition M, v |= @i©rϕ iff M[w], w |= ϕ. Applying the previous lemma, this
happens iff M, w |= ϕ[©k /(©k ∨ i)] iff (by definition) M, v |= @iϕ[©k /(©k ∨ i)]. ✷
It is worth noting that having nominals in the language is a key feature to
describe the©r /©k interaction with modal operators, and the Rem axiom strongly
uses this feature. The possibility to identify with a nominal the point in which
a remember operation is taking place allows us to fully describe the behavior of
this interaction.
We now turn to completeness. We will build a Henkin model using named
maximal consistent sets (MCSs) for an arbitrary consistent set (see [BdRV01] for
further details).
6.1.3. Definition. An MCS is named if and only if it contains a nominal. We
call any nominal belonging to an MCS a name for that MCS. Also, if Γ is an
MCS and i is a nominal, then we call {ϕ | @iϕ ∈ Γ} a named set yielded by Γ.
Furthermore, we say that a model is named if every point in the model is the
denotation of some nominal (for all w ∈ W there is some nominal i such that
V (i) = {w}).
The idea behind the construction presented in [BdRV01] is that we can extract
all the information we need to build a named canonical model from a single MCS.
We start by noting that hidden inside any MCS there is a collection of named
MCSs with a number of relevant properties:
6.1.4. Lemma. Let Γ be an MCS. For every nominal i, let ∆i be {ϕ | @iϕ ∈
Γ}. Then, (i) for every nominal i, ∆i is an MCS that contains i; (ii) for all
nominals i and j, if i ∈ ∆j, then ∆i = ∆j; (iii) for all nominals i and j,
@iϕ ∈ ∆j iff @iϕ ∈ Γ; and (iv) if i is a name for Γ then Γ = ∆i.
Proof. We only sketch the proof, the full details can be found in [BdRV01].
Claim (i) can be proved using Ref (to guarantee that i ∈ ∆i), Gen@ and Self-
dual@ (to prove that ∆i is an MCS). Claim (ii) is proved using Sym and Nom,
Claim (iii) follows by Agree. And Claim (iv) is obtained by Intro and Self-dual@.
✷
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Given a consistent set of formulas Σ, we can always expand it to an MCS Σ+
using the standard Lindenbaum’s Lemma. The problem is that nothing guar-
antees that this MCS will be named. In addition, as we want to extract named
MCSs from named sets yielded by Σ+, we have to ensure that there are enough
named MCSs to use as existential witnesses during the construction of the Henkin
model. Here is where the Name and Paste rules are useful. Expanding the lan-
guage with new nominals, the Name rule is going to solve our first problem, and
the Paste rule solves the second. We call an MCS Γ pasted iff @i〈r〉ϕ ∈ Γ implies
that for some nominal j, @i〈r〉j ∧@jϕ ∈ Γ. Name and Paste guarantee that any
consistent set of formulas can be extended to a named and pasted MCS.
6.1.5. Lemma (Extended Lindenbaum Lemma). Let S = 〈prop,nom,rel〉
be a signature, let nom′ be a countably infinite collection of nominals disjoint from
nom, and let S ′ be the signature obtained by extending S with nom′. Then ev-
ery HLm(@, 〈r〉)-consistent set of formulas in S can be extended to a named and
pasted MCS in S ′.
Proof. Full details can be found in [BdRV01]. The proof follows the standard
Lindenbaum’s construction with the following modifications. Take a consistent
set of formulas Σ, and name it by adding a new nominal k (use Name to prove
consistency). Using an enumeration of all the formulas, we expand Σ step-by-step
with a formula that is consistent with the expanded set at each point. Because we
want the final MCS to be pasted, at the (m+1)-th step, when we are considering
Σm and the formula ϕm+1, if Σ
m∪{ϕm+1} is inconsistent, we set Σ
m+1 = Σm. Else,
if ϕm+1 has the form @i〈r〉ϕ, we set Σ
m+1 = Σm ∪ {ϕm+1} ∪ {@i〈r〉j ∧ @j〈r〉ϕ},
where j is new (relying on the Paste rule for consistency). If ϕm+1 does not have
the form @i〈r〉ϕ, we set Σ
m+1 = Σm ∪ {ϕm+1} as usual. Finally, we take the
infinite union of all the Σi. ✷
Now we can define the model we need, using the named sets yielded by a
named and pasted MCS.
6.1.6. Definition. Let Γ be a named and pasted MCS. The named model
yielded by Γ is MΓ = (W Γ, (RΓr )r∈rel, V
Γ, SΓ). Here W Γ is the set of all named
sets yielded by Γ, uRΓr v holds iff for all formulas ϕ, ϕ ∈ v implies 〈r〉ϕ ∈ u,
V Γ(a) = {w ∈ W Γ | a ∈ w} for any atom a, and SΓ = {w | ©k ∈ w}.
Note that MΓ is well defined, since by items (i) and (ii) of Lemma 6.1.4, V Γ
assigns to every nominal a singleton subset ofW Γ. Using the fact that Γ is named
and pasted, we can prove the following Existence Lemma:
6.1.7. Lemma (Existence Lemma). Let Γ be a named and pasted MCS, and
let M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 be the named model yielded by Γ. Suppose u ∈ M
and 〈r〉ϕ ∈ u. Then there is a v ∈M such that uRrv and ϕ ∈ v
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Proof. The proof is similar as the one in [BdRV01]. As u ∈ W , for some
nominal i we have that u = ∆i (recall that ∆i = {ϕ | @iϕ ∈ Γ}). Hence as
〈r〉ϕ ∈ u, @i〈r〉ϕ ∈ Γ. But Γ is pasted so for some nominal j, @i〈r〉j ∧@jϕ ∈ Γ,
and so 〈r〉j ∈ ∆i and ϕ ∈ ∆j. If now we show that ∆iR∆j, then ∆j would be
a suitable choice for v. So suppose that ψ ∈ ∆j. This means that @jψ ∈ Γ. By
@-agree (item (iii)) of Lemma 6.1.4 @jψ ∈ ∆i. But 〈r〉j ∈ ∆i. Hence, because
〈r〉i∧@iφ→ 〈r〉φ is provable with this axiomatization, 〈r〉ψ ∈ ∆i as required. ✷
Now we are ready to prove the Truth Lemma that will lead us to the desired
completeness result. Before that, to treat the©r case properly, we have to redefine
the complexity of the formulas, to be able to handle the substitutions made by
the Rem axiom.
6.1.8. Definition. We define the complexity of a formula as comp(ϕ) = 2(k +
1)(r + 1)(d + 1) + v, where k, r and d are the number of occurrences of ©k , ©r
and 〈r〉 respectively, and v is the number of occurrences of all the other possible
operators.
Note that with this definition, comp(©rϕ) > comp(ϕ[©k /(©k ∨ i)]).
6.1.9. Lemma (Truth Lemma). Let M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 be the named
model yielded by a named and pasted MCS, and let u ∈ W . Then, for all formulas
ϕ, ϕ ∈ u iff M, u |= ϕ.
Proof. By Induction on the complexity comp of ϕ. The atomic, boolean and
modal cases are obvious (the Existence Lemma is used for the modal case, and
the©k case follows directly from the definition of SΓ). We analyze the satisfaction
operators. Suppose M, u |= @iψ. This happens iff M,∆i |= ψ (by items (i) and
(ii) of Lemma 6.1.4, ∆i is the only MCS containing i, and hence, by the atomic
case of the present lemma, the only point in M where i is true) iff ψ ∈ ∆i (by
inductive hypothesis) iff @iψ ∈ ∆i (using the fact that i ∈ ∆i together with
Intro for the left-to-right direction and Intro and Self-dual@ for the right-to-left
direction) iff @iψ ∈ u (by Agree).
To finish the proof, let us analyze the case for©r . Given u ∈M, we know that
for some nominal i we have u = ∆i, so by definition,M, u |= i and i ∈ u. Suppose
M, u |= ©rψ. This happens iff M, u |= @i©rψ (because M, u |= i) iff M, u |=
@iψ[©k /(©k ∨ i)] (by Corollary 6.1.2) iff M, u |= ψ[©k /(©k ∨ i)] (again because
M, u |= i) iff ψ[©k /(©k ∨ i)] ∈ u (by inductive hypothesis) iff @iψ[©k /(©k ∨ i)] ∈ u
(because i ∈ u, using Intro for the left-to-right direction, and Self-dual@ and
Intro for the right-to-left direction) iff @i©rψ ∈ u (by the Rem axiom) iff©rψ ∈ u
(because i ∈ u, applying again Intro and Self-dual@). ✷
6.1.10. Theorem (Completeness for HLm(@, 〈r〉)). Every MCS in the logic
HLm(@, 〈r〉) is satisfiable in a countable named model.
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Proof. Let Σ be a consistent set of formulas from HLm(@, 〈r〉). We use the
Extended Lindenbaum Lemma to expand it to a named and pasted set Σ+ in an
extended countable language. Let M be the named model yielded by Σ+. By
item (iv) of Lemma 6.1.4, because Σ+ is named, Σ+ is an element in the domain
of M. By the Truth Lemma, M,Σ+ |= Σ. The model is countable because each
point is named by some nominal in the extended language, and there are only
countably many of these. ✷
This establishes strong completeness as desired.
6.1.1 Pure extensions
As we anticipated in the introduction of this section, because our Henkin model
is named, we can prove a more general result.
6.1.11. Definition. If a formula ϕ contains no propositional symbols (that is,
its atoms are nominals or ©k ), we say that ϕ is ©k -pure. Furthermore, if ϕ is a
©k -pure formula, we say that ψ is a ©k -pure instance of ϕ if ψ is obtained from
ϕ by uniformly substituting nominals for nominals. A formula ϕ is pure if its
atomic subformulas are only nominals.
The axiomatization we presented in Figure 6.1 for HLm(@, 〈r〉) has the fol-
lowing property: for any set of pure formulas Π, if P is the logic obtained by
adding the formulas in Π as axioms, then P is complete with respect to the class
defined by Π.1 This result can be extended to ©k -pure formulas for the case of
HLm∅ (@, 〈r〉), the logic obtained over the class C∅.
We first state a property that will help us achieve the completeness result for
pure axioms.
6.1.12. Lemma. Let M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 be a named model.
1. Let ϕ be a pure formula, and suppose that for all pure instances ψ of ϕ,
M |= ψ. Then for any V ′ and S ′, 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V
′, S ′〉 |= ϕ.
2. Let S = ∅ and ϕ be a©k -pure formula. Suppose that for all©k -pure instances
ψ of ϕ, M |= ψ. Then for any V ′, 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V
′, S〉 |= ϕ.
Proof. We only discuss item 2. Suppose that the hypothesis holds, but for
some valuation V ′, 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V
′, ∅〉 6|= ϕ. We can take ρ, a ©k -pure in-
stance of ϕ, such that ρ is obtained from ϕ replacing each nominal i by j, where
V ′(i) = V (j). By an induction on the formula complexity, it is easy to see that
(W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, ∅) 6|= ρ. This is a contradiction. ✷
1These general completeness results are standard in hybrid logics (see [BT98]).
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With the help of Lemma 6.1.12, and since we showed that we can build named
models from HLm(@, 〈r〉)-MCSs, a wide range of strong completeness results can
be established (with the same proof as the one given in [BdRV01]).
6.1.13. Theorem. Let Π be a set of pure formulas and let A be the axiomatiza-
tion obtained by adding formulas in Π as axioms to the axiomatization shown in
Figure 6.1. Then, every A-consistent set of formulas is satisfiable in a countable
named model in the class defined by Π.
Proof. Given an A-consistent set of formulas Ω, we can use the Extended
Lindenbaum’s Lemma to extend it to a named an pasted A-MCS Ω+. The named
model MΩ that Ω+ gives rise to will satisfy Ω at Ω+. In addition, as every
formula in Π belongs to every A-MCS, we have that MΩ |= Π. Therefore, by
Lemma 6.1.12, MΩ is in the class of models defined by Π. ✷
To finish this section we will discuss an extension of the axiomatization pre-
sented above to characterize HLm∅ (@, 〈r〉).
6.1.14. Theorem. The system obtained by extending the axiomatization in Fig-
ure 6.1 with the axiom (Empty) ⊢ ¬©k is sound and strongly complete for the
logic HLm∅ (@, 〈r〉).
Proof. Soundness of Empty is obvious for the class of HLm∅ (@, 〈r〉)-models.
The completeness proof is as the one for HLm(@, 〈r〉), but in addition, thanks
to Empty, all maximal consistent sets ∆i are such that ¬©k ∈ ∆i. Therefore, the
final model yielded by Γ, MΓ = 〈W Γ, (RΓr )r∈rel, V
Γ, SΓ〉, is such that SΓ = ∅,
and thus, it is a HLm∅ (@, 〈r〉)-model. ✷
6.1.15. Corollary. For the case of HLm∅ (@, 〈r〉), the result of adding Π, a set
of pure formulas, can be extended to a set Π of ©k -pure formulas
Proof. Trivial, using Lemma 6.1.12, and the same proof as in Theorem 6.1.13.
✷
6.2 Dealing with other memory operators
We now turn to hybrid memory languages containing the ©e and ©f operators.
We will first discuss completeness for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e ), then for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©f ),
and finally for the logic HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e ,©f ).
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6.2.1 Adding the ©e operator
We take as a starting point the axiomatization for HLm(@, 〈r〉) presented in
Figure 6.1. The first thing we should notice is that the Rem axiom is no longer
sound. For example, take the valid formula @i©e (©k ∨ i) and use Rem to conclude
@i©r©e©k . This is clearly a contradiction, since after wiping out the memory, ©k
cannot be true. Observe that the problem lays in the interaction between©r and
©e . The replacement operation defined by Rem cannot be carried out throughout
the whole formula: it should avoid replacements within the scope of an©e . More
formally, for each formula ϕ and nominal i we define the formula ϕ⋆i as follows:
p⋆i = p p ∈ prop ∪ nom
©k ⋆i = ©k ∨ i
(¬ϕ)⋆i = ¬ϕ
⋆
i
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
⋆
i = ϕ1
⋆
i ∧ ϕ2
⋆
i
(©rϕ)⋆i = ©rϕ
⋆
i
(〈r〉ϕ)⋆i = 〈r〉ϕ
⋆
i
(@jϕ)
⋆
i = @jϕ
⋆
i
(©eϕ)⋆i = ©eϕ
Analogously to Lemma 6.1.1, we can use (·)⋆ to characterize the behavior of
the ©r operator and its interaction with the ©e operator.
6.2.1. Lemma. Let M be a model and w ∈ M such that M, w |= i. Then
M, w |=©rϕ iff M, w |= ϕ⋆i .
Axioms:
All the axioms from HL(@)
Rem’ ⊢ @i(©rϕ↔ ϕ
⋆
i )
Erase1 ⊢ ©e¬©k
Erase2 ⊢ ©e s↔ s s ∈ prop ∪ nom
Erase3 ⊢ ©e¬p↔ ¬©e p
Erase4 ⊢ ©e (p ∧ q)↔ (©e p ∧©e q)
Erase5 ⊢ ©e 〈r〉p↔ 〈r〉©e p
Erase6 ⊢ ©e@ip↔ @i©e p
Erase7 ⊢ @i(©e©rϕ↔©eϕ
⋆
i )
Rules:
All the rules from HL(@)
Figure 6.2: Axiomatization for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e ).
This result naturally suggests an axiom Rem’ (shown in Figure 6.2) that
replaces Rem. To characterize the ©e operator, we should first notice that it
behaves globally and that it does not change the evaluation point. This implies
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that there is no interaction between ©e and ¬,∧, 〈r〉 and @. To describe the
interaction between ©e and ©r we can again make use of the operation (·)⋆. The
detailed axiomatization is in Figure 6.2.
Soundness of this axiomatization is straightforward. The completeness proof
uses the same techniques introduced in Section 6.1. The proof of the Truth
Lemma is carried out by induction in the complexity of the formula, and the new
axioms handle the case for ©e by appropriately reducing the complexity in order
to use the inductive hypothesis, as it is done in Lemma 6.1.9.
So now we can give the strong completeness result for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e )). The
proof of this theorem follows exactly the same technique used in Theorem 6.1.10.
6.2.2. Theorem (Completeness for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e )). Every maximal con-
sistent set in the logic HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e ) is satisfiable in a countable named model.
Since it is clear that Lemma 6.1.12 still holds in HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e ), and the
canonical model we built is named, it is easy to see that one can also establish
a stronger completeness result in terms of pure formulas for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e ), in
the same way as stated in Theorem 6.1.13 and Theorem 6.1.14.
6.2.3. Theorem (Completeness for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e )). Let Π be a set of pure
formulas and let A be the axiomatization obtained by adding formulas in Π as ax-
ioms to the axiomatization shown in Figure 6.2. Then, every A-consistent set of
formulas is satisfiable in a countable named model in the class defined by Π.
6.2.2 Adding the ©f operator
Let us consider an axiomatization for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©f ). The main complication,
compared with the case we just discussed, is that the ©f operator has a local
behavior, and clearly depends on the point of evaluation. Hence, describing its
interaction with the ©r operator will be more involved. We will require two
rewriting functions (·)r and (·)f . Using these two functions, we can obtain a very
simple axiomatization of HLm(@, 〈r〉,©f ) (see Figure 6.3).
Axioms:
All the axioms from HL(@)
Rem ⊢ @i(©rϕ↔ ϕ
r
i )
Forg ⊢ @i(©fϕ↔ ϕ
f
i )
Rules:
All the rules from HL(@)
Figure 6.3: Axiomatization for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©f ).
For each formula ϕ ∈ HLm(@, 〈r〉,©f ) and nominal i, we define the formula
ϕri as follows:
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pri = p p ∈ prop ∪ nom
©k ri = (©k ∨ i)
(¬ϕ)ri = ¬ϕ
r
i
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
r
i = (ϕ1
r
i ∧ ϕ2
r
i )
(©rϕ)ri = ©rϕ
r
i
(〈r〉ϕ)ri = 〈r〉ϕ
r
i
(@jϕ)
r
i = @jϕ
r
i
(©fϕ)ri = ©f ((i→ ϕ) ∧ (¬i→ ϕ
r
i ))
6.2.4. Lemma. For every pointed model (M, w) such that M, w |= i, and for all
v ∈M, M[w], v |= ϕ iff M, v |= ϕri .
Proof. By induction on ϕ. For the base case, if ϕ is a proposition symbol or a
nominal, say a, then since ari = a we have M[w], v |= a iff M, v |= a. For the ©k
case we have to prove M[w], v |=©k iff M, v |=©k ∨ i.
⇒) Assume that M[w], v |= ©k . If v = w, then M, v |= i, and therefore
M, v |=©k ∨ i. If v 6= w, then M, v |=©k , and hence M, v |=©k ∨ i.
⇐) Let us assume that M, v |=©k ∨ i. If v = w, then M[w], v |=©k . On the
other hand, if v 6= w, then we know thatM[w], v |= ¬i, and thereforeM, v |=©k .
We conclude M[w], v |=©k .
Let us analyze the ϕ = ©fψ case. Suppose that v = w, therefore M[w], w
|= ©fψ iff M[w,−w], w |= ψ iff M[−w], w |= ψ iff (because M[−w], w |= i)
M[−w], w |= (i → ψ) ∧ (¬i → ψri ) iff (by definition of ©f ) M, w |= ©f ((i →
ψ)∧(¬i→ ψri )). On the other hand, suppose w 6= v. Therefore,M[w], v |=©fψ iff
M[w,−v], v |= ψ iff (because v and w are different points)M[−v, w], v |= ψ iff (by
inductive hypothesis) M[−v], v |= ψri iff (because M[−v], v |= ¬i) M[−v], v |=
(i→ ψ) ∧ (¬i→ ψri ) iff (by definition of ©f ) M, v |=©f ((i→ ψ) ∧ (¬i→ ψ
r
i ))
The conjunction, negation, diamond, @ and remember cases are straightfor-
ward, using the inductive hypothesis and the fact that the translation from ϕ to
ϕri distributes over ∧, ¬, 〈r〉, @ and ©r . ✷
6.2.5. Corollary. Let M by a model, and w ∈ M. Then M, w |= @i(©rϕ ↔
ϕri ).
In the same way, we can define a formula ϕfi to deal with the ©f case:
pfi = p p ∈ prop ∪ nom
©k fi = (©k ∧ ¬i)
(¬ϕ)fi = ¬ϕ
f
i
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
f
i = (ϕ1
f
i ∧ ϕ2
f
i )
(©fϕ)fi = ©fϕ
f
i
(〈r〉ϕ)fi = 〈r〉ϕ
f
i
(@jϕ)
f
i = @jϕ
f
i
(©rϕ)fi = ©r ((i→ ϕ) ∧ (¬i→ ϕ
f
i ))
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6.2.6. Lemma. For every pointed model (M, w) such that M, w |= i, and for all
v ∈M, M[−w], v |= ϕ iff M, v |= ϕfi .
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The only cases that are worth analyzing are ©k and
©rψ. The other cases are equivalent to the proof of Lemma 6.2.4. For the©k case
we have to prove M[−w], v |=©k iff M, v |=©k ∧ ¬i.
⇒) Assume that M[−w], v |= ©k . If v = w, this is an absurd, so v 6= w.
Therefore M, v |=©k , and hence M, v |=©k ∧ ¬i.
⇐) Let us assume thatM, v |=©k ∧¬i. If v = w, thenM, v |= i, so this is an
absurd. Therefore v 6= w, and then we know that M[−w], v |=©k , and therefore
M[−w], v |=©k ∧ ¬i.
Let us analyze the ϕ =©rψ case. Suppose that v = w, thereforeM[−w], w |=
©rψ iff M[−w,w], w |= ψ iff M[w], w |= ψ iff (because M[w], w |= i) M[w], w |=
(i→ ψ)∧(¬i→ ψfi ) iff (by definition of©r )M, w |=©r ((i→ ψ)∧(¬i→ ψ
f
i )). On
the other hand, suppose w 6= v. Therefore, M[−w], v |=©rψ iff M[−w,+v], v |=
ψ iff (because v and w are different points) M[+v,−w, ], v |= ψ iff (by inductive
hypothesis) M[+v], v |= ψfi iff (because M[+v], v |= ¬i) M[+v], v |= (i →
ψ) ∧ (¬i→ ψfi ) iff (by definition of ©r ) M, v |=©r ((i→ ψ) ∧ (¬i→ ψ
f
i )) ✷
6.2.7. Corollary. Let M by a model, and w ∈ M. Then M, w |= @i(©fϕ ↔
ϕfi ).
Soundness of Rem and Forg in the axiomatization of HLm(@, 〈r〉,©f ) in Fig-
ure 6.3 are a direct consequence of Corollaries 6.2.5 and 6.2.7.
To achieve completeness, we first have to give an adequate notion of com-
plexity of formulas in such a way that the Truth Lemma for this logic can be
shown. As in section 6.1, we look for a function comp : forms → N such that
comp(©rϕ) > comp(ϕ[©k /(©k ∨ i)]). But in this setting, to account for the new
axioms of Figure 6.3, we have stronger restrictions: we need to find a function
such that comp(©rϕ) > comp(ϕri ) and comp(©fϕ) > comp(ϕ
f
i ). The complexity
given in Definition 6.1.8 is not suitable because the lengths of ϕri and ϕ
f
i are much
larger than the length of ϕ. We next show some upper bounds for the lengths of
ϕri and ϕ
f
i and then we define a suitable complexity function.
Observe that some right-hand formulas in the definition of ϕri and ϕ
f
i are
abbreviations of formulas using ∧ and ¬ as the only boolean connectives. Having
this in mind, it can easily be shown the following equalities concerning |ϕ|, the
length of a formula ϕ:
|(©fϕ)ri | = 15 + |ϕ|+ |ϕ
r
r|
|(©rϕ)fi | = 15 + |ϕ|+ |ϕ
f
i |
|(ϕ ∧ ψ)∗i | = 3 + |ϕ
∗
i |+ |ψ
∗
i | for ∗ ∈ {r, f}
|(†ϕ)∗i | = 1 + |ϕ
∗
i | for † ∈ {¬, 〈r〉,@j} and ∗ ∈ {r, f}
|©k ri | = 8
|©k fi | = 6
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It can be shown by induction on ϕ that max{|ϕri |, |ϕ
f
i |} ≤ (|ϕ| + 7)
2. Let nr(ϕ)
denote the nesting depth of ©r in the formula ϕ, i.e. the maximum number of
occurrences of ©r along the paths of the syntactic tree of ϕ. In the same way,
let nf (ϕ) denote the nesting depth of ©f in ϕ. Observe that nr(ϕ) = nr(ϕ
r
i ) and
nf (ϕ) = nf (ϕ
f
i ).
Let c(ϕ) : forms → R be defined as
c(ϕ) = 23(nr(ϕ)+nf (ϕ)) · log |ϕ|.
The reader may verify that c(©rϕ) > c(ϕri ) and c(©fϕ) > c(ϕ
f
i ). Furthermore, for
all the subformulas ψ of a formula ϕ, c(ψ) is strictly increasing in |ψ|. Therefore,
comp : forms → N defined as
comp(ϕ) = 2c(ϕ) = |ϕ|2
3(nr(ϕ)+nf (ϕ))
is a suitable complexity function.
With the complexity function properly defined, strong completeness follows
using the same techniques introduced in Section 6.1. As for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e ), it
is easy to see that the result holds for any pure axiomatic extension.
6.2.8. Theorem (Completeness for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©f )). Let Π be a set of pure
formulas and let A be the axiomatization obtained by adding formulas in Π as ax-
ioms to the axiomatization shown in Figure 6.3. Then, every A-consistent set of
formulas is satisfiable in a countable named model in the class defined by Π.
6.2.3 The operators ©e and ©f together
Finally, putting together the ideas from the previous two axiomatizations, we
obtain a sound and complete axiomatization for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e ,©f ). The first
step is to extend the definition of ϕri and ϕ
f
i to handle the case of ©e :
(©eϕ)ri = ©eϕ
(©eϕ)fi = ©eϕ
Note that Lemmas 6.2.4 and 6.2.6 still hold. Now we only need to add the
axioms we used to characterize ©e with minor changes. Observe that the com-
plexity function defined in Subsection 6.2.2 is appropriate for this case also. The
final axiomatization is shown in Figure 6.4.
6.2.9. Theorem (Completeness for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e ,©f )). Let Π be a set of
pure formulas and let A be the axiomatization obtained by adding formulas in Π
as axioms to the axiomatization shown in Figure 6.4. Then, every A-consistent
set of formulas is satisfiable in a countable named model in the class defined by
Π.
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Axioms:
All the axioms from HL(@)
Rem ⊢ @i(©rϕ↔ ϕ
r
i )
Forg ⊢ @i(©fϕ↔ ϕ
f
i )
Erase1 ⊢ ©e¬©k
Erase2 ⊢ ©e s↔ s s ∈ prop ∪ nom
Erase3 ⊢ ©e¬p↔ ¬©e p
Erase4 ⊢ ©e (p ∧ q)↔ (©e p ∧©e q)
Erase5 ⊢ ©e 〈r〉p↔ 〈r〉©e p
Erase6 ⊢ ©e@ip↔ @i©e p
Erase′7 ⊢ @i(©e©rϕ↔©eϕ
r
i )
Erase8 ⊢ ©e©fϕ↔©eϕ
Rules:
All the rules from HL(@)
Figure 6.4: Axiomatization for HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e ,©f ).
6.3 The case for MLm(〈〈r〉〉)
In the previous section we mentioned the importance of nominals to describe the
interaction between memory and modal operators. In this section we will show
that if we restrict ourselves to use 〈〈r〉〉 instead of 〈r〉, it is possible to define
a sound and complete axiomatization where nominals can be avoided. The key
ingredient is that in this logic we can describe the interaction between©r and©k at
the propositional level. This is not a coincidence. Because this logic has the tree
model property (see Theorem 4.1.3), we can assume that we evaluateMLm(〈〈r〉〉)-
formulas on trees, and since there are no cycles, the remember operator has no
real effect beyond the current point.
Given a formula ϕ, we define the formula ϕ♯ as the result of replacing all the
occurrences of ©k that are in ϕ at modal depth zero by ⊤. Formally:
p♯ = p p ∈ prop
©k ♯ = ⊤
(¬ϕ)♯ = ¬ϕ♯
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
♯ = ϕ♯1 ∧ ϕ
♯
2
(©rϕ)♯ = ©rϕ♯
(〈〈r〉〉ϕ)♯ = 〈〈r〉〉ϕ
6.3.1. Lemma. M, w |=©rϕ iff M, w |= ϕ♯.
Proof. We proceed by induction. The case for ©k , the propositional symbols
and boolean connectives are straightforward. We analyze the other cases. For
the case ϕ = ©rψ. M, w |= ©r©rψ iff M, w |= ©rψ iff (by inductive hypothesis)
M, w |= ψ♯ iff M, w |= (ψ♯)♯ iff (by inductive hypothesis) M, w |= ©r (ψ♯) iff
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M, w |= (©rψ)♯. For the case ϕ = 〈〈r〉〉ψ. M, w |= ©r 〈〈r〉〉ψ iff (by definition)
M[w], w |= 〈〈r〉〉ψ iff (by definition of 〈〈r〉〉) there is a v ∈ M, wRrv such that
M[w], v |= ψ iff (by definition of 〈〈r〉〉) M, w |= 〈〈r〉〉ψ iff (by definition of ♯)
M, w |= (〈〈r〉〉ψ)♯. ✷
The axiomatization for MLm(〈〈r〉〉) (see Figure 6.5) is an extension of the
axiomatization for the basic modal logic [BdRV01] (using [[r]], the dual of 〈〈r〉〉,
instead of [r]), plus the axiom Rem〈〈r〉〉 ⊢ ©rϕ↔ ϕ
♯.
Axioms:
CT All classical tautologies
K[[r]] ⊢ [[r]](p→ q)→ ([[r]]p→ [[r]]q)
Rem〈〈r〉〉 ⊢ ©rϕ↔ ϕ
♯
Rules:
MP If ⊢ ϕ and ⊢ ϕ→ ψ then ⊢ ψ
Gen[[r]] If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ [[r]]ϕ
Sub If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ ϕ[p/ψ] for any p ∈ prop
Figure 6.5: Axiomatization for MLm(〈〈r〉〉).
Soundness of Rem〈〈r〉〉 follows from Lemma 6.3.1. Soundness for the rest of
the axioms and rules is straightforward. We will prove completeness with respect
to the class of acyclic models, and therefore for the class of all models. We will
use a step-by-step construction. I.e., instead of building the entire canonical
model, we will carry out a stepwise selection from MCSs of the canonical model
of MLm(〈〈r〉〉) as our basic building blocks.2
We define Mc = 〈W c, (Rcr)r∈rel, V
c, Sc〉, the MLm(〈〈r〉〉) canonical model, in
the usual sense (see [BdRV01] for details). That is, W c is the set of all maximal
consistent sets of formulas of MLm(〈〈r〉〉), ΓRcr∆ iff for all ϕ ∈ ∆, 〈r〉ϕ ∈ Γ,
Γ ∈ V c(p) iff p ∈ Γ and Sc = {Γ | ©k ∈ Γ}.
6.3.2. Definition. A network N = 〈N, (Rr)r∈rel, v〉 is a triple where N is a
countable non-empty set of elements, each Rr is a binary relation on N , and v is
a function that maps elements in N to maximal consistent sets.
We say that a network is coherent if (C1)
⋃
r∈rel Rr defines an acyclic graph
and (C2) v(s)Rcrv(t) for all s, t ∈ N such that sRrt. A network is saturated if
whenever 〈〈r〉〉ψ ∈ v(s) for some s ∈ N , then there is a t ∈ N such that sRrt and
ψ ∈ v(t).
We want networks to play the role of models, so we have to check that we
have imposed the right conditions on a network to achieve this.
2Alternatively, one can take the standard canonical model and then unravel it to obtain a
tree, and therefore acyclic, model.
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6.3.3. Definition. Let N = 〈N, (Rr)r∈rel, v〉 be a network. We define the in-
duced valuation VN (p) = {s ∈ N | p ∈ v(s)}, the induced set of memorized points
SN = {s ∈ N | ©k ∈ v(s)}, and the induced modelMN = 〈N, (Rr)r∈rel, VN , SN 〉.
FN = 〈N, (Rr)r∈rel〉 is called the underlying frame of N .
We are now ready to prove a Truth Lemma.
6.3.4. Lemma (Truth Lemma). Let N = 〈N, (Rr)r∈rel, v〉 be a coherent and
saturated network. Then, for all ϕ and s ∈ N ,
MN , s |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ v(s).
Proof. Before we prove this lemma, let us observe the following property: let
M = 〈W, (Rr)r∈rel, V, S〉 be an acyclic model, and let w, v ∈ W be such that
wRrv. Then for all formulas ϕ, M[w], v |= ϕ iff M, v |= ϕ.
We now proceed by induction on ϕ. The propositional case, the ©k case
and the boolean cases are straightforward, given the definition of MN . Let us
suppose that MN , s |= ©rψ. This happens iff (by Lemma 6.3.1) MN , s |= ψ
♯ iff
(by inductive hypothesis) ψ♯ ∈ v(s) iff (by Rem〈〈r〉〉 axiom) ©rψ ∈ v(s).
The 〈〈r〉〉 case: for the left-to-right direction, if MN , s |= 〈〈r〉〉ψ, then there
exists t ∈ N such that sRrt and MN [s], t |= ψ. Therefore, MN , t |= ψ. By
inductive hypothesis, ψ ∈ v(t). Because the network is coherent, and sRrt, then
v(s)Rcrv(t), and we conclude 〈〈r〉〉ψ ∈ v(s). For the other direction, let us suppose
that 〈〈r〉〉ψ ∈ v(s). Because the network is saturated, there is a t ∈ N such that
ψ ∈ v(t) and sRrt. By inductive hypothesis, MN , t |= ψ, so MN [s], t |= ψ, and
therefore by definition, MN , s |= 〈〈r〉〉ψ. ✷
Summing up, we have reduced the problem of finding a model for an MCS
∆ to a search for a coherent and saturated network for ∆. The idea here is to
start with a coherent network and, one step at a time, remove the defects that
are preventing the network from being saturated.
6.3.5. Definition. Let N be a network. We say that N has a saturation defect
if there is a node s ∈ N and a formula 〈〈r〉〉ψ ∈ v(s) such that there is no t ∈ N
verifying R(s, t) and ψ ∈ v(t).
Because a coherent network may have saturation defects, we have to say more
about what is the meaning of repairing a defect. We are going to extend a network
with a saturation defect with another where the defect is corrected.
6.3.6. Definition. Let N0 = 〈N0, R0, v0〉 and N1 = 〈N1, R1, v1〉 be two net-
works. We say that N1 extends N0 if FN0 is a subframe of FN1 and v0 agrees
with v1 on N0.
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The following lemma states that a saturation defect of a finite coherent net-
work can always be repaired.
6.3.7. Lemma (Repair Lemma). Let N be a finite and coherent network with
a saturation defect. Then there is a network N ′ extending N without that defect.
Proof. Because N has a saturation defect, there is a node s ∈ N and a formula
〈〈r〉〉ψ ∈ v(s) such that there is not a t ∈ N , sRrt and ψ ∈ v(t). We define N
′ as
N ′ = N ∪ {s′} with s′ 6∈ N
R′r = Rr ∪ {(s, s
′)}
v′ = v ∪ {(s′,∆)}
where ∆ is an MCS containing ψ such that v(s)Rcr∆. We are going to prove the
existence of such ∆ through an Existence Lemma similar to Lemma 6.1.7 right
away, so let us assume that for the moment. Clearly, N ′ is a coherent network
extending N and does not have the previous defect. ✷
The Existence Lemma referred in the above proof is very similar to the one
used for the basic modal logic in [BdRV01].
6.3.8. Lemma (Existence Lemma). For all MCS Γ such that 〈〈r〉〉ϕ ∈ Γ, there
exists an MCS ∆ such that ΓRc∆.
Proof. Suppose 〈〈r〉〉ϕ ∈ w. We will construct a point v such that wRcv and
ϕ ∈ v. Let v− be {ϕ} ∪ {ψ | [[r]]ψ ∈ w}. Then v− is consistent. For suppose
not. Then there are ψ1, . . . , ψn such that ⊢ (ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn)→ ¬ϕ, and from this
it is easy to see (using K [[r]] and Gen [[r]]) that ⊢ [[r]](ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn) → [[r]]¬ϕ. We
conclude ⊢ ([[r]]ψ1∧ . . . [[r]]∧ψn)→ [[r]]¬ϕ. Now, [[r]]ψ1∧ . . . [[r]]∧ψn ∈ w, therefore
it follows that [[r]]¬ϕ ∈ w. Using that [[r]]ϕ is a rewriting of ¬〈〈r〉〉¬ϕ, ¬〈〈r〉〉ϕ ∈ w.
This is an absurd, since w is an MCS containing 〈〈r〉〉ϕ.
By an easy argument, it is clear that wRcv iff for all formulas ϕ, [[r]]ϕ ∈ w
implies ϕ ∈ v. So let v be any MCS extending v−. By construction, ϕ ∈ v.
Furthermore, for all formulas ψ, [[r]]ψ ∈ w implies ψ ∈ v, and therefore wRcv. ✷
Now we can prove the desired strong completeness result. We start with a
singleton network, and we extend it step by step to a larger network using the
Repair Lemma. We obtain the saturated network we want by taking the union
of our sequence of networks.
6.3.9. Theorem. The axiomatization is strongly complete with respect to the
class of MLm(〈〈r〉〉) models.
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Proof. Let S = {si | i ∈ N}. Enumerate the potential saturation defects
(the set S × forms). Given a consistent set Σ, expand it to an MCS Σ+. The
initial network is N 0 = 〈{s0}, ∅, (s0,Σ
+)〉, which is finite and coherent. Given a
network N i, i ≥ 0, where the minimal saturation defect is D, we define N i+1 as
the extension of N i (following the Repair Lemma) without that defect. If N i has
no saturation defects, then N i+1 = N i. Let N N = 〈N, (Rr)r∈rel, v〉 be:
N =
⋃
n∈N
Nn Rr =
⋃
n∈N
Rnr v =
⋃
n∈N
vn.
It is clear that N N is saturated. For suppose not; let d be the minimal satura-
tion defect (with respect to the enumeration) of N N, say d = dk. By construction,
there must be an approximation N i of N N of which d is also a defect. There only
can be k defects that are less than d, so d will be repaired before the stage k + i
of the construction. This is a contradiction, so N N is a coherent and saturated
network, and therefore MNN , s0 |= Σ. ✷
6.3.1 An extension to MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f )
Here we will make use of the equivalence preserving translation that takes formu-
las fromMLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) toMLm(〈〈r〉〉) (as we saw in Section 4.1.1) to provide an
axiomatization that includes the ©f operator.
The axiomatization for MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) is shown in Figure 6.6. The operation
(·)♯ is the one defined at the beginning of Section 6.3, that replaces all the oc-
currences of ©k that are in the applied formula at modal depth zero by ⊤, and
Tr is the equivalence preserving translation defined in Theorem 4.1.5 that takes
formulas from MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) to MLm(〈〈r〉〉).
Axioms:
CT All classical tautologies
K[[r]] ⊢ [[r]](p→ q)→ ([[r]]p→ [[r]]q)
Rem©f〈〈r〉〉 ⊢ ©rϕ↔ Trr(ϕ)
♯
Forg©f〈〈r〉〉 ⊢ ©fϕ↔ Trf (ϕ)
Rules:
MP If ⊢ ϕ and ⊢ ϕ→ ψ then ⊢ ψ
Gen[[r]] If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ [[r]]ϕ
Sub If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ ϕ[p/ψ] for any p ∈ prop
Figure 6.6: Axiomatization for MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ).
Soundness of this axiomatization is quite easy to establish. It is only worth
mentioning the cases for Rem©f〈〈r〉〉 and Forg
©f
〈〈r〉〉.
6.3.10. Lemma. The axioms Rem©f〈〈r〉〉 and Forg
©f
〈〈r〉〉 are sound.
114 Chapter 6. Axiomatizations
Proof. We have shown in Theorem 4.1.5 that for all ϕ inMLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ), |= ϕ↔
Trr(ϕ). Therefore, if we instantiate ϕ in ©rψ, and we apply the definition of Trr,
we get |=©rψ ↔©rTrr(ψ). Observe that©rTrr(ψ) is anML
m(〈〈r〉〉)-formula, and
therefore it is valid to apply the operation (·)♯ (defined forMLm(〈〈r〉〉)-formulas).
Applying Lemma 6.3.1, we get |=©rψ ↔ Trr(ψ)
♯ as desired. Soundness of Forg©f〈〈r〉〉
follows directly from the definition of Tr and the fact that the translation preserves
equivalence. ✷
To prove completeness we can reproduce the argument for MLm(〈〈r〉〉), and
use a step-by-step model construction technique for the class of acyclic models.
We only prove the Truth Lemma, since the other steps are identical.
6.3.11. Lemma (Truth Lemma). Let N = 〈N, (Rr)r∈rel, v〉 be a coherent and
saturated network. Then, for all ϕ and s ∈ N ,
MN , s |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ v(s).
Proof. We now proceed by induction on ϕ. We only prove the cases of ©r and
©f , since the other cases are identical as in Lemma 6.3.4. First, observe that both
the translation Tr and the operation (·)♯ decrease the complexity of the formula.
Let us suppose that MN , s |= ©rψ. This happens iff (by Lemma 6.3.1)
MN , s |= Trr(ψ)
♯ iff (by inductive hypothesis) Trr(ψ)
♯ ∈ v(s) iff (by Rem©f〈〈r〉〉
axiom) ©rψ ∈ v(s). For the ©f case. MN , s |= ©fψ iff (by Lemma 6.3.1)
MN , s |= Trf (ψ) iff (by inductive hypothesis) Trf (ψ) ∈ v(s) iff (by Forg
©f
〈〈r〉〉 axiom)
©fψ ∈ v(s). ✷
We conclude the desired result:
6.3.12. Theorem. The axiomatization is strongly complete with respect to the
class of MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) models.
6.4 Some final remarks
In this chapter we showed how nominals can be an effective tool to achieve com-
pleteness: by allowing to describe the precise interaction between ©r and ©k we
could give a completeness result for HLm(@, 〈r〉). Small variations of this ax-
iomatization leads us to completeness results for other languages, as we showed
for HLm∅ (@, 〈r〉), HL
m(@, 〈r〉,©e ), HLm(@, 〈r〉,©f ) and HLm(@, 〈r〉,©e ,©f ). We
also showed that in the case of MLm(〈〈r〉〉) and MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) we made use of
the tree model property to overcome the lack of nominals. This is clearly not the
case when we lose this property, as it is the case for MLm(〈r〉), MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©e ),
MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉), etc. It is not a coincidence then that the modal memory logics we
proved undecidable in Chapter 4 are exactly the ones that are causing us trouble
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to find appropriate axiomatizations here, since those logics do not have the tree
model property.
Being explicit, the remaining question for this chapter is the following:
6.4.1. Question. Can we find sound and complete axiomatizations for memory
logics without the tree model property, and which do not have nominals?
Following the same philosophy we kept throughout this work, our intention
was to give the basic techniques to characterize memory operators using nominals,
and not to exhaustively list all possible languages. Observe that, for example, the
logicHLm(〈〈r〉〉) can be easily axiomatized by replacing the Back axiom presented
in Figure 6.1 by ⊢ @i〈r〉@jϕ → @jϕ[©k /(©k ∨ i)] (and similarly with the Paste
rule).

Chapter 7
Tableau systems
Sacudido del a´rbol cayo´
un fruto dulce muy raro
“El a´rbol del gran bonete”, Patricio Rey y sus Redonditos de Ricota.
In the last chapter we presented axiomatic systems for different memory logic
fragments, and we concentrated mainly in hybrid memory logics, since we saw
that nominals were a key factor to achieve completeness. In this chapter we are
going to turn to tableau systems for memory logics. We are going to use a labeled
tableau system to be able to “name” points in the model, and we will see that
having this ability will make nominals less essential here. Labels act as a meta-
logical device to keep track of points, and in that sense they behave as nominals
“outside” the language. As we said in Section 2.2.5, tableau systems can be
regarded as a backward reasoning system, in the sense that they begin with the
desired result and work backward from there to create a proof. In this way, they
are closer to semantics than axiomatic systems, and they allow the possibility to
have a finer-grained control on the derivation of a proof.
Here we are going to present a sound and complete tableau system for the
logic MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ). The tableau works for both the class of all models and
C∅, the class of models with an empty memory. Tableau systems are in general
quite modular, in the sense that each operator has an associated rule (or set of
rules). This is not an exception in our case, and this modularity will allow us
to drop rules to obtain sound and complete tableau systems for sublanguages of
MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ).
As we proved in Chapter 4, MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ) is not decidable, and there-
fore the tableau system we present is non-terminating. We are also interested
in investigating the decidable memory fragments we found, and in providing a
terminating tableau for those cases. Therefore, we are also going to present a
terminating, sound and complete tableau forMLm(〈〈r〉〉). This result is strongly
based on the tree model property this logic enjoys, as we saw in Section 4.1.
We are not going to explore tableau systems for hybrid memory logics. How-
ever, this is quite straightforward to achieve taking the labeled tableau system
presented in [BB07] forHL(@) and extending it with the memory rules we present
in this chapter.
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7.1 A tableau system for MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f )
The tableau rules we present here are an extension of the tableau system for the
basic modal logic we showed in Section 2.2.5. To be able to present this system
there are some concepts that need to be appropriately extended. First, we need
to extend the idea of negated normal form we talked about in Section 2.2.5 to
include memory operators. Since all the memory operators we defined are self-
dual, the equivalence ¬©ϕ ≡ ©¬ϕ, with© ∈ {©r ,©e ,©f }, can be used to bring
a formula into this form. Therefore, throughout this chapter we assume that
formulas are in NNF.
The kind of formulas that can occur in a tableau branch are also an extended
version of the one for the basic modal logic.
7.1.1. Definition. [Prefixed, accessibility and equality formulas] LetW = {w1,
w2, . . . } be an infinite, enumerable set of labels. Then 〈w,R, F 〉
C :ϕ is a prefixed
formula, where ϕ ∈MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ), C ∈ {Ca, C∅}, w ∈ W and R and F are finite
subsets of W . wRrw
′ is an accessibility formula for r ∈ rel, and w,w′ ∈ W .
w ≈ w′ is an equality formula for w,w′ ∈ W .
Intuitively, in the prefix 〈w,R, F 〉C , w is the label of the point where the
formula holds, C is the class of models we are working with (Ca is the class of
all models, and C∅ is the class of models with an empty memory). The set R
is where we keep track of the explicitly memorized points, stored by ©r in the
current branch. In the same way, F is the set of points that ©f explicitly forgets.
Observe that since every prefixed formula is derived in finitely many steps, R and
F will always be finite sets. The intended interpretation of wRrw
′ is the same
we used for the basic modal logic: the point denoted by w′ is accessible from
the point denoted by w by the interpretation of relation symbol r. Finally, the
intended interpretation of an equality formula w ≈ w′ is that w and w′ label the
same point in a given branch. We will use the term formula to denote either a
formula of MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ), a prefixed formula, an accessibility formula, or an
equality formula.
We present the set of rules in three different figures. In Figure 7.1 we show
the classical rules for the basic modal logic, that handle propositional and modal
cases. Observe that these rules do not modify the sets R and F , since their
corresponding operators do not interact with the memory.
In Figure 7.2 we define the set of rules that deals with the memory. Let us try
to grasp an intuitive idea of how they work. The general invariant that these rules
assume is that R and F are always disjoint sets, and soundness of some of the rules
depends on this. Rule (©k ) specifies that if w is in the memory, then either it is
one of the explicitly memorized points, or it is in the initial memory, in which case
©k holds even with no explicitly memorized points. Rule (¬©k ) is the dual rule,
and defines the interaction between ¬©k and the set of explicitly forgotten points.
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(∧)
〈w,R, F 〉C :ϕ ∧ ψ
〈w,R, F 〉C :ϕ
〈w,R, F 〉C :ψ
(∨)
〈w,R, F 〉C :ϕ ∨ ψ
〈w,R, F 〉C :ϕ | 〈w,R, F 〉C :ψ
(〈r〉)
〈w,R, F 〉C :〈r〉ϕ
wRrw
′
〈w′, R, F 〉C :ϕ
† ([r])
〈w,R, F 〉C :[r]ϕ
wRrw
′
〈w′, R, F 〉C :ϕ
Key:
† w′ is fresh.
Figure 7.1: Propositional and modal rules
This rule uses the fact that R and F are disjoint, since if ¬©k holds in w and w is
not one of the explicitly forgotten points, then it is neither in the initial memory,
nor in R. Rules for ©r and ©f simply store the current point in the appropriate
set ((©r ) stores w in R, and (©f ) in F ). These rules also make sure that R and F
are always disjoint sets, removing w from the corresponding set. Rule (©e ) wipes
out the explicitly memorized and forgotten points and evaluates the satisfiability
of the formula in a model with no initial memory. Finally, the rule (repl) handles
the equivalence relation between labels, and allows replacements among labels in
the same equivalence class. Observe that the presence of the ©e modality may
force the calculus to switch from the evaluation over Ca to that over C∅.
(©k )
〈w, {v1, . . . vk}, F 〉
C :©k
w ≈ v1 | · · · |w ≈ vk | 〈w, ∅, ∅〉
C :©k
(¬©k )
〈w,R, {v1, . . . vk}〉
C :¬©k
w ≈ v1 | · · · |w ≈ vk | 〈w, ∅, ∅〉
C :¬©k
(©f )
〈w,R, F 〉C :©fϕ
〈w,R− {w}, F ∪ {w}〉C :ϕ
(©r )
〈w,R, F 〉C :©rϕ
〈w,R ∪ {w}, F − {w}〉C :ϕ
(©e )
〈w,R, F 〉C :©eϕ
〈w, ∅, ∅〉C∅ :ϕ
(repl)
〈w,R, F 〉C :ϕ
w ≈∗ w′
〈w′, R[w 7→ w′], F [w 7→ w′]〉C :ϕ
‡
Key:
‡ a ≈∗ b iff (a, b) occurs in the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure of the relation
{(w,w′) | w ≈ w′appears in the current branch}. A[w 7→ w′] = A if w 6∈ A, and
(A− {w}) ∪ {w′} otherwise.
Figure 7.2: Memory rules
In Figure 7.3 we define the set of clash rules. Rule (⊥p) is the standard
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clash rule for propositional symbols. Observe that the application of this rule
only needs p and ¬p to occur in the same point, regardless of the memory and
the class of models. The rule (⊥©k ) is the equivalent rule for ©k , but needs an
empty memory, since otherwise the truth value of ©k could be modified by the
current memory. Rules (⊥R) and (⊥F ) relates ©k with the current memory: if
w is explicitly memorized, then ¬©k cannot hold. Equivalently, if w is explicitly
forgotten, then ©k cannot hold. Note that (⊥R) also assumes that R and F are
disjoint, since otherwise w could be memorized in R, but then forgotten by F .
Finally, a branch can be immediately closed in the case ©k holds in an initially
empty memory due to the rule (⊥∅).
(⊥p)
〈w,R1, F1〉
C1 :p
〈w,R2, F2〉
C2 :¬p
⊥
(⊥©k )
〈w, ∅, ∅〉C :©k
〈w, ∅, ∅〉C :¬©k
⊥
(⊥R)
〈w, {w} ∪R,F 〉C :¬©k
⊥
(⊥F )
〈w,R, {w} ∪ F 〉C :©k
⊥
(⊥∅)
〈w, ∅, ∅〉C∅ :©k
⊥
Figure 7.3: Clash rules
Now we are going to focus on the completeness of the calculus. As usual, we
will show that given an open and saturated branch Γ, we can define a modelMΓ
that satisfies all the formulas that occur in the branch. To define the domain of
MΓ we first need the following definition.
7.1.2. Definition. [EqΓ] Let Γ be an open and saturated branch of a tableau
forMLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ). EqΓ is the smallest equivalence relation extending {(w,w
′) |
(w ≈ w′) ∈ Γ}.
7.1.3. Definition. [MΓ] Let Γ be an open and saturated branch of a tableau for
MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ). We define the induced model MΓ = 〈WΓ, (RrΓ)r∈rel, VΓ, SΓ〉
as:
WΓ = {w | w occurs in Γ}/EqΓ
RrΓ = {([w], [w
′]) | wRrw
′ ∈ Γ}
VΓ(p) = {[w] | 〈w,R, F 〉
C :p ∈ Γ, for any R, F and C}
SΓ = {[w] | 〈w, ∅, ∅〉
Ca :©k ∈ Γ},
where [w] is the equivalence class of w in EqΓ. Given a set of labels A, and
a saturated and open branch Γ, we will denote [A] = {[v] | v ∈ A}. We call
MΓ∅ = 〈WΓ, RΓ, VΓ, ∅〉, the version of M
Γ with an empty memory.
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First we are going to show that if the tableau starts with R and F being
disjoint, then this property holds for every prefixed formula at every branch.
7.1.4. Lemma. Let Γ be an open and saturated branch of a tableau for the logic
MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ) that has as root a prefixed formula 〈w,R, F 〉C:ϕ such that [R]∩
[F ] = ∅. Then, for every prefixed formula 〈w′, R′, F ′〉C
′
:ψ in Γ, [R′] ∩ [F ′] = ∅.
Proof. We prove it by induction on the length of the derivation of Γ. The base
case is obvious given the hypothesis. For the inductive step. The propositional
and modal rules do not modify R and F , and the clash rules have no prefixed
formulas as consequents. So let us analyze the memory rules. Both the prefixed
consequents of the rules (©k ) and (¬©k ) and the consequent of the rule (©e ) set
R′ = ∅ and F ′ = ∅, so R′ ∩ F ′ = ∅ easily follows. The rules (©f ) and (©r ) delete
w from one set and add w to the other set, so using the inductive hypothesis,
R′ ∩ F ′ = ∅ is also easy to see. The only interesting case is the rule (repl). Let
us assume, for the sake of contradiction, that R[w 7→ w′] ∩ F [w 7→ w′] 6= ∅.
Using the inductive hypothesis, we know that the only possibility is R[w 7→
w′] ∩ F [w 7→ w′] = {w′}. If this rule was applied, we also know that [w] = [w′].
This equivalence was introduced by the rules (©k ) or (¬©k ) (which are the only
rules that introduce equivalences). Let us assume that w ≈ w′ was previously
introduced in the branch by (¬©k ). That means that 〈w,R′′, F ′′〉C:¬©k ∈ Γ,
for some R′′ and F ′′, and w′ ∈ F ′′. But then by (repl) and ⊥F , Γ cannot be
open. The other case is that w ≈ w′ was introduced by (©k ), and that means
that 〈w,R′′, F ′′〉C:©k and w′ ∈ R′′. But then by (repl) and ⊥R, Γ cannot be
open. Therefore, the only possibility for Γ to be an open branch is that R[w 7→
w′] ∩ F [w 7→ w′] = ∅. ✷
Now we are ready to prove the desired lemma.
7.1.5. Lemma. Let MΓ = 〈WΓ, (RrΓ)r∈rel, VΓ, SΓ〉 be the induced model for Γ,
where Γ is an open and saturated branch of a tableau for MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ) whose
root 〈w,R, F, :〉Cϕ is such that [R] ∩ [F ] = ∅. Then:
1. 〈w,R, F 〉Ca :ϕ ∈ Γ implies MΓ[+[R],−[F ]], [w] |= ϕ.
2. 〈w,R, F 〉C∅ :ϕ ∈ Γ implies MΓ∅ [+[R],−[F ]], [w] |= ϕ.
Proof. We proceed by induction on ϕ. We sometimes expand the sets R and F
as R = {v1, . . . , vk} and F = {u1, . . . , uj}.
Case ϕ := p. If 〈w,R, F 〉Ca :p ∈ Γ, then [w] ∈ VΓ(p). Therefore,M
Γ[+[R],−[F ]],
[w] |= p. The case for C∅ is analogous.
Case ϕ := ¬p. Suppose 〈w,R, F 〉C :¬p ∈ Γ. If MΓ[+[R],−[F ]], [w] |= p, it
means that [w] ∈ VΓ(p) and hence, by definition, 〈w,R
′, F ′〉C
′
:p ∈ Γ for
some R′, F ′ and C ′. But in that case rule (⊥p) applies and the branch
would be closed. Again, the case for C∅ is analogous.
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Case ϕ :=©k . We consider the cases for Ca and C∅:
1. If 〈w, {v1, . . . , vk}, {u1, . . . , uj}〉
Ca :©k ∈ Γ, then some consequent of the
(©k ) rule must occur in Γ too. If 〈w, ∅, ∅〉Ca :©k ∈ Γ, by definition,
[w] ∈ SΓ. If there is a ui ∈ {u1, . . . , uj} such that [w] = [ui], then by
(repl), 〈ui, {v1, . . . , vk}[w 7→ ui], {u1, . . . , uj}[w 7→ ui]〉
Ca :©k ∈ Γ, and
by (⊥F ) the branch would be closed. Therefore, [w] 6∈ {[u1], . . . , [uj]}
and hence, M[+[v1], . . . ,+[vk],−[u1], . . . ,−[uj]], [w] |= ©k . The other
case is that there is a vi such that [vi] = [w]. Therefore, to see
M[+[v1], . . . ,+[vk],−[u1], . . . ,−[uj]], [w] |= ©k , we only have to show
that [vi] 6∈ {[u1], . . . , [uj]}, but this is guaranteed by Lemma 7.1.4.
2. If 〈w, {v1, . . . , vk}, {u1, . . . , uj}〉
C∅ :©k ∈ Γ, then again some consequent
of the (©k ) rule must occur in Γ too. The case 〈w, ∅, ∅〉C∅ :©k ∈ Γ cannot
occur, since by (⊥∅) the branch would be closed. The other possibility
is that there is a vi such that [vi] = [w], and this case is analogous to
case 1).
Case ϕ := ¬©k . We consider again the cases for Ca and C∅:
1. Assume 〈w, {v1, . . . , vk}, {u1, . . . , uj}〉
Ca :¬©k ∈ Γ. Let us analyze the
situation of [w]. If [w] ∈ SΓ, using (repl) we can conclude that
〈w, ∅, ∅〉Ca :©k ∈ Γ. Looking at the consequents of the (¬©k ) rule,
〈w, ∅, ∅〉Ca :¬©k cannot be in the branch, since by (⊥©k ) the branch would
be closed. So the only possibility is that w ≈ ui ∈ Γ for some ui ∈
{u1, . . . , uj}. That means [w] = [ui], and thereforeM[+[v1], . . . ,+[vk],
−[u1], . . . ,−[uj]], [w] |= ¬©k as desired. Other case is that [w] ∈
{[v1], . . . , [vk]}, but that means that there is a vi ∈ {v1, . . . , vk} such
that [w] = [vi]. By (repl), 〈vi, {v1, . . . , vk}[w 7→ vi], {u1, . . . , uj}[w 7→
vi]〉
Ca :¬©k ∈ Γ and by (⊥R) the branch would be closed. The last
possibility is that [w] 6∈ SΓ and [w] 6∈ {[v1], . . . , [vk]}. Therefore,
M[+[v1], . . . ,+[vk],−[u1], . . . ,−[uj]], [w] |= ¬©k .
2. If 〈w, {v1, . . . , vk}, {u1, . . . , uj}〉
C∅ :¬©k ∈ Γ, the proof is analogous to
case 1).
Case ϕ :=©rψ. Suppose 〈w,R, F 〉Ca :©rψ ∈ Γ. By rule (©r ), we know 〈w,R ∪
{w}, F − {w}〉Ca :ψ ∈ Γ. By inductive hypothesis, MΓ[+[R ∪ {w}],−[F −
{w}]], [w] |= ψ. Observe that w ∈ (R ∪ {w}) − (F − {w}), and therefore
MΓ[+[R],−[F ]], [w] |=©rψ. The case for C∅ is analogous.
Case ϕ :=©fψ. Suppose 〈w,R, F 〉Ca :©fψ ∈ Γ. By rule (©f ), we know 〈w,R −
{w}, F ∪ {w}〉Ca :ψ ∈ Γ. By inductive hypothesis, MΓ[+[R − {w}],−[F ∪
{w}]], [w] |= ψ. Observe that [w] is not in the current memory ofMΓ[+[R−
{w}],−[F ∪ {w}]], and therefore MΓ[+[R],−[F ]], [w] |= ©fψ. The case for
C∅ is analogous.
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Case ϕ :=©eψ. If 〈w,R, F 〉Ca :©eψ ∈ Γ then, by rule (©e ), 〈w, ∅, ∅〉C∅ :ψ ∈ Γ
and, by inductive hypothesis, MΓ∅ , [w] |= ψ. Therefore, it follows that
M[+[R],−[F ]], [w] |=©eψ. The case for C∅ is analogous.
The remaining boolean and modal cases are dealt with in the standard way. ✷
7.1.6. Theorem. The tableau calculus for MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ) is sound and com-
plete for both the classes Ca and C∅.
More precisely, given ϕ ∈ MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ), ϕ is satisfiable iff any saturated
tableau forMLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ) with root 〈w, ∅, ∅〉Ca :ϕ has an open branch. An equiv-
alent result holds for the C∅ class, starting with a tableau with root 〈w, ∅, ∅〉
C∅ :ϕ.
Proof. Soundness is easy to see. Observe that the condition [R] ∩ [F ] = ∅ is
fulfilled by the root of the tableau, and therefore using Lemma 7.1.4, by every
prefixed formula in it. This is important to establish the soundness of (¬©k ) and
(⊥R). Completeness is straightforward from Lemma 7.1.5: assume that a formula
ϕ ∈ MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ) is not satisfiable in the class C while there is a saturated
tableau T with root 〈w, ∅〉C :ϕ and open branch Γ; MΓ satisfies ϕ and is in the
class C which contradicts the assumption. ✷
It is also straightforward to see that if we drop the (©e ) or (©f ) rules (or
both) from the calculus, then we can prove soundness and completeness for the
corresponding sublanguage of MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ) with respect to both classes Ca
and C∅.
7.1.7. Theorem. The tableau calculus forMLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ) without the (©e ) rule
(the (©f ) rule) is sound and complete for MLm(〈r〉,©e ) (MLm(〈r〉,©f )) for both
the classes Ca and C∅. In the same way, the tableau calculus for ML
m(〈r〉,©e ,©f )
without the (©e ) and (©f ) rules is sound and complete for MLm(〈r〉) for both the
classes Ca and C∅.
7.2 A terminating tableau for MLm(〈〈r〉〉)
In this section we are going to present a tableau for MLm(〈〈r〉〉). As we saw in
Section 4.1,MLm(〈〈r〉〉) is decidable, and therefore we are interested in presenting
a terminating tableau calculus. The calculus we present is again an extension of
the tableau for the basic modal logic presented in Section 2.2.5. In this case, the
notion of prefix is much simpler than the one we used forMLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ), since
we do not have to keep track of the explicitly memorized and forgotten points.
The tree model property is going to be a key ingredient, and we will only have to
flag a point as memorized at a propositional level. Every time a modal transition
is made, there is no need to keep that flag. Additionally, we do not need equality
formulas anymore, since each label represents a point by itself, and no equivalence
classes are needed.
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7.2.1. Definition. [Prefixed and accessibility formulas] Let W = {w1, w2, . . . }
be an infinite, enumerable set of labels. Then ws:ϕ is a prefixed formula, where
ϕ ∈ MLm(〈〈r〉〉), s is either the flag R or the flag U , and w ∈ W . wRrw
′ is an
accessibility formula for r ∈ rel, and w,w′ ∈ W .
Intuitively, wR represents that the point w is explicitly memorized by©r , and
wU means that the memorized state of w is unknown, in the sense that w could
be or not in the initial memory of the model, but it is not explicitly memorized.
In Figure 7.4 we present the tableau rules for MLm(〈〈r〉〉). Rules (∨), (∧),
(⊥©k ) and (⊥p) are just the same rules we used forML
m(〈r〉,©e ,©f ), so we are not
going to make further comments on them. Observe the interaction between the
rules (©r ) and (⊥©r ). The rule (©r ) flags the current point w as being memorized,
and request that ϕ must be true there. Since w is currently memorized, ¬©k
cannot hold in wR, and rule (⊥©r ) watches for this. The fact that it is not necessary
to carry a set of the memorized points, as we did in the previous section, is made
explicit by the rules (〈〈r〉〉) and ([[r]]). These rules takes a prefixed formula with
label w, and independently of the flag w has, they flag w′ with U . The intuitive
meaning of this is that we are building a tree-like model, and therefore the effect
of memorizing a point is overridden by the modal transitions.
(∧)
ws:ϕ ∧ ψ
ws:ϕ
ws:ψ
(∨)
ws:ϕ ∨ ψ
ws:ϕ | ws:ψ
(〈〈r〉〉)
ws:〈〈r〉〉ϕ
wRrw
′
w′U :ϕ
† ([[r]])
ws:[[r]]ϕ
wRrw
′
w′U :ϕ
(©r )
ws:©rϕ
wR:ϕ
(⊥©k )
ws:©k
ws:¬©k
⊥
(⊥©r )
wR:¬©k
⊥
(⊥p)
ws1 :p
ws2 :¬p
⊥
Key:
† w′ is fresh.
Figure 7.4: Tableau rules for MLm(〈〈r〉〉)
In order to have a terminating tableau, we impose two general constraints on
the construction of a tableau. Observe that these constraints are the same used
by the tableau for the basic modal logic we showed in Section 2.2.5.
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1. A formula is never added to a tableau branch where it already occurs.
2. The rule (〈〈r〉〉) is never applied twice to a formula on a given branch.
We now define the notion of induced model of an open and saturated branch
for this case.
7.2.2. Definition. [MΓ] Let Γ be an open and saturated branch of a tableau
for MLm(〈〈r〉〉). Define the induced model MΓ = 〈WΓ, (RrΓ)r∈rel, VΓ, SΓ〉 as:
WΓ = {w | w occurs in Γ}
RrΓ = {(w,w
′) | wRrw
′ ∈ Γ}
VΓ(p) = {w | ws:p ∈ Γ, for s ∈ {U,R}}
SΓ = {w | wU :©k ∈ Γ}.
The following lemma explicitly states that the induced model of an open
and saturated branch is acyclic. Observe that together with the soundness and
completeness proof we will show later, this can be regarded as an alternative for
proving the tree model property we showed in Theorem 4.1.3.
7.2.3. Lemma. Let MΓ = 〈WΓ, (RrΓ)r∈rel, VΓ, SΓ〉 be the induced model for Γ,
where Γ is an open and saturated branch of a tableau for MLm(〈〈r〉〉). Then MΓ
is acyclic.
Proof. This property is quite easy to see. The only rule that adds pairs wRrw
′ to
the accessibility relationship is (〈〈r〉〉), and each time it is applied, w′ is requested
to be new. In contrast with the induced model of MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ), there is no
equivalent class of points here, and each label is a point inMΓ by itself. Therefore
there cannot be a cycle in MΓ. ✷
Now we can prove the key lemma to show completeness.
7.2.4. Lemma. Let MΓ = 〈WΓ, (RrΓ)r∈rel, VΓ, SΓ〉 be the induced model for Γ,
where Γ is an open and saturated branch of a tableau for MLm(〈〈r〉〉). Then:
1. wU :ϕ ∈ Γ implies M
Γ, w |= ϕ.
2. wR:ϕ ∈ Γ implies M
Γ[w], w |= ϕ.
Proof. We proceed by induction on ϕ. The boolean cases (∧) and (∨) are dealt
with in the standard way.
Case ϕ := p. If wU :p ∈ Γ, then w ∈ VΓ(p) and, therefore, M
Γ, w |= p. The case
for wR is analogous using the fact that M, w |= p iff M[w], w |= p.
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Case ϕ := ¬p. Suppose wU :¬p ∈ Γ. If M
Γ, w |= p, it means that w ∈ VΓ(p)
and hence, by definition, ws:p ∈ Γ for s ∈ {R,U}. But in that case rule
(⊥p) applies and the branch would be closed. Again, the case for wR is
analogous.
Case ϕ :=©k . If wU :©k ∈ Γ, then by definition M, w |= ©k . For the other case,
it is always the case that M[w], w |=©k .
Case ϕ := ¬©k . Suppose that wU :¬©k ∈ Γ, and assume for the sake of contra-
diction that M, w |= ©k . Then, by definition, wU :©k ∈ Γ. By (⊥©k ), the
branch would be closed. Therefore, M, w |= ¬©k as desired. For the other
case, suppose that wR:¬©k ∈ Γ. By (⊥©r ), the branch would be closed, so
this case cannot occur.
Case ϕ :=©rψ. Suppose wU :©rψ ∈ Γ. By rule (©r ), we know wR:ψ ∈ Γ. By
inductive hypothesis, MΓ[w], w |= ψ. By definition, MΓ, w |= ©rψ. The
case for wR is identical.
Case ϕ := 〈〈r〉〉ψ. Suppose wU :〈r〉ψ ∈ Γ. By rule (〈r〉), we know w
′
U :ψ ∈ Γ
and wRrw
′. By inductive hypothesis, MΓ, w′ |= ψ. Since MΓ is acyclic,
M, w |= 〈〈r〉〉. The case for wR is identical, using again that M
Γ is acyclic.
Case ϕ := [[r]]ψ. This case is analogous to ϕ := 〈〈r〉〉ψ.
✷
7.2.5. Theorem. The tableau calculus for MLm(〈〈r〉〉) is sound and complete
for the class of all models.
More precisely, given ϕ ∈MLm(〈〈r〉〉), ϕ is satisfiable iff any saturated tableau
for MLm(〈〈r〉〉) with root wU :ϕ has an open branch.
Proof. Soundness is easy to see. Completeness is straightforward with the help
of Lemma 7.2.4: assume that a formula ϕ ∈ MLm(〈〈r〉〉) is not satisfiable in the
class of all models, while there is a saturated tableau T with root wU :ϕ and open
branch Γ; MΓ satisfies ϕ which contradicts the assumption. ✷
7.2.1 Showing termination
Finally, we are going to show that every tableau derivation is finite. Since the
tableau rules are all finitely branching, by Ko¨nig lemma [K0¨2], it suffices to see
that the construction of every branch terminates, or in other words, that every
saturated branch has finite length.
Given a prefixed formula ws:ϕ, with s being the flag R or U , we call ws the
prefix of ϕ.
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7.2.6. Definition. Given a tableau branch Γ and a prefix σ, the set of true
formulas at σ on Γ, written TΓ(σ), is defined as TΓ(σ) = {ϕ | σ:ϕ ∈ Γ}.
Notice that accessibility formulas are not included in TΓ(σ).
7.2.7. Lemma (Subformula Property). Let T be a tableau with the prefixed
formula σ0:ϕ0 as root. For any prefixed formula σ:ϕ occurring on T , ϕ is a
subformula of ϕ0.
Proof. This is easily seen by going through each of the tableau rules. ✷
7.2.8. Lemma. Let Γ be a branch of a tableau, and let σ be any prefix occurring
on Γ. Then the set TΓ(σ) is finite.
Proof. Let σ0:ϕ0 denote the root formula of Γ. From Lemma 7.2.7, we know
that TΓ(σ) ⊆ {ϕ | ϕ is a subformula of ϕ0}, and hence TΓ(σ) is finite. ✷
7.2.9. Definition. Let T be a tableau. If a prefixed formula τ :ψ of T has been
introduced by applying a rule to a premise σ:ϕ of T then we say that τ :ψ is
generated by σ:ϕ, and we write σ : ϕ ≺ τ :ψ.
7.2.10. Definition. Let Γ be a branch of a tableau. If a prefix τ has been
introduced to the branch by applying a rule to a premise σ:ϕ then we say that τ
is generated by σ on Γ, and we write σ ≺Γ τ .
Now we define a measure for the complexity of a prefixed formula:
7.2.11. Definition. Let T be a tableau, σ:ϕ be a prefixed formula occurring on
T and let |ϕ| denote the length of the ϕ. We define the complexity of σ:ϕ just in
terms of the length of ϕ, that is m(σ:ϕ) = |ϕ|.
Now we are going to show that the relationship ≺ defines a finitely branching
tree, where each branch has finite length.
7.2.12. Lemma (Decreasing length). Let T be a tableau. If σ:ψ ≺ τ :ϕ then
m(σ:ψ) > m(τ :ϕ).
Proof. This is straightforward by going through each of the tableau rules. ✷
7.2.13. Lemma (Finite branching). Let Γ be a branch of a tableau. For any
σ:ϕ ∈ Γ there is only a finite number of prefixed formulas τ :ψ ∈ Γ such that
σ:ϕ ≺ τ :ψ.
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Proof. For any given prefix σ the set TΓ(σ) is finite (Lemma 7.2.8). Additionally,
for each formula ϕ in TΓ(σ), with the only exception of (〈〈r〉〉), all the rules
generates at most one new deterministic prefix when applied to σ:ϕ, since the
first restriction imposed to the tableau construction requests that a formula is
never added to a tableau branch where it already occurs. For the (〈〈r〉〉) rule, the
second restriction limits to one the number of applications to σ:ϕ, and therefore
this rule generates exactly one new prefix for each formula. Thus, ≺ is finitely
branching. ✷
7.2.14. Theorem (Termination). Any tableau forMLm(〈〈r〉〉) built using the
rules presented in Figure 7.4 is finite.
Proof. Let σ0:ϕ0 be the root of a tableau T . Let us analyze the ≺ relationship
of possible derivations of σ0:ϕ0. By Lemma 7.2.13, the derivation tree is finitely
branching. By Lemma 7.2.12, each branch has finite length. By Ko¨nig Lemma,
the derivation tree is finite. ✷
7.3 Tableau or axiomatic systems?
To close this chapter it is worth making some final remarks. We have seen that
labeled tableau systems are a nice device for proof discovery. The ability to use
labels overcame the difficulty we faced with axiomatic systems to describe the
interaction between the memory operators©r and©k and the modal operator 〈r〉
without nominals.
Additionally, the tableau system we presented forMLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ) could shed
light on the task of discovering decidable (and interesting!) fragments of mem-
ory logics. The tableau rules we presented make explicit that a possible rea-
son for undecidability is the unrestricted application of (repl). As it was shown
in [AFGM09], limiting the number of applications of (repl) results in a terminating
(although incomplete) tableau system. However, we could not find a reasonable
fragment for which the restricted tableau is complete. One idea could be to re-
strict the class of models to the one where the number of cycles is bounded by a
fixed k. Within this class, perhaps bounding the number of applications of (repl)
to some number (that depends on k and the length of the input formula) would
be enough to have a complete and terminating tableau for that class of models.
The general question can be formulated as follows:
7.3.1. Question. Could the tableau rules presented for MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ) be
restricted in some way such that the resulting system is terminating and complete
for some reasonable class of models?
Finally, the above comments could give the feeling that tableau systems are
somehow “better” than axiomatic systems. As we said before, tableau systems
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are closer to the semantics, and therefore sometimes the interaction between
different operators is “hidden” in the derivation of a formula. On the other
hand, axiomatic systems usually show these interactions explicitly, and some logic
properties become clearer. For example, recall the axiomatization forMLm(〈〈r〉〉)
we presented in Section 6.3. The axiom Rem〈〈r〉〉 evidences that the effect of ©r
does not go beyond the propositional level. On the other hand, in the tableau for
MLm(〈〈r〉〉) we presented in Section 7.2, one may have to analyze the interaction
of the rules (〈〈r〉〉), ([[r]]) and (©r ) to notice that this property is present. Summing
up, tableau and axiomatic systems are just two different ways (among others) to
look at a characterization of a logic through a proof-theoretic device, and the
advantages of each method depends on the context of use.

Chapter 8
Conclusions
–Vengo a venderle sus u´ltimas palabras –dijo el hombre–. Son muy importantes porque
a usted nunca le van a salir bien en el momento, y en cambio le conviene decirlas en
el duro trance para configurar fa´cilmente un destino histo´rico retrospectivo.
–Traduc´ı lo que dice- mando´ el tiranuelo a su inte´rprete.
–Habla en argentino, Excelencia.
–¿En argentino? ¿Y por que´ no entiendo nada?
“Cuento sin moraleja”, Julio Corta´zar.
We have taken a sort of “logic tour” in our quest for a better understanding
of the memory logic family. We have visited different places, from which we have
gained new perspectives to look at these modal fragments and learn how they
behave in various situations. Like in any research work, we have left pending
issues, and in many aspects we have only taken the first steps in our exploratory
trip. We will continue working on this matter, to further expand our knowledge
on memory logics.
This thesis can be seen as a contribution to the general enterprise of finding
an appropriate logic for a specific task. The work we carried through can be
regarded as a validation of the claim that modal logics make up a nice framework
to combine different features, and that they offer a fine-grained set of tools that
allow the logician to customize his own logical system. We have tried to show that
there are many aspects that should be taken into consideration when designing a
logic: expressive power and its complexity counterpart, the presence or absence
of relevant meta-logical properties, and its characteristics from a proof-theoretic
perspective.
We can also look at this work from the opposite perspective, and consider
it as a way to measure the maturity of the modal logic tools that are currently
available. Are really modal logics a plug-and-play system, in which a logician
can choose between a menu of available features, understanding its pros and
cons? Given a new modal logic family, as it was our case with memory logics,
how developed are the tools to analyze it? How easy is this task? Are there
standard procedures one can “run” on a logic to determine its properties? Of
course, we do not have conclusive answers to these questions, but it is a good
exercise to consider these concerns in the context of what we have done. Looking
at the things we learned during this work, there are many useful “off-the-shelf”
techniques to use, but the field of logic design is still young and there is a long
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way to go. Much effort is needed to analyze particular cases, and the standard
techniques only cover a part of the modal logic universe. Nevertheless, this is a
very active and evolving area, and in the future one can expect that, step by step,
more general questions are going to be answered.
8.1 A review of what we did
We started in Chapter 1 explaining why first order logic is not always the al-
ternative to use, and that the existence of a big universe of logics is justified by
different contexts of use, each of them with specific needs. For example, if we are
in a situation where we need a feasible inference method, first order logic is proba-
bly not a good choice. Since expressive power and complexity are usually related,
sometimes a less expressive logic is enough to model a particular problem, and
we do not have to pay the extra cost in complexity. This is a possible real-case
scenario for the applied computer science field, but there are other areas (like
philosophy, for example) in which one can look for logics with certain theoretical
properties, and where decidability is not of particular interest. The general aim
of the first part Chapter 1 was to explain that our interpretation of “need” is
quite general, and that we are interested both in practical and theoretical aspects
of a logic.
In this context, we presented modal logics as a family of languages that have
some characteristics in common: restricted quantification, characterizations of
fragments of first and second order logic, and decidability in many of the cases.
Modal logics can be regarded as a set of fine-grained tools for exploring the inner
structure of classical systems, providing a wide option of modal operators to
choose from. We presented some of them, in order to give an overview of the type
of languages we were dealing with. We presented the basic modal logic, and some
richer operators: the universal modality, since and until, and the ability to name
points in a model through nominals, which led us to hybrid logics and binders.
We then introduced memory logics, and the idea of adding an explicit memory
to Kripke models. We gave further details about this family in Chapter 2, fixing
a set as the storage structure. We showed some examples using ©r and ©k , the
usual operators on sets that add elements and test membership. We also studied
some variations within this schema: we proposed other operators, like©e and ©f ,
we distinguished the class C∅, a natural way to start evaluating a formula with
an empty memory, and we looked at certain restrictions in the interplay between
memory and modal operators, like the 〈〈r〉〉 operator. In short, we showed that
adding an explicit memory to Kripke models incorporates a new factor to consider,
that can be used as a new ingredient to design a “made-to-fit” modal logic.
As we said before, this new family of logics can be seen as a way to model
dynamic behavior through explicit memory operators that change the evaluating
structure. But we can look at this approach from another perspective, that shows
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that modal logic is an effective aid to think in new ways of decomposing operators
which at first glance seem to be performing atomic actions. An example of this is
the way hybrid logics help to see the classical ∀ operator. One can reconsider the
action that ∀ performs on a model as two separate things: the ability to reach
all the elements in a model plus a way to name each of these elements. This can
be modeled in hybrid logics with the universal modality A, plus the downarrow
binder ↓, allowing the possibility to choose which specific aspects of ∀ we want in
our custom logic. A similar thing occurs with memory logics, and we can break
down the ↓ binder and the actions that it performs on the assignment function g
from a similar perspective: g can be regarded as a sophisticated memory structure
with unbounded size, direct access to all its memory cells, and where each stored
element can be unequivocally retrieved. With this new insight, we can choose
which type of storage we want to have, and therefore discover new ways of binding
elements. Given that the addition of ↓ generally leads to undecidability, this
perspective is particularly interesting.
In Chapters 3 and 4 we investigated the expressive power and the decidability
of different combinations of memory operators. To start the analysis we defined an
appropriate notion of bisimulation, which allowed us to compare the expressivity
among memory fragments. Bisimulations turned out to be a very useful tool,
and the definition we proposed for each memory fragment ended up being a quite
natural extension (once we understood them) of the bisimulation definition for
the basic modal logic.
The results from Chapter 3 followed in general the intuitions: we have weak-
ened the “storage structure” of ↓, and now having a set as memory, we cannot
unequivocally retrieve elements anymore. Consequently, we proved that all the
memory fragments we studied (up to MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f )) are less expressive than
HL(↓). To be more precise, we could prove that MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ) < HL(↓) and
MLm∅ (〈r〉,©e ,©f ) ≤ HL(↓), but we believe that ML
m
∅ (〈r〉,©e ,©f ) 6= HL(↓) also
holds, only that the models needed to show this are a little more involved. We
also proved that the weakest memory fragment we defined,MLm(〈〈r〉〉), is already
strictly more expressive than the basic modal logic. We also analyzed other stor-
age structures. It is quite obvious to see that using a list (and the usual operators
to manipulate it) gives us the expressive power of ↓, so we wanted to try other
structures. We analyzed then the case of using a stack. This result came as a
surprise, since we expected to have a weaker logic than HL(↓), but we proved
that MLst∅ (〈r〉) = HL(↓). The explanation can be found in the translation we
used to encode HL(↓) into MLst∅ (〈r〉): we expected to “lose” elements when
popping the top of the stack, but in fact the ability to “clone” the current stack
gave us the capacity to keep a complete mapping of points. Summing up, the
results we found in this section were quite promising, in the sense that adding
a memory to Kripke models does make a difference in terms of expressivity. In
this first exploratory trip, we found several fragments that allowed to gradually
increase the expressive power, starting with the basic modal logic and ending up
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with HL(↓).
In terms of decidability, if we had to draw a general conclusion looking at
the results shown in Chapter 4, we would say that although we have tamed the
binding power of ↓ by changing the storage structure to a weaker one, expressivity
is still very strong among memory logics. Most of the fragments turned out
to be undecidable, and undecidability came in general with the ability to force
cycles in a model. The examples of MLm(〈〈r〉〉) plus one single nominal and
MLm∅ (〈〈r〉〉) are quite representative in that sense. The only decidable (in fact
pspace-complete) fragments we found wereMLm(〈〈r〉〉) andMLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) (this
last fragment turned out to be equivalent to MLm(〈〈r〉〉)). The key attribute we
used to prove this was the tree model property ofMLm(〈〈r〉〉), and this property
was immediately lost when we forced the initial memory to be empty, or we added
a nominal to the language. Furthermore, although MLm(〈〈r〉〉) is strictly more
expressive than the basic modal logic, the additional expressive power provided
by ©r and ©k in this case was quite weak: the effect of ©r can be thought of
as restricted just to the current evaluating point. This can be understood as
a symptom that we have minimized the strength of ©r and ©k , and that the
contribution they make in terms of expressive power is not very relevant. In
many ways,MLm(〈〈r〉〉) is very much alikeML, as we will discuss looking at the
results found in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
Chapter 5 is devoted to study Craig interpolation and Beth definability. We
showed that interpolation fails for most of the memory fragments we defined.
The technique we used to prove that a valid formula ϕ → ψ has an interpolant
is quite standard. We reused the bisimilar models we had found in Chapter 3
and we adapted them to the common language of ϕ and ψ. The exception was
MLm(〈〈r〉〉), who has interpolation over propositional symbols and known. We
followed here an adaptation of the technique presented in [tC05]. The main ad-
vantage of this technique is that it is purely model-theoretical, and does not
need an axiomatic system (which we do not have, as we saw in Chapter 6). We
could have used a tableau system instead, which we do have, but it was interest-
ing to explore how MLm(〈〈r〉〉) behaved with respect to some model theoretical
concepts, such as ω-saturatedness and bisimulation products. We then analyzed
Beth definability. Since interpolation and Beth are properties which are usually
present (or absent) at the same time, we expected to have Beth for MLm(〈〈r〉〉).
The problem we faced here was that the standard technique to prove Beth having
interpolation fails, mainly because in the context ofMLm(〈〈r〉〉) the [[r]] operator
memorizes the current point of evaluation before performing a modal transition.
We could not find a proof for Beth for this fragment, but we stated a conjec-
ture from which the standard technique can be re-adapted. We also showed a
quite general class of models where Beth definability fails for all the memory
fragments we studied. There does not seem to be a standard way to disprove
Beth definability, and definitively this aspect of memory logics deserves further
analysis.
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In Chapters 6 and 7 we analyzed memory logics from a proof theoretical
perspective. We explored there axiomatizations and tableau characterizations
for different memory fragments. These chapters show the main differences among
both proof systems. While in axiomatic systems the interactions among operators
is showed explicitly, it is not always easy to describe the behavior of an operator in
terms of the other. This was case the case forMLm(〈r〉), where we could not find
an axiomatic characterization. This problem was “cured” when we introduced
nominals. The extra expressive power that nominals provide allowed to find
sound and complete axiomatic systems for all the hybrid memory fragments we
defined. Even more, using standard hybrid techniques, we could prove automatic
completeness for pure formulas (and ©k -pure formulas for the class C∅). The
tree model property was helpful again here, and we could also find a complete
axiomatization for MLm(〈〈r〉〉), even without nominals. A complete axiomatic
system for MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) was also easy to find, given the equivalence we found
in Chapter 4 between MLm(〈〈r〉〉,©f ) and MLm(〈〈r〉〉).
On the other hand, the prefixed labeled tableau systems we developed in
Chapter 7 overcame the difficulty we faced with axiomatic systems to describe
the interaction between the memory operators ©r and ©k and the modal oper-
ator 〈r〉 without nominals. As we already said in that chapter, this is mainly
because labels act as “external” nominals in the tableau rules. We presented a
unified tableau system for MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ) that works for both the class of all
models and C∅. As it is usually the case with tableaus, there are specific rules
for each logic operator, and therefore dropping the appropriate rules we could
find sound and complete tableaus for sub-languages of MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ). Given
that all these logics are undecidable, these systems are of course non-terminating.
We also presented a sound, complete and terminating tableau for MLm(〈〈r〉〉),
making strong use, again, of the tree model property. Both forMLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f )
andMLm(〈〈r〉〉) we extended the classic tableau system for the basic modal logic,
but of course in the case of MLm(〈r〉,©e ,©f ) we needed a more involved prefix,
since there was more information we needed to carry throughout the derivation.
Prefixed tableaus turned out to be a very flexible method to provide characteri-
zations, and they adapted quite well to these logics.
8.2 How do we continue?
There are many pending issues to analyze, and as we said in the first part of
this chapter, we are just at the beginning of our trip. We left some explicit
open questions during the development of this dissertation, many of them rather
technical, and we are not going to repeat them here. We want instead to set up
further lines of research from a more abstract perspective.
We said that memory logics are a particular type of dynamic logics, and that
the idea of modifying a model when evaluating a formula is not new. Nevertheless,
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memory logics do not bound the analysis to any fixed domain, and as we said
before, most of the work that has been done in this direction implicitly adds
some specific built-in behavior to the evolution of a model. Although we have
connected memory logics with the basic modal logic and hybrid logics, we have
not explored the connection with other dynamic logics. We want to examine
this issue in order to “test” how general is our framework, and how flexible is to
adapt to other type of needs where a specific domain is present. There are many
types of dynamic logics to look for, but dynamic epistemic logics seem to be a
good starting point. A possible connection may be in the line of the ideas we
presented in Section 2.1.2, where we introduced an operator that every time we
make a modal transition, all the points that satisfy some semantic condition are
added to the memory. This could be a way to model epistemic states through a
memory. There is also related work in [ABdCH09]. Although different in spirit,
the family of logics presented there study graph modifiers and some connections
with logics of public announcements and hybrid logics.
There is also the decidability issue, which is always present from the computer
scientist perspective. As we mentioned in the previous section, the restrictions
we imposed to©r and©k to have decidability were perhaps overkilling, and other
approaches can be examined. One line of research was suggested in Chapter 7,
where we conjecture that restricting the class of models to one where models
have a bounded (but fixed) number of cycles can led to a decidable fragment.
In a more general way, analyzing different classes of models is always a good
attempt, since it is possible to find very reasonable classes to work with, where
decidability results can be established. Other line is to work with the storage
structure. Although a set seems to be already a quite weak structure, we can
think, for example, in restricting the set operators to allow to check whether a
given point is in the memory, but to forbid knowing if a point is not memorized.
This of course implies syntactic restrictions in the language. Finally, we can try
to connect memory logics with the work with modal logics with concrete domains
(like TPTL, see [AH89b], or description logics with concrete domains [Lut03]).
The idea here is that instead of storing points of a model, one can store values that
are associated to the points. These values can represent any concrete magnitude,
like weight, temperature, time, etc. and the concrete part of the language provides
operators to deal with this magnitudes and functions to map each point to its
associated value. This idea can be regarded as another way of weakening the
storage structure, given that values do not identify points, as many points can
have the same associated value. In [AH89b] some decidability results have been
established using the so-called freeze operator (that can be thought of as the
version of ↓ that deals with values instead of points). Nevertheless, this result
is achieved imposing strong restrictions on the Kripke model and the type of
concrete domain to use. We can try to release some of those constraints by
replacing the freeze operator with a memory that stores concrete magnitudes and
appropriate operators to handle these values.
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